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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the history of humankind, people have been fascinated by 
the factors that drive human behavior. Clinicians try to understand the 
mechanisms that drive pathological behavior, politicians want to know how they 
can influence the voting behavior in their electorate, and marketers aim at 
influencing consumer behavior. As argued by Allport (1935), likes and dislikes are 
important determinants of behavior. Indeed, our interpersonal interactions, the 
activities we pursue, the products we buy, etc., are all, to some extent, guided by 
our personal likes and dislikes. Moreover, there is ample evidence showing that 
(most) likes and dislikes are acquired over time rather than innate (Rachman, 
1977; Walther, Nagengast, & Trasselli, 2005). This means, that we cannot only 
measure likes and dislikes in order to predict behavior, insights in the 
mechanisms underlying attitude acquisition and attitude change might also 
enable us to influence behavior. It may come as no surprise then, that likes and 
dislikes, also referred to as evaluations or attitudes, have become a central area 
of interest in psychological research. 
Traditionally, likes and dislikes were measured by asking participants to 
conduct and report a self-assessment of their likes and dislikes, e.g., by means of 
a questionnaire. Participants might be asked, for example, to evaluate the 
sentence ”I like fruit” on a scale from one (strongly disagree) to ten (strongly 
agree). These so-called explicit measures have been criticized, however, because 
they do not only depend on the goodwill of participants to express their likes and 
dislikes but also on their ability to express them (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald 
& Banaji, 1995). Moreover, during the past decades, it has become increasingly 
clear that behavior is not only determined by explicit likes and dislikes but also 
by implicit likes and dislikes, that is, the spontaneous evaluative reactions that 
objects, persons, or situations evoke. These insights led to the development of a 
new class of measurement techniques that do not rely on direct verbal reports 
but aim to capture spontaneous evaluative reactions. The advantage of these so-
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called implicit measurement techniques is twofold. First, implicit attitude 
measures make it harder for participants to misreport their likes and dislikes. 
Second, participants do not have to rely on introspection to assess their own 
likes and dislikes. As an example, consider the evaluative priming paradigm 
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). In this paradigm, participants are 
typically asked to evaluate a series of target stimuli (e.g., a picture of a cute 
kitten) as being positive or negative. Each target stimulus is preceded by the 
presentation of a task-irrelevant prime stimulus (e.g., a picture of a spider). 
Crucially, the evaluative congruence between prime and target stimuli is 
manipulated: the primes and the targets share the same evaluative tone on 
some trials (hereafter referred to as congruent trials, e.g., the prime word 
‘kitten’ followed by the target word ‘cute’), but differ in evaluative tone on other 
trials (hereafter referred to as incongruent trials, e.g., the prime word ‘kitten’ 
followed by the target word ‘nasty’). Typically, performance is facilitated on 
congruent trials as compared to incongruent trials (i.e., faster responses and less 
errors). The evaluative priming paradigm can be used to measure evaluative 
reactions to attitude objects by presenting attitude-relevant stimuli as primes. 
For example, by presenting pictures depicting spiders as primes, one could 
measure likes and dislikes toward spiders. Other, well-known examples of these 
implicit measurement techniques are the Implicit Association Test (IAT, 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the Affect Misattribution procedure 
(AMP, Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), the Extrinsic Aﬀective Simon 
task (EAST, De Houwer, 2003), and many others (see Fazio & Olson, 2003; Nosek, 
Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011 for a review). 
 In this chapter, I will first elaborate on the hypothesis that evaluative 
information processing occurs unconditionally (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Barlett, 1932; 
Lazarus, 1966; Wundt, 1907). Next, I will introduce the feature-specific attention 
allocation (i.e., FSAA) framework to account for the observation that automatic 
evaluative stimulus processing is modulated by selective attention allocation. I 
will then discuss recent studies demonstrating the moderating role of FSAA on 
the acquisition of likes and dislikes. Finally, based on the FSAA framework, I will 
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present new predictions concerning the measurement and modification of 
spontaneous likes and dislikes and how these new ideas were tested during my 
research project. 
Feature-Specific Attention Allocation modulates automatic evaluative 
processing 
Various influential researchers have proposed that evaluative processing 
occurs in an unconditional and automatic fashion (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Barlett, 
1932; Lazarus, 1966; Wundt, 1907). However, it wasn’t until Zajonc (1980) 
published his seminal work on the primacy of evaluative judgments that the 
‘automatic evaluative processing hypothesis’ was scrutinized systematically. The 
majority of knowledge concerning automatic evaluative stimulus processing has 
been derived from experiments using the evaluative priming paradigm (Fazio et 
al., 1986). The evaluative priming effect can come about only if participants 
process the evaluative tone of the task-irrelevant primes and can thus be used as 
an index of evaluative stimulus processing. By examining the conditions under 
which this effect can be obtained, one can thus learn about the conditions under 
which evaluative stimulus processing can occur. Numerous experiments with the 
evaluative priming paradigm have confirmed that humans can indeed process 
the evaluative tone of a stimulus under automaticity conditions (Moors & De 
Houwer, 2006). For example, Hermans, De Houwer, and Eelen (2001) showed 
that the evaluative priming effect takes place at a very short time interval (i.e., 0 
ms) between the onset of the prime stimulus and the onset of the target 
stimulus. The occurrence of the evaluative priming effect at short stimulus onset 
asynchronies (i.e., SOA) is generally considered as evidence that stimulus 
evaluation is a fast process (Klauer, Roßnagel, & Musch, 1997). Moreover, the 
evaluative priming effect has been found even when participants were not 
instructed to evaluate stimuli (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; 
Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002), or when stimulus duration 
prohibited the conscious perception of the stimulus (Draine & Greenwald, 1998; 
Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995). Finally, the magnitude of the evaluative 
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priming effect is unaffected by a mental load (e.g., remembering a series of digits 
during performance of the evaluative priming task), suggesting that evaluative 
processing is not dependent on the availability of cognitive resources (Hermans, 
Crombez, & Eelen, 2000).  
However, despite numerous studies attesting to the unconditional, 
automatic nature of evaluative processing (see Klauer & Musch, 2003), Spruyt 
and colleagues demonstrated that the evaluative tone of a prime stimulus is 
processed only under conditions that maximize selective attention for the 
evaluative stimulus dimension (Everaert, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2013; Spruyt, De 
Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007; Spruyt, 
Klauer, Gast, De Schryver, & De Houwer, 2015; Spruyt & Tibboel, 2015; Spruyt, 
2014). For example, in a seminal paper, Spruyt et al. (2009) used a pronunciation 
task to examine the influence of FSAA on the occurrence of the evaluative 
priming effect. Because participants are asked to name target stimuli in the 
pronunciation task, this task does not induce a particular semantic processing 
mindset. In this sense, the pronunciation task is semantically neutral. 
Pronunciation trials were embedded in a context of either evaluative or non-
evaluative semantic categorization trials. More specifically, participants were 
asked to categorize target stimuli according to their valence (i.e. positive or 
negative) or animacy (i.e., animal or object) and were thus encouraged to assign 
selective attention to evaluative or non-evaluative semantic stimulus features, 
respectively. Results revealed an evaluative but no non-evaluative priming effect 
on the pronunciation trials if participants assigned selective attention to 
evaluative features on the categorization trials. In contrast, a non-evaluative 
priming effect was found if participants were encouraged to assign selective 
attention to non-evaluative semantic stimulus features. In line with these 
findings, other markers of automatic evaluative stimulus processing have also 
been found to depend on the extent to which attention is assigned to the 
evaluative stimulus dimension, including the dot probe effect (Everaert et al., 
2013), the emotional stroop effect (Everaert et al., 2013), and the P3a evoked by 
unexpected emotional stimuli (Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, Pourtois, & De Houwer, 
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2013). Moreover, similar effects have been found in the domain of non-
evaluative semantic processing. In three ERP studies, Kiefer and Martens (2010) 
showed a masked semantic priming effect (N400) if participants were 
encouraged to assign attention to (non-evaluative) semantic stimulus features. 
However, the masked semantic priming effect was abolished if participants were 
encouraged to assign attention to perceptual stimulus features (for related 
findings see also Ansorge, Kunde, & Kiefer, 2014; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Kiefer, 
2012; Martens & Kiefer, 2009). 
The modulation of evaluative processing by FSAA is readily explained by 
the FSAA framework developed by Spruyt and colleagues (Everaert et al., 2013; 
Spruyt et al., 2009, 2007). Drawing on the Generalized Context Model (GCM) of 
classification (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Nosofsky, 1984, 1986; see also Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978) the FSAA framework states that stimulus dimensions are 
processed only if and to the extent that they are selectively attended to. In 
addition, selective attention assignment is assumed to be dependent upon 
current goals and task demands. The FSAA framework can be conceptualized by 
representing stimuli in a multidimensional space. Each dimension of this space 
corresponds to a specific stimulus feature and the structure of the space 
depends on the focus of selective attention. More specifically, selective attention 
assignment stretches the space along the attended dimension whereas the space 
along unattended dimensions shrinks (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; see also Carrol 
& Wish, 1974; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Medin, 1983; Nosofsky, 1984; Reed, 
1972; Tversky, 1977). As a result, the saliency of the attended dimension will 
increase. Differences along the attended dimension become more apparent 
whereas differences along unattended dimensions become less salient. This 
principle is illustrated in Figure 1 taken from Everaert (2012).  
Direct support for the FSAA framework was provided in a unpublished 
study conducted in our lab (Everaert, 2012) in which participants were asked to 
categorize computer-generated faces either in terms of emotional expressions 
(i.e., the emotion group) or in terms of age (i.e., the age group). Intermixed with 
these categorization trials, participants were presented with similarity judgments  
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Figure 1. Hypothetical example of the multidimensional representation of 
feature-specific attention allocation. Each section shows a two-dimensional 
space in which the horizontal axis reflects the evaluative stimulus dimension 
whereas the vertical axis reflects the animacy dimension. Figures are stimuli 
taken from Spruyt et al. (2007). Panel A depicts the two-dimensional space under 
the assumption that attention is distributed equally across the two stimulus 
dimensions. Panel B shows the effect of feature-specific attention allocation 
towards the evaluative stimulus dimension. Panel C shows the effect of feature-
specific attention allocation towards the animacy dimension. 
 
trials. During these similarity judgment trials, participants were asked to judge 
the similarity between pairs of faces. Using INDSCAL, a multidimensional scaling 
approach, these similarity judgment ratings were transformed into attention 
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weights representing the amount of attention assigned to different stimulus 
features by a given individual. It was shown that the emotion group and the age 
group assigned different weights to the two stimulus features. Whereas the 
emotion group assigned greater weight to the emotion dimension as compared 
to the age dimensions, the age group assigned greater weight to the age 
dimension as compared to the emotion dimension. It should be noted that the 
FSAA framework is not limited to stimuli with an evaluative tone but generalizes 
to non-evaluative stimuli (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986). 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEATURE-SPECIFIC ATTENTION ALLOCATION 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ACQUISITION, MODIFICATION, AND MEASUREMENT OF LIKES 
AND DISLIKES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
Given that FSAA impacts automatic evaluative processing, the question 
arises whether FSAA can also modulate the acquisition of likes and dislikes, their 
measurement, and the degree to which they can be changed. Interestingly, Gast 
and Rothermund (2011) provided evidence that the acquisition of likes and 
dislikes can be moderated by FSAA. They examined the influence of attentional 
focus on the occurrence of the evaluative conditioning (i.e., EC) effect. In a 
typical EC study, a neutral stimulus is paired with a stimulus that has a clear 
positive or negative meaning. The EC effect refers to the shift in valence of the 
initial neutral stimulus (i.e., Conditioned Stimulus or CS) toward the valence of 
the positive or negative stimulus (i.e., Unconditioned Stimulus or US) with which 
it was jointly presented. This phenomenon has now been replicated in a large 
number of studies (for a review, see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & 
Crombez, 2010). In one seminal study, Gast and Rothermund (2011) intermixed 
EC trials with categorization trials in which participants were asked to judge the 
CS-US pair based on their evaluative features or a non-evaluative semantic 
feature. Thus, participants were encouraged to selectively attend either to 
evaluative or non-evaluative stimulus features, respectively. Results revealed an 
EC effect if participants allocated selective attention to evaluative features 
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during the categorization trials. However, if participants assigned attention to 
non-evaluative semantic features, the EC effect was absent. This finding suggests 
that a person will learn about the evaluative tone of a new stimulus only if the 
person is in a evaluative mindset. Similar findings have been reported in the 
domain of classical conditioning. Olson, Kendrick, & Fazio (2009) showed that 
conditioning can be observed in the non-evaluative domain (e.g. size), if selective 
attention is allocated to these non-evaluative stimulus features during the 
conditioning procedure. Interestingly, recent studies of Spruyt et al. (2015) 
suggest that FSAA not only modulates the acquisition of likes and dislikes but 
also the generalization of recently acquired likes and dislikes to novel stimuli. In 
three EC studies, participants were presented with various CSs that could be 
classified in two subordinate categories (e.g., young men versus old women) 
based on two stimulus dimensions (i.e., age and gender). Either during (i.e., 
Experiment 1 and 2) or before (i.e., Experiment 3) the EC phase, participants 
were encouraged to assign attention to one of these stimulus dimensions. During 
a subsequent generalization test, novel stimuli were evaluated in a manner that 
was consistent with the acquired liking of those CSs that were similar in terms of 
the stimulus dimension that was selectively attended to during the evaluative 
conditioning phase. 
While Gast and Rothermund (2011) provided empirical evidence for the 
hypothesis that the acquisition of likes and dislikes is modulated by FSAA, the 
moderating role of FSAA on the measurement and modification of likes and 
dislikes has not been tested empirically. Therefore, in a first line of research of 
this project, we examined the modulating role of FSAA on the measurement of 
spontaneous likes and dislikes. We hypothesized that a higher predictive validity 
would be found for implicit attitude measurement techniques in which 
participants are not encouraged to assign attention to evaluative semantic 
stimulus features relative to implicit measurement techniques in which 
participants are encouraged to attend to evaluative stimulus features.  
This hypothesis was based on the assumption that individuals will not only 
differ in the extremity or direction of their likes and dislikes but are also likely to 
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differ in the extent to which selective attention assignment is required to 
automatically process the evaluative tone of attitude objects. For instance, 
spider-fearful participants might not only evaluate spiders as more negative than 
control participants (Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2006), they might also show 
negative reactions to spiders even though current task-demands require them to 
assign selective attention to non-evaluative stimulus features. In line with this 
idea, numerous studies have shown that FSAA is governed by personal goals. 
FSAA can be driven by explicit task instructions (Everaert, 2012; Spruyt et al., 
2009) or more subtle aspects of the task design (Everaert, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 
2011). In addition, one can expect stable inter-individual differences in the 
extent to which selective attention is assigned to certain stimulus dimensions. In 
line with this reasoning, it has been observed that socially anxious individuals 
show a greater emotional Stroop effect for words related to social threat relative 
to physical threat whereas individuals experiencing anxiety concerning physical 
dangers show a greater emotional Stroop effect for words related to physical 
threat compared to social threat (Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). In 
addition, multidimensional scaling studies have shown that individuals with 
bulimic symptoms assign greater weight to stimulus dimensions reflecting body 
size than individuals without bulimic symptoms (Viken, Treat, Nosofsky, McFall, 
& Palmeri, 2002). Likewise, Cavanagh and Davey (2001) demonstrated that 
spider-fearful participants assign greater weight to the evaluative stimulus 
dimension than fearless participants. Fazio and Dunton (1997) observed a 
correlation between spontaneous racial bias (as measured with the evaluative 
priming paradigm) and the degree of attention assigned to a race-related 
stimulus dimension (indexed using the INDSCAL algorithm). In accordance with 
the FSAA framework, these findings suggest that attitude objects might indeed 
trigger evaluative processing in an automatic fashion, provided that their 
personal relevance is sufficiently high. It can thus be hypothesized that inter-
individual differences in implicit evaluation will be most outspoken under 
conditions that promote selective attention for a non-evaluative stimulus 
feature. This idea is related to theories concerning the importance of attitude 
accessibility, i.e., the strength of the object-evaluation association (Fazio, 2001; 
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Fazio, 1990). Likes and dislikes high in accessibility are assumed to be easily 
activated upon the mere perception of a stimulus whereas likes and dislikes low 
in accessibility are less likely to become activated from memory upon the 
perception of a stimulus. Interestingly, it has been shown that highly accessible 
likes and dislikes are usually personally relevant (Bizer & Krosnick, 2001; 
Krosnick, 1989). Based on the FSAA framework, it could be suggested that 
evaluative features of highly accessible likes and dislikes are processed in an 
automatic and unconditional fashion because the attitude-relevant stimulus 
features are chronically attended to. 
In Chapter 2, we discuss two studies designed to investigate the 
moderating role of FSAA on the measurement of spontaneous likes and dislikes. 
In the first study, we presented participants with a picture-picture naming task in 
which targets were to be named on 50% of the trials. This task was used to 
measure implicit likes and dislikes toward fruit and candy. On the remaining 50 % 
of the trials, a green or purple rectangle surrounding the target was presented, 
indicating that a categorization task was to be performed. Participants were 
either asked to categorize stimuli according to valence (i.e., the evaluative 
condition), animacy (i.e., the semantic condition), or the color of the surrounding 
rectangle (i.e., non-semantic condition) and were thus encouraged to assign 
selective attention to evaluative stimulus features, non-evaluative semantic 
features or perceptual features, respectively. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were presented with some pieces of fruit and candy as a little thank-
you present and were informed that they could choose one item to take home. 
We hypothesized to observe higher predictive validity in the semantic and non-
semantic condition relative to the evaluative condition.  
In the second study, participants performed both an evaluative 
categorization task and a semantic categorization task. Thus, participants were 
encouraged to assign attention to either evaluative or non-evaluative semantic 
stimulus features, respectively. Both tasks were designed to measure 
spontaneous likes and dislikes of spiders. At the end of the experiment, 
participants performed a behavioral assessment task (i.e., BAT) to assess how 
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close participants were willing to approach a living spider. Similar to Experiment 
1, we expected the predictive validity of semantic categorization task to be 
higher than the predictive validity of the evaluative categorization task. 
Importantly, the within-subjects design of Experiment 2 also enabled us to 
examine a second hypothesis. We predicted that spider-fearful participants will 
process the evaluative features of attitude-relevant stimuli independent of 
whether selective attention is focused on evaluative features or non-evaluative 
semantic stimulus features. Therefore, we predicted no difference between 
inter-individual difference scores obtained with the evaluative categorization 
task and inter-individual difference scores obtained with the semantic 
categorization task for spider fearful-participants. In contrast, for participants 
who were not afraid of spiders, we expected that the evaluative features of 
spider-related stimuli would be processed only if selective attention for the 
evaluative stimulus dimension is maximized (i.e., the evaluative categorization 
task). Consequently, we expected a significant difference between inter-
individual difference scores obtained in the evaluative categorization task and 
the semantic categorization task in control participants. 
One could argue that the participants tested in Chapter 2 were students for 
whom the tested attitude objects were not necessarily personally relevant. To 
meet this concern, we decided to test our hypothesis about the impact of FSAA 
and relevance on the predictive validity of implicit attitude measures using a 
meta-analytical approach. In Chapter 3, we describe a meta-analysis in which we 
compare the predictive validity of implicit measurement techniques that 
maximize selective attention assignment towards non-evaluative semantic 
features relative to implicit measurement techniques that maximize selective 
attention assignment towards evaluative stimulus features. Moreover, we 
empirically tested whether the effect of FSAA is modulated by the personal 
relevance of the attitude object. We did not expect relevance to be a significant 
moderator of predictive validity in implicit attitude measurements that maximize 
selective attention for evaluative stimulus features. However, we did expect that 
personal relevance would influence the effect of FSAA on the predictive validity 
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of implicit measures if participants are not encouraged to assign selective 
attention to the evaluative stimulus dimension. Finally, we also considered 
various other moderators that could influence the relationship between implicit 
likes and dislikes and behavior (e.g., the nature of the response task, the nature 
of the behavioral outcome, the domain of study).  
In a second line of research of the current project, we examined the impact 
of FSAA on the extinction of likes and dislikes. Research has shown that likes and 
dislikes are highly resistant to extinction (Craske, 1999; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; 
Krypotos, Arnaudova, Effting, Kindt, & Beckers, 2015), potentially because the 
spontaneous evaluative response that is evoked by an attitude object 
consistently reaffirms the evaluative tone of this object (Lewicki, Hill, & 
Czyzewska, 1992; Martin & Levey, 1978). Based on the FSAA framework, it can be 
hypothesized that an encounter with an attitude object is less likely to result in 
an evaluative response if attention is directed away from the evaluative stimulus 
dimension, and hence, that the extinction rate of likes and dislikes must be 
contingent upon the degree to which attention is assigned to other, non-
evaluative (semantic) stimulus features. 
In Chapter 4, the evaluative conditioning paradigm was used to examine 
the modulating role of FSAA on the extinction of recently acquired likes and 
dislikes. In a first experiment, CSs were abstract Gabor patches that varied along 
two orthogonal, perceptual dimensions (i.e., orientation and spatial frequency). 
We manipulated the extent to which participants assigned selective attention to 
one of these dimensions, both during the acquisition phase and the extinction 
phase of the experiment. During the acquisition phase, one of these perceptual 
features was predictive of the valence of the USs and participants were asked to 
categorize the CSs in terms of this feature. Next, participants performed an 
extinction phase in which CSs were presented alone. In the extinction phase, 
participants were encouraged to assign selective attention to the valence of the 
CSs (i.e., the evaluative condition), the perceptual stimulus feature that was 
correlated with valence in the acquisition phase (i.e., the relevant condition) or 
the stimulus feature that was unrelated to valence in the acquisition phase (i.e., 
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the irrelevant condition). To measure the effects of our FSAA-manipulation, 
extinction was assessed both post-acquisition and post-extinction through a 
measure of implicit evaluation (i.e., the Affect Misattribution Paradigm; Payne, 
Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) and explicit evaluative ratings. Extinction was 
expected to occur in the irrelevant condition but not in the evaluative condition. 
Because participants in the relevant condition were encouraged to assign 
attention to a stimulus feature that was related to valence, we expected 
extinction to be less pronounced in this condition relative to the irrelevant 
condition. 
In Chapter 5, the idea that FSAA impacts the extinction rate of likes and 
dislikes was again examined using pre-existing attitudes rather than attitudes 
created in the laboratory by means of an evaluative conditioning procedure. 
Participants were asked to categorize a series of real-life pictures according to 
either their valence (i.e., evaluative condition) or their animacy (i.e., semantic 
condition). Importantly, one fourth of our stimuli depicted spiders, thereby 
allowing for a test of the hypothesis that a manipulation of FSAA can be 
exploited as a means to reduce dislikes toward fearful stimuli. Following the 
exposure phase, participants were asked to complete the Affect Misattribution 
Procedure (i.e., the AMP), give evaluative ratings, and complete a stimulus-
response compatibility (i.e., SRC) task. It was expected that each of these 
measures would reveal less negative evaluations towards spiders in the Semantic 
Condition as compared to the Evaluative Condition. In addition, we included 
(novel) exemplars that were not presented during the exposure phase to 
examine the extent to which the impact of our manipulation would generalize to 
novel stimuli.  
In Chapter 6, we will briefly summarize the main findings of the 
dissertation project. In addition, we will discuss how our findings can serve to 
improve implicit measurement techniques of likes and dislikes. Finally, we will 
address the implications of our findings with regard to the modification of likes 
and dislikes as well as their therapeutic value.  
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THE MODERATING ROLE OF FEATURE-SPECIFIC ATTENTION 
ALLOCATION ON PREDICTIVE VALIDITY IN THE EVALUATIVE 
PRIMING TASK. 
In two experiments, we examined the impact of feature-specific attention 
allocation on the predictive validity of implicit attitude scores obtained with the 
evaluative priming paradigm. In Experiment 1, participants performed a picture-
picture naming task. Naming trials were intermixed with categorization trials in 
which participants were encouraged to selectively attend to either evaluative 
stimulus features, non-evaluative semantic stimulus features, or perceptual 
stimulus features. In Experiment 2, participants performed both an evaluative 
categorization task and a semantic categorization task and were thus 
encouraged to assign selective attention to evaluative features and non-
evaluative semantic features, respectively. Even though the experimental design 
of these experiments was quite different, their pattern of results were remarkably 
consistent. First, in both experiments, inter-individual difference scores obtained 
under conditions that maximized selective attention to evaluative stimulus 
features were unrelated to outcome measures. Second, we did observe a 
significant relationship between outcome measures and inter-individuals 
difference scores obtained under conditions that encouraged selective attention 
to non-evaluative semantic features. Interestingly, in both experiments, this 
relationship was opposite to what was predicted. That is, implicit likes were 
associated with avoidance behavior whereas implicit dislikes were associated 
2 
 with approach behavior. Potential underlying mechanisms of this unexpected 
finding are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Allport (1935) claimed that ‘attitudes drive behavior’, the 
measurement of likes and dislikes has become a major field of interest in the 
psychological research community. To capture those likes and dislikes, 
participants are typically asked to self-asses and report their likes and dislikes. 
These so-called ‘explicit attitude measures’ were soon criticized, however, as 
they allow for intentional misreports and capitalize on the ability of participants 
to self-assess their own likes and dislikes by means of introspection. Moreover, it 
has become clear that behavior is not only determined by explicit likes and 
dislikes but also by automatic evaluative reactions towards stimuli (hereafter 
referred to as implicit likes and dislikes).  
For these reasons, behavioral scientists have developed a class of 
measurement techniques that allow for the measurement of likes and dislikes in 
an indirect way, that is without the need to rely on self-reports by the 
respondent. As an example, consider the evaluative priming task developed by 
Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986). In this task, participants are 
asked to evaluate a series of target stimuli as positive or negative. Each target 
stimulus presentation is preceded by the presentation of a task-irrelevant prime 
stimulus (e.g., a picture of a spider). Performance is generally better when the 
evaluative tone of the prime stimulus and the target stimulus is congruent (e.g. 
spider-unhappy) as compared to when the evaluative tone of the prime-target 
pair is incongruent (e.g., spider-happy). This phenomenon is usually referred to 
as the evaluative priming effect and can be exploited as a means to capture 
implicit likes and dislikes towards the prime stimuli. For example, Fazio, Jackson, 
Dunton, and Williams (1995) adapted the evaluative priming task to measure 
inter-individual differences in racial prejudice. Faces of black and white 
individuals were presented as primes followed by positive and negative target 
adjectives. The extent to which racial information conveyed by the primes 
facilitated or interfered with target responding was then used as a measure of 
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the implicit likes and dislikes towards black and white individuals. Importantly, 
implicit likes and dislikes as measured by the evaluative priming task proved to 
be predictive of prejudiced behavior (i.e., duration of eye contact with a black 
person). This seminal finding demonstrated that the evaluative priming task can 
be used as a valid predictor of behavior and triggered a surge of studies 
examining the predictive validity of implicit measures in general. However, while 
demonstrations of the predictive validity of the evaluative priming paradigm 
continued to appear in the literature (see for example Degner, Wentura, 
Gniewosz, & Noack, 2007; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Frings & 
Wentura, 2003), the usefulness of the evaluative priming paradigm is not 
unequivocal. For example, it has been shown that the reliability of evaluative 
priming scores is (often) disappointingly low (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 
2000; Fazio & Olson, 2003, but see Vandromme, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2011). In 
addition, a recent meta-analysis conducted by Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, and 
Payne (2012) revealed that, taken together, the relationship between attitude-
relevant behavior and inter-individual difference scores obtained with the 
evaluative priming paradigm is relatively modest (i.e., r =.28 ). Finally, some 
studies were unable to replicate the relation between inter-individual difference 
scores obtained with the evaluative priming paradigm and behavior. For 
example, Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandekerckhove, and Eelen (2007) were 
unable to predict the choice between a piece of fruit or candy at the end of an 
experimental session on the basis of the implicit likes and dislikes towards fruit 
and candy as measured by the evaluative priming task. Similarly, Falk, Heine, 
Takemura, Zhang, and Hsu (2015) observed that implicit self-esteem as 
measured by the evaluative priming paradigm was unrelated to a wide range of 
behavioral outcomes (e.g., friend rating of self-competence, friend rating of self-
liking, friend rating of self-esteem, or the ambiguous statements task). To 
account for these inconsistent findings, it has been argued that the (predictive) 
validity of implicit measures in general and the evaluative priming paradigm in 
particular is dependent on moderating factors. Examples of such moderating 
factors include the motivation to control prejudice (Olson & Fazio, 2004), 
whether attitude measurement were administered in a stereotypically positive 
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context such as a basketball arena or a stereotypically negative context such as a 
slum (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001), and whether the examined stereotypical 
group seems homogenous or not (Lambert, Payne, Ramsey, & Shaffer, 2005). 
 The aim of the present study was to examine the influence of one other 
potential moderator of predictive validity in the evaluative priming paradigm, 
i.e., feature-specific attention allocation (hereafter referred to as FSAA). Whilst it 
is typically argued that evaluative stimulus information is processed in an 
unconditional and automatic fashion (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Barlett, 1932; Lazarus, 
1966; Wundt, 1907; Zajonc, 1980), recent evidence suggests that automatic 
stimulus evaluation is highly dependent on the degree to which attention is 
assigned to the evaluative stimulus dimension. The evaluative priming effect, for 
example, is typically obtained only if participants are encouraged to process all 
incoming stimulus information in an evaluative manner (e.g., Everaert, Spruyt, & 
De Houwer, 2016; Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer, 
Everaert, & Hermans, 2012; Spruyt, Klauer, Gast, De Schryver, & De Houwer, 
2015; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandromme, & Eelen, 2007; Spruyt & 
Tibboel, 2015; Spruyt, 2014, but see Becker, Klauer, & Spruyt, 2016). Likewise, 
FSAA has been shown to impact other markers of automatic evaluative 
processing, including the dot probe effect (Everaert, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2013), 
the emotional Stroop effect (Everaert, et al., 2013), and neuropsychological 
markers of implicit evaluation (Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, Pourtois, & De Houwer, 
2013). Similar effects have also been shown in the domain of automatic non-
evaluative semantic processing (e.g., Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Kiefer & Martens, 
2010; Kiefer, 2012; Martens & Kiefer, 2009).  
The observation that automatic evaluative stimulus processing is 
dependent upon FSAA has huge implications for the measurement and predictive 
validity of implicit attitude measures because individuals are likely to differ not 
only in the extremity and direction of their implicit likes and dislikes but also in 
the extent to which selective attention assignment is required to process the 
valence of attitude objects in an automatic fashion. For instance, abstaining 
smokers might not only have more favorable automatic affective reactions 
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towards cigarettes than non-smokers (e.g., Spruyt, Lemaigre, et al., 2015) but 
might also exhibit positive reactions to cigarettes even when current task-
demands require them to selectively attend to non-evaluative stimulus 
information. It can thus be hypothesized that inter-individual differences in 
implicit evaluation will be most outspoken under conditions that promote 
selective attention for a non-evaluative stimulus feature. 
Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandekerckhove, and Eelen (2007) provided 
preliminary evidence for the hypothesis that predictive validity of the evaluative 
priming task depends on FSAA. They showed that inter-individual diﬀerence 
scores obtained with an implicit measure in which participants were not 
encouraged to engage in evaluative stimulus processing (i.e., the picture-picture 
naming task) predicted behavior relatively well as compared to inter-individual 
diﬀerence scores obtained with implicit attitude measures in which attention to 
evaluative stimulus features was maximized (i.e., evaluative decision task and 
the implicit association test). 
 The hypothesis that FSAA moderates the predictive validity of the 
evaluative priming task was tested in two experiments. In Experiment 1, implicit 
likes and dislikes towards fruit and candy were examined using the picture-
picture naming task. We deliberately opted for the picture-picture naming task 
(hereafter referred to as PPNT) as this task does not induce a particular semantic 
processing mindset as participants are simply asked to name a series of target 
pictures. Participants were presented with target pictures that varied on two 
separable dimensions, i.e., valence and animacy. Target pictures were preceded 
by prime pictures depicting either fruit or candy. Target pictures were to be 
named as fast as possible unless they were surrounded by a colored rectangle. In 
this case, participants were asked to categorize target the pictures either 
according to their valence (i.e., evaluative condition), animacy (i.e., semantic 
condition), or the color of the surrounding rectangle (i.e., non-semantic 
condition). Thus, participants were encouraged to assign selective attention to 
the evaluative stimulus dimension, to a non-evaluative semantic stimulus 
dimension, or to a non-semantic, perceptual stimulus dimension, respectively. 
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Note that, although participants were encouraged to adopt a non-evaluative 
processing mindset in both the semantic and the non-semantic condition, these 
two conditions differ in a significant way. Whereas participants in the non-
semantic condition were encouraged to assign attention to the perceptual 
features of the target stimuli, participants in the semantic condition were 
encouraged to process non-evaluative, semantic stimulus information while 
ignoring the evaluative tone of these stimuli. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were presented with the choice between a piece of fruit or a candy 
bar. We expected that the relationship between the evaluative priming scores 
and the choice behavior would be dependent upon the degree to which 
participants assigned attention to the evaluative stimulus dimension. More 
specifically, we expected predictive validity of the evaluative priming scores to be 
higher in the non-semantic semantic condition and semantic condition compared 
to the evaluative condition. We had two distinct a priori hypotheses about the 
difference in predictive validity between the non-semantic condition and 
semantic condition. On the one hand, it is possible that inter-individual 
differences in automatic evaluative processing will be especially pronounced 
under conditions that maximize selective attention to non-evaluative semantic 
features as compared to conditions that maximize attention to semantically 
neutral stimulus features. In this case, we would expect higher predictive validity 
in the semantic condition as compared to the non-semantic condition. On the 
other hand, inter-individual differences in automatic evaluative processing might 
be suppressed if participants are encouraged to attend to a non-evaluative 
semantic stimulus feature. Consequently, we would expect higher predictive 
validity in the non-semantic condition as compared to the semantic condition. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants 
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One hundred and twenty-three participants (32 men, 91 women) at Ghent 
University with a mean age of 21.76 years (SD = 2.80 years) took part in the 
experiment in exchange for a payment of 4 €. In total, nine participants were 
excluded from the analysis. Two participants were excluded because more than 
one fourth of their data points (i.e., 26.6 % and 28.1 %) had to be removed due 
to errors, voice key failures, outliers, or responses given outside of the response 
window. Four other participants were excluded because their mean reaction 
time (i.e., 938 ms, 1011 ms, 1013 ms, and 1018 ms) exceeded the outlier 
criterion of 2.5 standard deviation above the sample mean (i.e., 682 ms). One 
other participant was excluded as he accidently tampered with the settings of 
the external voice key device in the middle of the experiment. Finally, two 
participants were excluded because they clearly stated that the evaluative 
nature of one of the target pictures was opposite to what was intended by the 
researcher. One of these participants had an allergy to latex, so she perceived a 
target picture depicting balloons as very negative. The other participant had a 
fascination with weapons and perceived a target picture depicting a gun as very 
positive. Note, however, that results were not contingent upon the inclusion or 
exclusion of these participants. Participants were randomly assigned to either 
the evaluative (n = 38), the semantic (n = 36), or the non-semantic (n = 40) 
condition. 
Materials 
On the basis of normative data collected by Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, 
& Eelen (2002), eight stimuli were selected to be used as targets. Several of 
these pictures originated from the International Affective Picture System (i.e., 
IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). Targets varied on two orthogonal 
dimensions, i.e., valence and animacy. On a scale ranging from very negative (-5) 
to very positive (+5), the mean evaluative ratings of the positive (M = 2.17, SD = 
0.40) and negative (M = -1.99, SD = 0.40) target pictures diﬀered signiﬁcantly,  
F(1, 6) = 103.09, p < 0.001. Mean evaluative ratings did not diﬀer between 
pictures depicting objects (M = -0.20, SD = 2.47) and pictures depicting living 
creatures (M = 0.38, SD = 2.43), F < 1. All target pictures could be named with a 
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single word (see Appendix). Two pictures depicting fruit (i.e., an orange and an 
apple), two pictures depicting candy (i.e., a Snicker and a Mars) and four pictures 
of neutral geometric stimuli (i.e., a square, a trapezium, a hexagon, and a 
diamond) were selected to serve as primes.  
The experiment was programmed in Aﬀect 4.0 (Spruyt, Clarysse, 
Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010). Response latencies were 
registered with an external voice key connected to the parallel port of an Intel 
Core Duo E8600 computer. All stimuli were presented against the black 
background of a 19 inch computer monitor (100 Hz) and were 512 pixels wide 
and 384 pixels high.  
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three practice phases followed by the 
experimental task. In the first practice phase, each target picture was presented 
together with its corresponding name. Participants were instructed to look 
attentively at the pictures and to remember the corresponding names as they 
would need to use these words to name the pictures correctly during the naming 
task. Each trial started with a 500-ms fixation cross followed by a blank screen for 
750 ms. Next, the target picture was presented until participants pressed the 
spacebar of the keyboard or 3000 ms elapsed. The next trial was initiated after 
an ITI that varied randomly between 500 and 1500 ms. Note, that the same ITI 
was used throughout the entire study. The second practice phase was equal to 
the first practice phase with the exception that the eight target pictures were 
now presented without the corresponding names written underneath them. 
Participants were instructed to name the target words as fast and accurately as 
possible by using the names learned during the first practice phase. Pictures 
were presented until participants gave a response or 4000 ms elapsed. Incorrect 
responses were corrected by the experimenter. The experimenter coded 
whether the microphone was triggered accurately and whether the participant 
had made a correct response. During the third practice phase, each target 
picture was presented twice (i.e., 16 trials). In half of these trials, participants 
were instructed to name the targets (i.e., naming trials). In the other half of the 
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trials, targets were surrounded by a colored rectangle (i.e., induction trials). 
Participants were instructed to categorize the target if it was surrounded by a 
colored rectangle and to name the target otherwise. Each target picture was 
presented once on a naming trial and once on an induction trial. The color of the 
rectangle was randomized and could either be green or purple. In the evaluative 
condition, participants were instructed to categorize the targets according to 
their valence (i.e., positive or negative). Participants in the semantic condition 
were instructed to categorize targets according to their animacy (i.e., alive or 
object). Finally, in the non-semantic condition, participants were instructed to 
categorize targets according to the color of the rectangle (i.e., green or purple). 
Targets were presented on the screen until a response was detected or 4000 ms 
elapsed. If an erroneous response was made, the experimenter corrected the 
participant.  
The procedure of the experimental task was identical to that of the third 
practice phase except that the target pictures were now preceded by prime 
pictures. Participants were informed that the prime pictures were irrelevant for 
the task at hand and could be ignored. The task consisted of 192 trials divided 
into two blocks of 96 trials each. In between blocks participants could take a 
small break. Within each block, each prime was combined four times with each 
target picture. Half of the trials required a naming response (i.e., naming trials) 
whereas a categorization response was required on the other trials (i.e., 
induction trials). Each trial started with the presentation of a ﬁxation cross in the 
center of the computer screen for 500 ms, followed by a 500 ms blank screen. 
Then, a prime picture was presented for 200 ms. After a delay of 50 ms, the 
target picture was presented, resulting in a stimulus onset asynchrony of 250 ms. 
The target picture remained on the screen until the participant gave a response 
or until 4000 ms elapsed.  
At the end of the experiment, participants were presented with a Fun-size 
Snickers candy bar, a Fun-size Mars candy bar, an apple, and an orange. 
Participants were informed that they could choose one of these objects to take 
home as a little thank-you present. We did not include self-reports of likes and  
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Table 1 
Number of participants choosing fruit or candy as a function of condition (% 
between brackets)  
 Choice behavior 
Condition Candy Fruit 
Evaluative  12 (31.58) 26 (68.42) 
Non-Semantic 20 (50.00) 20 (50.00) 
Semantic  13 (36.11) 23 (63.89) 
 
dislikes towards fruit and candy because we wanted to avoid interference 
between these explicit reports and choice behavior at the end of the experiment, 
and vice versa. 
Results 
Data Reduction and analysis.  
Only the data of the naming trials were analyzed. Neutral priming trials 
(neutral/negative and neutral/positive trials) were considered filler trials and 
were not included in the analysis. Furthermore, we excluded data from trials on 
which the voice key was improperly activated (4.53 %), an incorrect response 
was given (1.80 % in the evaluative condition, 0.66 % in the non-semantic 
condition, and 1.73 % in the semantic condition), or a response was given after 
the response deadline (0.04 % in the evaluative condition, 0.16 % in the non-
semantic condition, and 0.12 % in the semantic condition). Finally, we discarded 
all response latencies that deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations from a 
participant’s mean latency in a particular condition (see Ratcliff, 1993; 2.63 % in 
the evaluative condition, 2.44 % in the non-semantic condition, and 2.80 % in the 
semantic condition).  
For each individual participant, two difference scores were computed. 
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First, we subtracted the mean response latencies observed on trials consisting of 
a fruit-related prime and a positive target from the mean response latencies 
observed on trials consisting of a fruit-related prime and a negative target. 
Second, we subtracted the mean response latencies observed on trials consisting 
of candy-related prime and a positive target from the mean response latencies 
observed on trials consisting of a candy-related prime and negative target 
Finally, to obtain a relative preference score, the second difference score 
was subtracted from the first difference score. Hence, positive priming scores 
indicate a preference for fruit over candy. Because participants made a 
dichotomous choice between fruit and candy, logistic regression analyses were 
performed to investigate the predictive validity of the implicit attitude measure 
in each condition. 
Descriptive statistics 
As can be seen in Table 1, participants were more inclined to choose a 
piece of fruit instead of a piece of candy as a take-home present. Choice 
behavior did not differ between conditions, Χ²(2) = 3.01, p = 0.22. Overall, the 
implicit preference score was negative (i.e., -16 ms) and reliable, t(113) = -2.21, p 
< .05, d = -0.21. In sum, our sample showed an overall implicit preference for 
candy over fruit. Inter- individual difference scores were not dependent upon the 
condition factor, F < 1.  
The relationship between implicit attitudes and behavior 
The individual choices between fruit (coded as 1) and candy (coded as 0) 
were regressed onto the condition factor (evaluative condition vs. non-semantic 
condition vs. semantic condition) and the inter-individual difference scores. In 
isolation, neither the condition factor, Χ²(2) = 2.80, p = .25, nor the inter-
individual difference scores, Χ²(1) = 1.29, p = .26, were a reliable predictor of 
behavioral choice at the end of the experiment. However, as anticipated, the 
interaction between the two predictors did reach significance, Χ²(2) = 6.10, p < 
0.05. As expected, inter-individual difference scores as measured by the picture-
picture naming task were unrelated to behavior in in the evaluative condition, 
Χ²(1) = 0.17, p = .68, odds ratio (unit change) = 1.00. In contrast, the inter-
41  CHAPTER 2  
 
 
individual difference scores obtained in the semantic condition did prove to be 
related to behavior, Χ²(1) = 5.06, p < .05, odds ratio(unit change) = 0.99. 
Surprisingly, however, this effect was in the opposite direction of what one 
would expect: the more an inter-individual difference score was indicative of a 
preference for fruit over candy, the higher the probability that participants chose 
for candy at the end of the experimental session. In the non-semantic condition, 
there was no relationship between the behavioral outcome measure and the 
inter-individual difference scores, Χ²(1) = 2.17, p = .14, odds ratio (unit change) = 
1.01 
Discussion 
Earlier studies revealed that the extent to which an individual engages in 
automatic evaluative processing in the absence of an explicit evaluative 
processing goal depends on the personal relevance of the attitude objects. The 
higher the personal relevance of a particular attitude object, the more likely that 
one will process its evaluative connotation. Accordingly, in line with the FSAA 
framework developed Spruyt and colleagues (Everaert, et al., 2013; Spruyt et al., 
2007; 2009), one may predict that measures of implicit evaluation will be less 
indicative of behavioral outcomes if they are obtained under conditions that 
maximize selective attention for the evaluative stimulus dimension as compared 
to when they are obtained under conditions that require participants to focus 
selective attention on non-evaluative stimulus information. To test this 
hypothesis, we examined the impact of FSAA on the predictive validity of the 
PPNT, i.e., a variant of the evaluative priming task that does not induce a 
semantic processing mindset. Naming trials were intermixed with induction trials 
in which participants were encouraged to assign selective attention to evaluative 
features (i.e., evaluative condition), non-evaluative sematic stimulus features 
(i.e., semantic condition), or perceptual stimulus features (i.e., non-semantic 
condition). We expected that the predictive validity of the PPNT would be less 
pronounced in the evaluative condition relative to the semantic condition and 
the non-semantic condition. Two competing hypothesis could be postulated 
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about the difference in predictive validity between the semantic condition and 
the non-semantic condition. First, if inter-individual differences are most 
outspoken under conditions that maximize selective attention to non-evaluative 
semantic features as compared to conditions that maximize attention to 
semantically neutral stimulus features, we would expect higher predictive 
validity in the semantic condition as compared to the non-semantic condition. 
Second, inter-individual differences in automatic evaluative processing might be 
abolished if participants are encouraged to process non-evaluative semantic 
stimulus features but be unaffected if participants are encouraged to process 
non-semantic stimulus features. In this case, we would expect higher predictive 
validity in the non-semantic condition compared to the semantic condition. 
In line with our hypotheses, inter-individual difference scores obtained 
with the PPNT did not predict behavior in the evaluative condition. In contrast, 
the results obtained in the non-semantic condition were not in line with our 
expectations. Despite the fact that participants were not encouraged to assign 
attention to a non-evaluative stimulus dimension, no relationship was found 
between the inter-individual difference scores obtained in the PPNT and 
subsequent choice behavior. At least three different accounts can be proposed 
to explain this unexpected finding. First, it is possible that the evaluative tone of 
the primes was processed but simply did not influence the speed of target 
responding. According to a response-level account of evaluative processing, the 
evaluative priming effect occurs because the primes automatically activate 
response tendencies that interfere or facilitate responses to the target (Klauer, 
Roßnagel, & Musch, 1997; Rothermund & Wentura, 1998; Wentura, 2000). In the 
PPNT, such a response-level mechanism is unable to operate as each target 
stimulus requires a unique response. Therefore, if it is assumed that the 
evaluative priming effect can emerge only if there is overlap between the 
response set and the prime set, it is almost a trivial finding that no relationship 
was found between the outcome behavior and the evaluative priming scores. It 
must be emphasized, however, that in line with various other studies (e.g., De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001; De Houwer & Randell, 2004; Spruyt, et al., 
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2002), we did observe an overall preference for candy over fruit. This 
observation clearly shows that the PPNT did capture implicit evaluations and is 
therefore incompatible with the idea that evaluative priming effects can emerge 
only if there is dimensional overlap between the response and the prime set. 
Second, one may simply argue that the semantic condition included a 
relatively large proportion of participants that did not entertain pronounced likes 
and dislikes towards fruit and candy. Given our reasoning concerning the 
importance of personal relevance, such a scenario would imply that the 
evaluative priming scores were driven by implicit evaluations for only a limited 
number of participants. The likelihood of such a scenario seems rather small, 
however, given that participants were assigned to different conditions at 
random.  
Therefore, as a third and more likely explanation, one may argue that the 
requirement to engage in a shallow, non-semantic processing style hampered 
the semantic analysis of the primes in general. It is important to note that 
participants were unaware of the nature of the required response (i.e., color 
decision or picture naming) until the colored rectangle appeared around the 
target. Semantic information was thus task-irrelevant until the target in the 
naming trial was presented. One could thus argue that participants did not 
engage in semantic processing until the target in a naming trial was presented. 
However, such an explanation is at odds with studies showing processing of 
evaluative stimulus features even though participants were encouraged to assign 
attention to perceptual stimulus features (see for example Effting, Salemink, 
Verschuere, & Beckers, 2016; Peeters et al., 2013). Moreover, this account does 
not explain why inter-individual difference scores in our sample revealed a 
significant overall preference for candy over fruit. Indeed, a significant 
preference for either fruit or candy could have come about only if participants 
processed the evaluative features of prime stimuli. However, it should be noted 
that, although no significant difference in inter-individual difference scores 
between conditions was observed, the mean inter-individual difference score in 
the semantic condition was much smaller (i.e., - 9 ms) than the mean inter-
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individual difference scores in the non-semantic and evaluative condition (both - 
20 ms).  
Finally, In accordance with our hypotheses, individual difference scores 
obtained in the semantic condition were reliable predictors of choice behavior. 
To our surprise, however, the nature of this relationship was opposite to our 
predictions. The more inter-individual difference scores revealed a preference of 
fruit over candy, the higher the probability that participants chose a candy bar 
instead of a piece of fruit to take home. Given the unexpected nature of this 
observation, we were initially reluctant to give much weight to this isolated 
finding. We did, however, decide to conduct a follow-up study in order to verify 
whether this observation was a chance finding. In addition, we wanted to 
address a number of shortcomings of Experiment 1. 
First, given our reasoning concerning attitude importance, it seems key to 
examine implicit attitudes in participants for whom the tested attitude objects 
are of high personal relevance. One may question whether a study focusing on 
the implicit attitude towards fruit and candy in a random sample of (healthy) 
students meets this requirement (but see Spruyt, et al., 2007).  
Second, in Experiment 1, the behavioral outcome measure was a one-shot, 
binary decision between a piece of candy or a piece of fruit. Such a measure 
might be very sensitive to contextual factors. In Experiment 1, for example, we 
observed that participants were more likely to choose a piece of candy rather 
than a piece of candy in the morning, Χ²(1) = 6.42, p < .05. In Experiment 2, we 
opted for a measure that would be less sensitive to external influences in order 
to increase the reliability of the outcome measure.  
Finally, in Experiment 1, we deliberately opted not to administer explicit 
attitude measures because we did not want these explicit reports to interfere 
with choice behavior at the end of the experiment and vice versa. As a result, we 
were unable to ascertain that participant held strong likes and dislikes towards 
fruit and candy. To remove this problem, we did include explicit measures in 
Experiment 2.  
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EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2, we measured implicit likes and dislikes towards spiders in 
a group of spider-fearful participants and a control group. Participants 
performed two evaluative priming tasks designed to measure implicit likes and 
dislikes towards spiders. Importantly, participants were either asked to 
categorize target stimuli according to their evaluative features ( i.e., evaluative 
categorization task) or according to their non-evaluative semantic features (i.e., 
semantic categorization task) and were thus encouraged to assign attention to 
evaluative stimulus features and non-evaluative semantic features, respectively. 
At the end of the experiment, participants performed a behavioral assessment 
task (i.e., BAT) to assess avoidance behavior towards a living spider. We expected 
that inter-individual difference scores obtained with the semantic categorization 
task would show a more pronounced relation with BAT performance than inter-
individual difference score obtained with the evaluative categorization task. In 
addition, we expected that the degree to which the two tasks would produce 
similar inter-individual difference scores would be dependent upon the personal 
relevance of the prime stimuli. That is, we expected spontaneous evaluative 
processing of attitude objects to be independent of the requirement to focus 
attention on either non-evaluative or evaluative stimulus features in the spider-
fearful group. In contrast, we expected that individuals in the control group 
would be more likely to process the evaluative features of the attitude objects 
while performing the evaluative categorization task as compared to the semantic 
categorization task. In sum, we expected to observe a reliable difference 
between inter-individual difference scores obtained in the semantic condition 
and the evaluative condition in the control group only.  
Method 
Participants 
Forty spider-fearful students and 40 non-anxious controls at Ghent 
University took part in the experiment in exchange for a payment of 5 €. 
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Participants were selected based on their self-reported spider fear in a screening 
survey embedded in the web-based Experiment Sign-up site of Ghent University. 
Two participants were removed from the analyses because their overall error 
rate in the semantic categorization task (i.e., 18.75 % in both cases) exceeded the 
cutoff criterion which was set at 2.5 standard deviations of the mean number of 
errors in the semantic categorization task (i.e., 6.61 %). Two other participants 
were removed because their mean reaction time (i.e., 681 ms and 693 ms) in the 
evaluative categorization task exceeded 2.5 standard deviation of the mean 
reaction time) in the evaluative categorization task (i.e., 499 ms). Finally, one 
participant was removed because her mean number of errors in the evaluative 
condition (i.e., 25.78 %) exceeded 2.5 standard deviation of the mean number of 
errors in the evaluative categorization task (i.e., 7.48 %). Results were not 
contingent upon the inclusion or exclusion of these participants unless otherwise 
stated. 
Materials 
Based on norm data collected by Spruyt et al. (2002), four positive and four 
negative color pictures referring to either objects or living creatures were 
selected to be used as targets (See Appendix). Several of these pictures 
originated from the International Affective Picture System (i.e., IAPS; Lang et al., 
1999). On a scale ranging from -5 (“very negative”) to + 5 (“very positive”), the 
mean valence rating of negative targets was significantly smaller than zero, M = -
1.99, SD = 0.72, t(3) = -1.99, p < .05. The mean valence rating of positive targets 
was significantly larger than zero, M = 1.85, SD = 0.72, t(3) = 5.18, p < .05. Mean 
evaluative ratings did not diﬀer between pictures depicting objects (M = -0.52, 
SD = 2.10) and pictures depicting living creatures (M = 0.38, SD = 2.43), t < 1. 
Stimuli that were used as primes were four pictures depicting spiders, four 
pictures depicting presents, and two pictures depicting geometric stimuli (i.e., a 
square and a trapezium). All pictures were 512 pixels wide and 384 pixels high. 
Computer tasks were run on a Dell Optiplex GX520 computer. An Affect 4.0 
program (Spruyt et al., 2010) controlled the presentation of the stimuli as well as 
the registration of the responses. Stimuli were presented against the black 
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background of a 19 inch computer monitor (100 Hz). 
The Dutch translation of the Fear of Spider Questionnaire (i.e., FSQ, Muris 
& Merkelbach, 1996; Szymanski & Donohue, 1995) was used to measure the 
explicit fear of spiders. The FSQ consists of 18 statements (e.g., I think a lot about 
spiders) which are to be rated on an eight-point Likert scale ranging from zero 
(Completely disagree) to seven (Completely agree).  
Procedure 
Participants were asked to complete the FSQ, followed by the evaluative 
categorization task and the semantic categorization task. The order of the two 
evaluative priming tasks was counterbalanced. On each trial, a fixation cross 
appeared for 500 ms, followed by a blank screen for 500 ms. Next, the prime 
stimulus was displayed for 200 ms. Following and SOA of 250 ms, the target 
stimulus was presented which remained on the screen until participants 
responded or 2000 ms had elapsed. If participants did not respond within 2000 
ms, a 2000 ms message (i.e., ‘Te laat!’ which translates as ‘Too slow!’) was 
presented. In all tasks, we used an inter-trial interval that varied between 500 
and 1500 ms. In the evaluative categorization task, participants were instructed 
to categorize targets according to their evaluative meaning. In the semantic 
categorization task, participants were instructed to categorize targets according 
to their animacy. Each task consisted of 160 trials, divided in two blocks of 80 
trials each (10 primes × 8 targets). In between blocks, participants could take a 
small break.  
Each evaluative priming task was preceded by 8 practice trials in which only 
a target stimulus was presented. Each target stimulus was presented once. On 
each practice trial, a 500-ms fixation cross was presented, followed by a blank 
screen for 750 ms. Next, the target stimulus was presented. Practice trials for the 
evaluative categorization task required participants to categorize the target 
stimuli in terms of their valence. Practice trials for the semantic categorization 
task required participants to categorize the target stimuli in terms of their 
animacy. In case of an erroneous response, a 500-ms error message (i.e., ‘FOUT!’ 
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which translates as ‘WRONG’) appeared.  
Upon completion of the categorization tasks, participants were informed 
about the upcoming BAT. They were told that the experimenter was interested 
in getting an impression of their level of spider fear. Therefore, they would be 
asked to enter a room containing a living spider located inside a cardboard box. 
Next, participants were presented with a photograph of the spider (i.e., Araneus 
diadematus) and were told that they would approach the spider shown on the 
photograph. In reality, however, the box did not contain a spider but was simply 
filled with leaves. Participants were first asked whether they were prepared to 
start the BAT. Following a positive response, participants were accompanied to 
an adjacent room that contained the cardboard box. Participants were asked to 
perform the following six steps: (1) approach the cardboard box, (2) touch the 
cardboard box, (3) open the cardboard box, (4) pick up the cardboard box, (5) try 
to uncover the spider by pushing away some leaves with a pencil, and (6) try to 
uncover the spider using their hands. Before each step was executed, the 
participant was asked whether he or she was willing to perform the step. 
Participants were assured that they could refuse to perform a particular step at 
any time. If a participant refused to perform a step, the instructions for that 
particular step were repeated. The BAT was terminated following a second 
refusal. The experimenter neither encouraged nor praised the participant during 
the performance of the BAT. Finally, participants were once more asked to fill 
out the FSQ. 
Results  
Data Reduction and analysis 
 Neutral priming trials (neutral/negative and neutral/positive trials) were 
not included in the analysis. Furthermore, we excluded trials in which an 
incorrect response was given (8.0 % in the evaluative condition, 6.3% in the 
semantic condition), a response was given past the response deadline (1.6 % in 
the evaluative condition, 1.6 % in the semantic condition), or if response 
latencies deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations from a participant’s mean 
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latency in a particular condition (see Ratcliff, 1993; 2.9% in the evaluative 
condition, 3.1% in the semantic condition).  
Similar to Experiment 1, two inter-individual difference scores were 
computed. A first difference score was calculated by subtracting the mean 
response latencies observed on trials consisting of a present-related prime and a 
positive target from the mean response latencies observed on trials consisting of 
a present-related prime and a negative target. Next, we calculated a second 
difference score by subtracting the mean response latencies on trials consisting 
of spider-related prime and a positive target from the mean response latencies 
observed on trials consisting of a spider-related prime and negative target. 
Finally, priming scores were obtained by subtracting the second difference score 
from the first difference score. Hence, positive priming scores indicate a 
preference for presents over spiders.  
Descriptive statistics 
A reliable mean inter-individual difference score of 15.82 ms was obtained 
in the evaluative categorization task, t(74) = 3.20, p < .001, d = .37. The mean 
inter-individual difference score in the semantic categorization task was 3.30 ms 
and was not statistically different from zero, t < 1. A difference score was 
computed by subtracting inter-individual difference scores obtained in the 
semantic categorization task from inter-individual difference scores obtained in 
the evaluative categorization task. This difference score was not dependent  on 
whether participants described themselves as spider-fearful (M = 20.45 ms, SD = 
58.06 ms) or being unafraid of spiders (M = 5.01 ms, SD = 48.73 ms) on the 
prescreening survey embedded in the web-based Experiment Sign-up site of 
Ghent University, F(1,73) = 1.57, p = .21, η² = 0.02. This effect was not dependent 
on the order in which the two categorization tasks were administered, F < 1. 
Interestingly, we did observe a marginal significant difference between inter-
individual difference scores obtained in the semantic categorization task and the 
evaluative categorization task if the spider-fearful group and control group were 
defined based on a median split of the FSQ scores obtained during the 
experimental session, F(1,73) = 3.87, p = .05, η² = 0.05. Interestingly, the 
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difference score was higher in the spider-fearful group (M = 26.27, SD = 54.23) as 
compared to the control group (M = 2.11, SD = 51.37). The effect was not 
modulated by the presentation order of the two categorization tasks, F(1,71) = 
1.61, p = .21, η² = 0.02. Follow-up analyses revealed that the difference score 
reached significance in the spider-fearful group but not in the control group, 
t(31) = 2.74, p < .05, d = 0.48 and t < 1, respectively. 
Correlational analyses 
Correlational analyses revealed an almost-perfect correlation between FSQ 
scores measured at the start of the experiment and FSQ scores at the end of the 
experiment, t(73) = 31.12, p < .001, r = .96. Accordingly, the two FSQ scores were 
averaged. We did not observe a significant correlation between the mean FSQ 
score and inter-individual difference scores obtained with the semantic 
categorization task, r = -.07, t < 1, or the evaluative categorization task, r = .19, 
t(73) = 1.65, p = .10, respectively. Inter-individual difference scores obtained in 
the semantic categorization task and the evaluative categorization task did not 
correlate with each other, r = .12, t < 1. 
Predictive validity 
To examine the relationship between implicit attitudes and the number of 
steps performed on the BAT, a cumulative logit model (i.e., proportional odds 
model) was used. Inter-individual difference scores obtained with the evaluative 
categorization task were unrelated to the number of steps performed on the 
BAT1, Χ² < 1. This effect was not dependent on the order in which the evaluative 
categorization task and the semantic categorization task were performed, Χ² < 1. 
In addition, we did not find a significant relationship between inter-individual 
difference scores obtained in the semantic categorization task and behavior, Χ² < 
1. However, there was some evidence that the relationship between the number 
of steps performed on the BAT and the inter-individual difference scores 
obtained with the semantic categorization task was dependent on the order in 
                                                     
1
 It may be noted that inter-individual difference scores obtained with the evaluative 
categorization task did predict BAT performance if outliers were not removed from analysis, 
𝛸2(1) = 5.94, p < .05. 
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which the two categorization tasks were performed, Χ²(1) = 2.43, p = .12. Follow-
up analyses revealed a significant relationship between the number of steps 
performed on the BAT and the inter-individual difference scores obtained in the 
semantic categorization task if this task preceded the evaluative categorization 
task, Χ²(1) = 4.24, p < .05. In line with Experiment 1, this relationship was again in 
the opposite direction of what we expected. Participants whose inter-individual 
difference scores were indicative of a high level of spider fear were more likely to 
perform a higher number of steps on the BAT than participants whose inter-
individual difference scores were indicative of lower level of spider fear (β = 
0.03). The effect did not reach significance if the semantic categorization task 
was performed after the evaluative categorization task, Χ² < 1.  
Finally, we also examined the relationship between the explicit measure of 
spider fear and behavior on the BAT. This relationship proved to be significant, β 
= -0.05, Χ²(1) = 45.13, p < .001. Participants whose FSQ scores indicated a 
relatively high level of spider fear completed fewer steps on the BAT. A 
hierarchical regression analysis in which both implicit and explicit measures of 
spider fear were included as predictors revealed a meaningful relationship 
between BAT performance and the explicit measure of spider fear only, Χ² < 1. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, it was observed that inter-individual difference scores 
were predictive of choice behavior only if participants were encouraged to assign 
selective attention to a non-evaluative, semantic stimulus dimension during 
attitude measurement. The nature of this relationship, however, was 
unanticipated. Participants whose inter-individual difference scores were 
indicative of an (implicit) preference for fruit over candy were more likely to 
select a piece of candy than a piece of fruit during the behavioral choice task. 
Because of the unexpected nature of this finding, we decided to conduct a 
second experiment aimed at examining the impact of FSAA on the predictive 
validity of implicit preference scores obtained with the evaluative priming 
paradigm.  
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Replicating the results of Experiment 1, we observed that BAT performance 
was unrelated to inter-individual difference scores obtained under conditions 
that promoted selective attention for the evaluative stimulus dimension. 
However, it should be noted that inter-individual difference scores obtained with 
the evaluative categorization task did reliably predict behavior if outliers were 
not removed from the analysis. It could thus be suggested that the absence of 
predictive validity in the evaluative decision task was due to a lack of power. Also 
in line with Experiment 1, was the observation that inter-individual difference 
scores obtained with a non-evaluative semantic categorization task were 
predictive of a behavioral outcome measure, at least if this task was performed 
prior to the evaluative decision task. The fact that the predictive validity of this 
task was contingent upon the task order can be readily accounted for in two 
ways. First, selective attention assignment can carry-over from one experimental 
phase to another (Vanaelst, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2016). Second, this effect 
might simply be due to fatigue or a sense of boredom as participants were 
required to complete two evaluative priming tasks in close succession. Most 
importantly, the relationship between BAT performance and the evaluative 
priming scores obtained in the non-evaluative semantic categorization task was 
again reversed. The more individual difference scores were indicative of fear 
towards spiders, the better BAT performance. It thus seems rather unlikely that 
the results in Experiment 1 were simply a chance finding. In contrast to our 
expectation, we did not observe a significant difference between inter-individual 
difference scores obtained in the semantic categorization task and evaluative 
categorization task in the control group. However, this difference score did reach 
significance in the spider-fearful group. A detailed discussion of these 
unexpected findings is provided in the general discussion. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the present study, we examined the hypothesis that measures of implicit 
evaluation will be less indicative of behavioral outcomes if they are obtained 
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under conditions that maximize selective attention for the evaluative stimulus 
dimension as compared to when they are obtained under conditions that require 
participants to focus selective attention on non-evaluative stimulus information. 
This hypothesis was based on the FSAA framework developed by Spruyt and 
colleagues (Everaert, et al., 2013; Spruyt et al., 2009; Spruyt, et al., 2007), in 
which it is stated that the extent to which evaluative stimulus features are 
processed is dependent on the degree to which attention is assigned to 
evaluative information. Moreover, one can expect stable inter-individual 
differences in the extent to which selective attention is assigned to certain 
stimulus dimensions as numerous studies have shown that FSAA is governed by 
personal goals. For example, using a multidimensional scaling approach, Fazio 
and Dunton (1997) observed a significant correlation between a measure of the 
implicit attitude towards black individuals and the degree to which participants 
were inclined to assign selective attention to race-related stimulus information 
(see also Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989; Viken, Treat, Nosofsky, McFall, & 
Palmeri, 2002).  
To test our hypothesis, we conducted two evaluative priming experiments 
in which participants were encouraged to assign selective attention to either 
evaluative stimulus information or to non-evaluative semantic features. Despite 
the fact that the procedures employed in these studies were quite different, the 
pattern of results were strikingly similar. First, implicit preference scores 
obtained with the (classic) evaluative decision task were unrelated to outcome 
measures (but see below). Second, in both experiments, a reliable relation was 
found between a behavioral outcome measure and evaluative priming scores 
obtained under conditions that maximized selective attention for non-evaluative, 
semantic stimulus features. Third, in both experiments, the nature of this 
relationship was counterintuitive. Participants were inclined to avoid attitude 
objects that were associated with a positive implicit preference and to approach 
attitude objects that were associated with a negative implicit preference, not the 
other way around.  
In sum, our studies provided some initial evidence for the idea that the 
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predictive validity of evaluative priming scores is indeed moderated by FSAA. 
Nevertheless, several aspects of our findings were surprising and require further 
discussion. Let us first consider the predictive validity of evaluative priming 
scores obtained under conditions that maximize selective attention for 
evaluative stimulus information. In line with our predictions, these evaluative 
priming scores were unrelated to behavior in Experiment 1. This result was 
replicated in Experiment 2, but it must be noted that we did observe a reliable 
relation in this second study if outliers were not removed. Furthermore, in 
Experiment 2, evaluative priming scores obtained with the evaluative decision 
task tended to correlate (p  = .10) with an explicit measure of spider fear (i.e., the 
FSQ). It could thus be hypothesized that these effects might have reached 
statistical significance had we included more statistical power. Taken together, 
then, our results seem to mimic the current state of affairs in the literature. 
Whereas several studies attesting to the predictive validity of the (classic version 
of the) evaluative priming paradigm have appeared in the literature (e.g., 
Degner, et al., 2007; Dovidio, et al., 2002; Frings & Wentura, 2003), several other 
studies failed to replicate this finding (Falk et al., 2015; Spruyt, et al., 2007). The 
present null findings are important because they indicate that FSAA is indeed an 
important moderator of predictive validity in the sequential priming paradigm 
and could prove to be valuable in understanding the inconsistent findings that 
appear in the literature. 
Second, in contrast to our expectations, in Experiment 2, we did not 
observe a significant difference between the inter-individual difference scores 
obtained with the semantic categorization task and the evaluative categorization 
task in the control group. We did, however, observe a clear-cut difference in the 
sample of spider-fearful participants. Clearly, this pattern of findings is exactly 
the opposite of what we had hypothesized a priori. We will address this 
observation in more detail below.  
Finally, we observed a reversed relationship between the behavioral 
outcome measure and evaluative priming scores obtained under conditions that 
maximized selective attention for the non-evaluative, semantic stimulus 
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features. This observation is not only counterintuitive, it is also at odds with 
several studies showing a (normal) positive relationship between behavioral 
measures and implicit attitude measures obtained in the absence of an 
evaluative processing mindset (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2002; Frings & Wentura, 2003; 
Spruyt, et al., 2007; Vandromme et al., 2011). At this point, we see two ways to 
account for this observation. First, as already noted above, it could simply be 
argued that the reversed relationship between the implicit attitude scores and 
the behavioral outcome measure resulted from Type-I errors. The fact, however, 
that this reversed relationship was observed in two consecutive experiments 
seems to be incompatible with such an account. Therefore, as an alternative 
explanation, one might argue that the requirement to maximize selective 
attention for non-evaluative semantic information somehow resulted in a 
reversal of the evaluative priming scores (i.e., participants responded faster to 
incongruent trials compared to congruent trials). Reversed evaluative priming 
effects have been reported by several authors (for an overview, see Klauer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, & Spruyt, 2009). For example, in six experiments, Glaser and 
Banaji (1999) consistently observed reversed evaluative priming effects for 
extreme primes in a word naming task. Chan, Ybarra, and Schwarz (2006) 
presented evidence that highly accessible targets are likely to show reversed 
priming effects. Similar results have also been reported in the non-evaluative 
domain (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; see also Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003). 
Importantly, the idea that the evaluative priming effect captured by the semantic 
categorization task were reversed could also explain the (unexpected) 
observation in Experiment 2 that the difference between the mean priming score 
obtained with the semantic categorization task and the mean priming score 
obtained with evaluative categorization task was reliable the spider-fearful 
group. If it is assumed that spider-fearful participants exhibited a normal 
(assimilative) priming effect in the evaluative categorization task but a reversed 
evaluative priming effect in the semantic categorization task, one would 
naturally predict a large difference between the two priming scores.   
The question arises, of course, how such reversal of the evaluative priming 
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effect can be accounted for at the mental-process level. Unfortunately, existing 
accounts of reversed priming effects such as the accuracy motivation account 
(Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Glaser, 2003) and the psychophysical account (Klauer et 
al., 2009) have great difficulty explaining the complete pattern of results 
obtained in our studies. The main problem is that both accounts explain the 
presence or absence of reversed priming effects in terms of specific procedural 
details (e.g., the extremity of the primes or the length of the SOA) whereas these 
procedural details were identical across the different versions of the evaluative 
priming tasks implemented in our studies. Further research will thus be required 
to substantiate the idea that the reversed relation between behavioral outcomes 
and evaluative priming scores observed in the present experiments did indeed 
result from to a reversal of the evaluative priming scores. We anticipate, 
however, that this research studies will be a stimulating enterprise as it could 
potentially advance our understanding of reversed evaluative priming effects in 
general. 
In sum, we conducted two studies aimed at showing that the predictive 
validity of implicit attitudes as captured by the evaluative priming paradigm 
might increase as a function of decreasing levels of selective attention for the 
evaluative stimulus dimension. In line with this reasoning, we found evaluative 
priming scores to be predictive of behavior only if participants were encouraged 
to assigned selective attention to a non-evaluative, semantic stimulus dimension. 
Unexpectedly, in both experiments, this relationship was in the opposite 
direction of what was predicted. Further research will be needed to establish the 
generality of this effect and to uncover its underlying mechanisms. 
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APPENDIX 
Experiment 1: description of target pictures 
- Picture depicting positive living beings: poesje (kitten) and bruid (bride) 
- Pictures depicting positive objects: ballonnen (balloons) and bloem 
(flower) 
- Pictures depicting negative living beings: slang (snake) and soldaat 
(soldier) 
- Pictures depicting negative objects: pistool (pistol) and vuilnis (garbage) 
Experiment 2: description of target pictures 
- Picture depicting positive living beings: poesje (kitten) and bruid (bride) 
- Pictures depicting positive objects: ballonnen (balloons) and lolly 
(popsicle) 
- Pictures depicting negative living beings: slang (snake) and soldaat 
(soldier) 
- Pictures depicting negative objects: pistol (pistol) and vuilnis (garbage) 
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A META-ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF FEATURE-SPECIFIC 
ATTENTION ALLOCATION ON THE PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF 
IMPLICIT ATTITUDE MEASUREMENTS 
 
Despite numerous studies attesting the predictive validity of implicit 
attitude measures, several authors have reported data in which the relationship 
between inter-individual differences scores obtained with these measures and 
behavioral outcome measures proved to be unreliable. To shed further light on 
the conditions under which implicit measures can be used to predict behavior, we 
examined the extent to which the predictive validity of these measures is 
dependent upon feature-specific attention allocation. We present a meta-analysis 
of 57 studies in which the predictive validity of either the evaluative priming 
paradigm or the approach-avoidance paradigm was examined. A small-to-
moderate relation between behavioral outcome measures and implicit attitude 
scores was obtained with the evaluative priming paradigm (r = .22) as well as the 
approach-avoidance paradigm (r = .16). In contrast to our expectations, however, 
there was no corroborating evidence for the idea that the predictive validity of 
implicit attitude measures depends on feature-specific attention allocation.  
 
3 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Allport (1935) proclaimed that personal likes and dislikes bear 
a strong relationship with behavior, behavioral scientists have sought reliable 
instruments to measure inter-individual differences in those likes and dislikes. 
Together with increasing evidence that attitude objects can be evaluated in an 
unconditional and automatic fashion (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Barlett, 1932; Lazarus, 
1966; Wundt, 1907), so called ‘implicit’ measurement techniques were 
developed to measure the spontaneous automatic reactions elicited by persons, 
objects, and situations. For example, in the evaluative priming paradigm (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), the influence of a task-irrelevant prime 
on the evaluative categorization of a subsequently presented target is examined. 
Crucially, the evaluative congruence between prime and target stimuli is 
manipulated. Evaluative categorization responses are typically facilitated (i.e., 
lesser errors and faster response times) when the prime and the target share the 
same connotation relative to when the evaluative connotation of the prime-
target pairs is incongruent (but see Chan, Ybarra, & Schwarz, 2006; Glaser & 
Banaji, 1999; Klauer, Teige-Mocigemba, & Spruyt, 2009). One can thus use the 
evaluative priming procedure to measure spontaneous likes and dislikes by 
displaying attitude-relevant stimuli as prime stimuli. For example, to measure 
spontaneous evaluative reactions toward spiders, pictures of spiders can be 
presented as primes. A typical observation is that spider-fearful participants 
show a benefit in both speed and accuracy if the picture of spider is followed by 
a negative word relative to when the picture is followed by a positive word (e.g., 
Klein et al., 2012). Other, well-known examples of implicit measurement 
techniques are the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998), the relational responding task (i.e., RRT, De Houwer, Heider, 
Spruyt, Roets, & Hughes, 2015), and the Approach- Avoidance task (i.e., AAT; 
Solarz, 1960). These techniques are especially useful in situations in which the 
validity of self-reports is debatable, either because likes and likes are not 
accessible through introspection or because there is considerable doubt that 
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participants will report their true likes and dislikes (see Fazio & Olson, 2003; 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). 
Numerous studies have shown that implicit attitude scores can be used to 
predict relevant behavioral outcomes (see for example, Degner & Wentura, 
2009; Descheemaeker, Spruyt, & Hermans, 2014; Klein et al., 2012; Spruyt et al., 
2015). Corroborating these results, recent meta-analytic reports have 
corroborated the reliable predictive validity of both the evaluative priming 
paradigm (Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012) and the IAT (Greenwald, et 
al., 2009). However, the magnitude of the relationship between behavioral 
outcomes and implicit attitudes as captured by the evaluative priming paradigm 
(Cameron et al., 2012) or the IAT (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 
2009) is only small to medium (r = .28 and r = .27, respectively). Moreover, 
despite several studies attesting the predictive validity of implicit measures (see 
for example Degner, Wentura, Gniewosz, & Noack, 2007; Dovidio, Kawakami, & 
Gaertner, 2002; Frings & Wentura, 2003), other studies have failed to replicate 
the existence of a meaningful relationship between behavioral outcome 
measures and inter-individual difference scores obtained with the evaluative 
priming paradigm (e.g., Falk, Heine, Takemura, Zhang, & Hsu, 2015; Spruyt, 
Hermans, De Houwer, Vandekerckhove, & Eelen, 2007), the AAT (e.g., Neimeijer, 
de Jong, & Roefs, 2015), or the IAT (e.g., Blanton et al., 2009). One way to 
account for these inconsistent findings is to assume that the predictive validity of 
implicit attitude measures is dependent upon moderating variables. 
 The main aim of the present meta-analysis was to examine the 
moderating influence of feature-specific attention allocation (i.e., FSAA) on the 
predictive validity of implicit measurement techniques. Although many studies 
supported the assumption that evaluative processing can take place in an 
unconditional and automatic fashion (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 
1996; Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Fazio, 2001; Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 
1995; Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000; Klauer, Roßnagel, & Musch, 1997; 
Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002; Vuilleumier, 2005; Zajonc, 1980), 
recent reports suggest that automatic evaluative stimulus processing is typically 
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reduced under conditions that promote selective attention for non-evaluative 
semantic stimulus features. This observation has now been confirmed using 
several markers of automatic stimulus processing, including the evaluative 
priming effect (e.g., Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer, 
Everaert, & Hermans, 2012), the affect misattribution paradigm (Everaert, 
Spruyt, and De Houwer, 2016), the dot probe effect (Everaert, Spruyt, & De 
Houwer, 2013), and the emotional stroop effect (Everaert et al., 2013). Similar 
effects have also been found in the domain of automatic non-evaluative 
semantic processing (see Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Kiefer, 
2012; Martens & Kiefer, 2009). These findings are accounted for by the feature- 
specific attention allocation framework developed by Spruyt and colleagues 
(Everaert et al., 2013; Spruyt et al., 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 
2007) in which it is stated that stimulus features are processed only if and to the 
extent that they are selectively attended to. Importantly, FSAA might not only be 
driven by explicit task instructions (Everaert, 2012; Spruyt et al., 2009) or subtle 
aspects of the procedure (Everaert, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2011), but might also 
be dependent on personal goals. That is, individuals might not only differ in the 
extremity and direction of their implicit likes and dislikes but also in the extent to 
which selective attention assignment is required to automatically process the 
evaluative tone of attitude objects. Various studies support the idea that 
selective attention to evaluative stimulus features is dependent on the personal 
relevance of attitude objects. For example, using a multidimensional scaling 
approach, Cavanagh and Davey (2001) showed that spider-fearful participants 
add greater weight to the evaluative stimulus dimension of pictures depicting 
spiders than non-fearful persons. Likewise, Viken, Treat, Nosofsky, McFall, and 
Palmeri (2002) observed that women with high levels of bulimic symptoms are 
more attentive to body size information and less attentive to facial affect 
information (see also Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 
1989). These results suggest that the degree to which participants process the 
evaluative features of attitude-relevant stimuli automatically is dependent upon 
the personal relevance of these stimuli. It can thus be hypothesized that inter-
individual differences in implicit evaluation will be particularly outspoken under 
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conditions that promote selective attention for a non-evaluative stimulus 
feature. However, for most implicit measurement techniques, it has been a 
common practice to maximize the extent to which participants assign attention 
to the evaluative features of task-relevant stimuli. Participants are typically asked 
to categorize (at least a subset of) stimuli according to their evaluative features 
(e.g., the evaluative priming paradigm; Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, Vanous, Ho, & 
Fazio, 2007; and the IAT; Greenwald, et al., 1998), the decide whether targets are 
more or less positive than an average target stimulus (e.g., the Affect 
misattribution procedure; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), or 
instructed to approach or avoid stimuli based on their evaluative connotation 
(e.g., the AAT; Solarz, 1960). 
Preliminary evidence for the hypothesis that the predictive validity of 
implicit attitude measures is moderated by FSAA, was observed in a study by 
Spruyt, et al. (2007) using the picture-picture naming task, a variant of the 
evaluative priming paradigm. The picture-picture naming task is semantically 
neutral because participants are simply asked to name the target pictures and 
are, therefore, not encouraged to selectively attend to a specific semantic 
stimulus dimension. Spruyt, et al. (2007) showed that individual diﬀerence scores 
obtained with the picture-picture naming task could predict participants’ choice 
between fruit or candy relatively well compared to inter-individual diﬀerence 
scores obtained with implicit attitude measures in which attention to evaluative 
features was maximized (i.e., the evaluative priming paradigm with the standard 
evaluative categorization task and the IAT, which both produced null-findings). 
To allow for a direct examination of the impact of FSAA on the predictive 
validity of implicit attitude measures, we only included implicit measurement 
tasks in which participants can either be asked to respond based on evaluative 
stimulus features or on the basis of non-evaluative stimulus features. One 
example of such a measure is the AAT in which participants have to approach or 
avoid a valenced stimulus. (Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2010; 
Solarz, 1960). The AAT is based on the assumption that positive stimuli tend to 
evoke approach tendencies whereas negative stimuli tend to evoke avoidance 
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tendencies. Generally, approach behavior is facilitated (i.e., faster responses 
and/or less errors) in response to positive stimuli and inhibited (i.e., slower 
responses and/or less errors) in response to negative stimuli. Likewise, avoidance 
behavior is facilitated (i.e., faster responses and/or less errors) in response to 
negative stimuli and inhibited (i.e., slower responses and/or less errors) in 
response to positive stimuli. Importantly, participants can be asked to respond to 
task-relevant stimuli either based on their evaluative features (i.e., valence; e.g., 
Churchill & Jessop, 2011) or based on their non-evaluative features (i.e., format 
or orientation of stimuli; e.g., Reinecke, Becker, & Rinck, 2010). Another attitude 
measurement paradigm that meets our inclusion criterion is the  evaluative 
priming paradigm. In most evaluative priming studies participants are asked to 
respond on the basis of the evaluative features of target stimuli (e.g., Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), but this is by no means a requirement. In the 
piciture-picture naming task developed by Spruyt, et al. (2007), for example, 
participants are instructed to simply name the targets. In contrast, an example of 
an implicit measurement technique that does not meet the inclusion criterion is 
the affect misattribution procedure (i.e., AMP; Payne et al., 2005). In this task, 
participants are presented with a valenced prime stimulus followed by the 
presentation of Chinese pictograph. Participants are asked to indicate whether 
the Chinese pictograph is less pleasant or more pleasant than the average 
Chinese pictograph. Typically, participants are more inclined to categorize the 
Chinese pictograph as less pleasant than the average Chinese pictograph 
following a negative primes stimulus as compared to a positive prime stimulus 
and vice versa. As such, it is inherent to the AMP that participants evaluate the 
task-relevant stimuli. For the same reason, we did not include studies in which 
the IAT was used to capture implicit evaluations (Greenwald et al., 1998). 
In addition, we examined whether the effect of FSAA on the predictive 
validity of implicit measures is modulated by the personal relevance of the to-be-
measured implicit attitudes. It can be expected that implicit measures that 
minimize selective attention assignment towards evaluative features will fail to 
pick up reliable inter-individual differences if the to-be-measured evaluation is of 
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low importance to the participants. In contrast, for participants for whom the to-
be-measured attitudes are personally relevant, we expected implicit measures to 
pick up implicit evaluations regardless of attentional deployment. Thus, inter-
individual differences between participants for whom the attitude object is 
relevant and for whom the attitude object is irrelevant will be largest under 
conditions that minimize attention towards evaluative stimulus features. 
Therefore, we expected that it would be specifically advantageous to use a 
measure that minimizes selective attention assignment towards evaluative 
stimulus features as compared to a measure that maximizes selective attention 
assignment towards evaluative stimulus features in a group consisting of people 
for whom attitude objects were or were not of personal importance. 
Finally, the present meta-analysis is important for a number of other 
reasons. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine the 
magnitude of the relation between behavioral outcome measures and inter-
individual difference scores obtained in the AAT. Accordingly, we ran a number 
of exploratory analyses in order to examine the moderating effect of various 
procedural variables that might impact the predictive validity of the AAT, 
including the type of task (i.e., the abstract manikin task, the joystick task, or the 
joystick feedback task), the type of the behavioral outcome (i.e., concurrent self-
reported behavior, retrospective self-reported behavior, concurrent objective 
behavior, and outcomes that summarize objective behavior omitted during the 
past), the domain of the study (i.e., prejudice, consumer preferences, 
personality, impulsive behavior, clinical psychology, or other for studies that did 
not fit any of the other domains), target modality (i.e., pictures or words), or the 
number of trials used in the study. Similarly, we examined several procedural 
variables that could influence predictive validity in the evaluative priming 
paradigm, including the type of task (i.e., the evaluative decision task, the 
semantic decision taks, the lexical decision task, or the naming taks), type of 
behavioral outcome, stimulus modality (i.e., pictures or words), and prime 
visibility (i.e., supraliminal or subliminal presentation). 
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METHOD 
Inclusion criteria 
Studies were included if they met a number of criteria. (1) We only 
included studies examining implicit likes and dislikes. Studies were not included if 
implicit measures were used to capture automatic non-evaluative semantic 
processing. For example, neither did we include measures that examined 
individual differences in the perceived relationship between alcohol and 
aggression nor did we include studies that examined individual differences in the 
perceived relationship between sex and power. (2) Only studies in which the  
evaluative priming paradigm or the approach-avoidance paradigm was used 
were included. Evaluative priming studies in which participants were asked to 
evaluate the targets (Fazio et al., 1986) were classified as instances of studies in 
which participants focused attention on evaluative stimulus information. 
Evaluative priming studies in which the semantic decision task (e.g., Banaji & 
Hardin, 1995), the naming task (Bargh et al., 1996; Hermans, De Houwer, & 
Eelen, 1994), or the lexical decision task (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) were 
used were included as instances of studies in which participants did not focus 
attention on non-evaluative stimulus information. To examine the predictive 
validity of the AAT, we included the abstract manikin task (De Houwer, Crombez, 
Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001), the joystick task (Chen & Bargh, 1999), the joystick 
feedback task (Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson, & Strack, 2008), and the vertical 
three button task (Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). In each of these tasks, participants 
can be asked to respond to target stimuli based on their evaluative stimulus 
features (e.g., valence) or based on their non-evaluative stimulus features (e.g., 
orientation or format of target stimuli; see Kersbergen, Woud, & Field, 2014; 
Machulska, Zlomuzica, Adolph, Rinck, & Margraf, 2015). (3) We restricted the 
literature search to studies that focused on behavior as an outcome measure. 
That is, we only include outcome measures that resembled observable behavior 
or behavior that, in principle, could have been observed. Thus, we did not 
include correlations between two implicit measures of likes and dislikes or 
73  CHAPTER 3  
between an implicit and an explicit measure of likes and dislikes. For example, 
the intention of a participant to perform a certain behavior was not considered 
to be an adequate outcome measure as intention is as a subjective self-
assessment of an unobservable construct. In this sense, the intention variable 
should be regarded as an indirect self-report measure of likes and dislikes 
instead of a proxy of behavior. In the same vein, we did not include studies in 
which the outcome variable consisted of a close friend of the participants 
reporting about the participants’ self-esteem or self-liking for two reasons (e.g., 
Falk et al., 2015). First, these judgments are considered to reflect likes and 
dislikes instead of observable behavior. Second, judgments of behavior by close 
friends can be biased by how participants perceive themselves. Indeed, it is likely 
that judgments of behavior by close friends will be in accordance with the 
manner in which participants present themselves. (4) Studies were not included 
if the relationship between the attitude measure and the outcome was qualified 
by a moderator variable. This criterium was adopted because we were primarily 
interested in the direct relationship between attitude and outcome measures. 
Furthermore, the necessity to use subsets of data to account for within-study 
moderators would have considerably complicated data-analysis. (5) Studies were 
written in English and published in a peer-reviewed journal. Authors were 
contacted for further information if studies did not provide adequate statistical 
information for derivation of effect sizes. 
Search Procedure 
A literature search was conducted until February 2016. Searches were 
executed in three databases (i.e., ISI Web of Science, PubMed, and PsycINFO) 
using the following keywords: implicit, measure (or measures), and behavior. 
Additional articles were obtained from the reference sections of these articles as 
well as the reference sections of an earlier meta-analysis concerning the 
predictive validity of the  evaluative priming paradigm (i.e., Cameron et al., 
2012). This initial search rendered a list of 474 studies to be considered for 
inclusion in the meta-analysis. Of these studies, 38 were excluded because the 
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implicit measure was not correlated with an adequate outcome variable. 
Another, 337 studies were excluded because of the  use of an implicit measure 
that was did not meet our inclusion criteria. Finally, 10 studies were excluded 
because we were unable to retrieve the statistical information needed for the 
calculation of the appropriate effect size, despite several requests for additional 
data from the original authors. In sum, 87 studies were retained for the analysis. 
These studies originated from 57 different articles and yielded 175 relevant 
effect sizes to be analyzed. Thirty of these studies concerned the predictive 
validity of the  evaluative priming paradigm, with a total of 95 effect sizes. The 
approach-avoidance paradigm was examined in 28 studies, with 80 effect sizes in 
total. 
Moderators 
One researcher coded all studies whereas a second researcher coded one 
fourth of them. Interrater reliability between the two researchers was assessed 
using the intraclass correlation coefficient for continuous measures and Cohen’s 
kappa in the case of categorical variables. These measures are reported below 
for each individual moderator.  
Transformation of effect size. Studies were coded with respect to 
whether the effect size was provided in the published report or had to be 
calculated on the basis of statistical information reported in the report. Cohen’s 
Kappa equaled 1. 
Type of implicit measurement. Studies were categorized based on the 
type of implicit measurement that was used to measure implicit evaluations: the  
evaluative priming procedure or the approach-avoidance paradigm. Cohen’s 
kappa equaled 0.92. 
Feature-Specific Attention Allocation. Effect sizes were classified in two, 
broad categories depending on whether the corresponding implicit measure 
involved an explicit evaluative processing mindset.  Evaluative priming studies in 
which a naming task, a lexical decision task, or a non-evaluative decision task was 
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used were all classified as studies in which participants were not required to 
focus attention on the evaluative stimulus dimension. Evaluative priming studies 
in which participants performed an evaluative decision task were classified as 
studies in which participants assigned selective attention to evaluative features. 
The AAT was considered to maximize attention to evaluative stimulus features if 
participants were asked to respond to target stimuli based on an attitude-
relevant stimulus features. For example, participants might be asked to respond 
to target stimuli based on whether stimuli depicted an alcoholic beverage or a 
non-alcoholic beverage. Since this stimulus feature is clearly related to likes and 
dislikes of alcohol, this type of task was considered as a task in which participants 
were encouraged to assign attention to evaluative stimulus features. However, if 
participants were asked to respond on the basis of an attitude-irrelevant feature 
(e.g., the shape of the target stimulus; Cousijn, Goudriaan, & Wiers, 2011) the 
AAT was considered to maximize attention to non-evaluative stimulus features. 
As mentioned above, we expected the predictive validity to be higher in tasks in 
which attention to non-evaluative stimulus features was maximized as compared 
to tasks in which attention to evaluative features was maximized. Cohen’s kappa 
for this variable equaled 1. 
Relevance. Studies were classified as ‘relevant’ if the implicit attitude 
measure was administered in a sample of participants for whom the presented 
attitude objects were personally relevant. For example, one can expect spider-
related stimuli or nicotine-related stimuli to be highly relevant for spider-fearful 
participants or (abstaining) smokers, respectively. Effect sizes obtained in 
samples of participants for whom the critical attitude objects were not 
particularly relevant were coded as ‘irrelevant’. If a sample consisted of a 
mixture of participants for whom the tested attitude objects were or were not 
personally relevant, studies were coded as ‘mixed relevance’. We expected a 
significant effect of relevance under conditions that maximized attention to non-
evaluative stimulus features. In contrast, we did not expect that relevance would 
moderate the predictive validity of tasks in which attention to evaluative 
stimulus features was maximized. Cohen’s Kappa equaled 0.82. 
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Type of Behavior. A distinction was made between behavior observed by 
the experimenter and self-report measures. In addition, we coded whether 
behavior took place at the time of the measurement itself (i.e., concurrent 
report) or whether behavior was reported after it took place (i.e., retrospective 
report) (see Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz, 2007). Accordingly, our coding scheme 
differentiated between four types of outcome measures: concurrent self-
reported behavior (e.g., self-reported choice behavior), retrospectively self-
reported behavior (e.g., a judgment of the average number of cigarettes smoked 
during the last month), concurrent objective behavior (e.g., behavior on a 
behavioral assessment task), and outcomes that summarized behavior omitted 
during the past in an objective way (e.g., Body Mass Index). As retrospective 
reports are often considered to be biased (Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz, 2007), we 
expected a stronger relation between implicit likes and dislikes and concurrent 
reports of behavior as compared to retrospective reports of behavior. Similarly, 
as self-reports are often contaminated by impression management strategies 
(see Fazio & Olson, 2003), we predicted higher predictive validity if objective 
behavior was used as an outcome measure than if self-reports were used. 
Cohen’s Kappa equaled 0.83. 
Type of research domain. A distinction was made between six different 
research domains: prejudice (based on gender, race, or groups), consumer 
preferences (e.g., time watching big brother), personality (e.g., self-esteem), 
impulsive behavior (non-clinical levels of behavior such as drinking, smoking, 
eating, fear, …), clinical psychology (studies among clinical populations such as 
persons with anorexia nervosa), and the category ‘other’ for studies that did not 
fit one of the above-mentioned categories. Since, this variable was added for 
purely exploratory reasons, we did not have an a priori hypothesis about the 
direction of the effect. Cohen’s kappa equaled 0.78. 
Publication year. The oldest study included in the meta-analysis was 
published in 1995. Given the accumulation of knowledge over time, one might 
predict (or hope) that that the predictive validity of implicit attitude measures 
must have improved over time as the result of methodological innovations (for 
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an example, see Wentura & Degner, 2010). The intraclass correlation coefficient 
equaled 0.99. 
Time of behavioral assessment. We coded whether the behavioral 
outcome assessment and the implicit attitude assessment took place in close 
temporal succession. This variable was included because the relationship 
between an implicit attitude measure and a behavioral outcome measure may 
change as a function of the delay between the these measures, for example 
because (implicit) evaluations themselves might change over time (e.g., Reinecke 
et al., 2010; Teachman & Woody, 2003). We expected predictive validity to be 
highest if attitude assessment and behavioral outcome assessment took place in 
close temporal succession as compared to when the two measures were 
assessed at different moments in time. Cohen’s kappa equaled 0.88. 
Methodological parameters. 
 Evaluative priming paradigm. To examine the extent to which the 
predictive validity of implicit priming measures is affected by procedural 
parameters, we took into account the following list of variables: the number of 
trials, stimulus modality (pictures vs. words), the duration of the presentation 
time of the primes and targets, the length of the interval between the onset of 
the primes and the onset of the targets (i.e., stimulus-onset asynchrony; SOA), 
the interval between two adjacent trials (i.e., inter-trial interval; ITI), and 
whether the presentation time of the target stimulus and the ITI was fixed or 
variable. In addition, we tested whether the relationship between inter- 
individual difference scores and behavior was influenced by whether primes 
were presented subliminal or supraliminal. Finally, we coded the type of 
evaluative priming paradigm that was used to measure implicit evaluations: the 
evaluative decision task, the semantic decision task, the lexical decision task, or 
the naming task.  
 Approach-avoidance paradigm. Procedural parameters taken into 
account were: target modality (i.e., pictures or words) and number of trials. We 
also coded whether the abstract manikin task, the joystick task, or the joystick 
feedback task was used. In the abstract manikin task, approach-avoidance 
78  CHAPTER 3  
 
behavior is measured on an abstract level. That is, participants move a manikin 
towards or away from the target stimulus with the use of a key on the computer 
key board. In contrast, in the joystick task, approach-avoidance behavior is 
operationalized as the actual horizontal movement of a vertically positioned 
joystick or lever. The joystick feedback task is identical to the joystick task except 
that visual feedback is given; i.e., the target stimulus comes closer or disappears 
upon movement of the joystick or lever. Finally, in the three button task, three 
one-button boxed are placed vertically on a stand. Participants push either the 
lower or the top button in response to a target stimulus. Note, however, that the 
vertical three button task was not recorded as an extra level of this moderator as 
none of the included studies made use of this particular task (see Phaf, Mohr, 
Rotteveel, & Wicherts, 2014 for an in depth analysis of the different types of 
approach-avoidance tasks). Finally, we also differentiated between different 
scoring algorithms that are used to compute inter-individual difference scores in 
the AAT. A first algorithm to be considered is the RT-based compatibility score 
that is computed by subtracting mean reaction times observed in the compatible 
condition from mean reaction times observed in the incompatible condition 
(e.g., Spruyt et al., 2013). Second, we considered the ‘D-measure’ which is 
computed by dividing the RT-based compatibility score by the pooled standard 
deviation (see Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & 
Lindenmeyer, 2011). Third, we included constrained RT-based compatibility 
effects in which the RT-base compatibility score is based on a subset of the 
presented stimuli (e.g., Peeters et al., 2013). For example, to obtain likes and 
dislikes toward alcohol, one would subtract the mean RT observed on trials in 
which alcohol-related stimuli have to be pulled from the mean RT observed on 
trials in which alcohol-related stimuli have to be pushed. Finally, we also coded 
studies in which the constrained RT-based compatibility effect was corrected for 
responses on neutral trials. In these studies an approach bias score was 
calculated for neutral stimuli by subtracting the mean RT on approach-neutral 
trials from the mean RT on avoid-neutral trials. Next, this approach bias for 
neutral stimuli was subtracted from the constrained RT-based compatibility 
effect for relevant stimuli (e.g., Neimeijer et al., 2015). Target duration and ITI 
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were not coded as most studies did not report these parameters 
Effect Size Calculation 
All effect sizes (i.e., odds ratios, t-statistics, F-statistics, Χ²-statistics) were 
converted to Pearson Correlation coefficients. As Pearson Correlation 
coefficients have some undesirable statistical properties (e.g., a problematic 
standard error formulation; Rosenthal, 1994), correlations were converted to 
Fisher’s z-scores (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). After the analysis, Fisher’s z-scores were 
converted back to their original scale. For the majority of studies, information 
about the reliability of the implicit measure or/and outcome measure was 
missing. Accordingly, no correction for attenuation of the correlations due to the 
unreliability of the involved variables was applied. The interrater reliability 
equaled .99. 
Analytic Model 
Data analysis was performed in the statistical software package R (version 
3.1.2.; R Core Team, 2014) using the metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010). A 
multilevel (i.e., three-level random effects model) meta-analysis was performed 
to deal with dependency between effect sizes (Van den Noortgate, López-López, 
Marín-Martínez, & Sánchez-Meca, 2014). We chose to perform a multi-level 
analysis as this method enabled us to perform an analysis on non-aggregated 
data. In contrast to a meta-analysis performed on aggregated datasets, the 
multi-level approach allows for (a) the use of all available data points and (b) an 
examination of all important moderating variables.  
It should be noted that analyses were performed on the absolute values 
of the effect sizes. We deliberately chose for this approach because we were 
primarily interested in the size of the attitude-behavior relationship and not in 
the direction of this relation. Moreover, for a considerable amount of 
experiments, the authors did not specify the expected direction of the 
relationship between behavior and implicit evaluations. As a result, it was often 
unclear whether the correlation was in the expected direction or not. Sensitivity 
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analysis were performed to identify outliers and influential data points. Effect 
sizes were considered influential if standardized residuals exceeded 3 and 
leverages were higher than two times the average leverage.  
Publication Bias 
 An important concern for each meta-analysis is the question 
whether there is evidence for a publication bias. Publication bias is mostly due to 
the underrepresentation of studies with small subject samples. The low 
statistical power of small sample studies often leads to non-significant results. 
Importantly, these null results are less likely to get published as compared to 
significant effects. Consequently, the literature will contain a disproportional 
amount of studies with small sample sizes and large effect sizes as compared to 
studies with small sample sizes ad small effect sizes. If publication bias is present, 
the studies included in the meta-analysis represent a biased selection of studies 
with large effects. Consequently, the results of the meta-analysis will provide an 
overestimation of the true effect size. To examine whether publication bias 
influenced our results, we examined the shape of a funnel plot in which a 
measure of the accuracy of the study (i.e., the standard deviation of the effect 
size) is plotted against the effect size (Elvik, 1998; Light, Singer, & Willet, 1994; 
Sterne & Egger, 2005). If publication bias is absent, effect sizes are arranged in a 
symmetric, pyramid shape. However, it must be noted that funnel plots in a 
multilevel meta-analysis should be interpreted with caution as these plots do not 
take into account the dependencies between effect sizes. Therefore, the 
occurrence of publication bias was also tested by using Egger’s regression test 
(Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997; Sterne & Egger, 2005). The multilevel 
random effects model was modified to include the variance of the effect sizes as 
a moderator. The intercept of this analysis provides a measure of asymmetry, 
i.e., studies with small sample sizes reveal effect sizes that differ systematically 
form the effects of larger studies. Publication bias is assumed if the intercept of 
the regression deviates significantly from zero. The significance of the intercept 
was tested at p < .1 (see Egger et al., 1997). 
81  CHAPTER 3  
RESULTS 
Effect sizes 
Correlations (k = 175) ranged from 0 (by definition, given the use of 
absolute values) to 0.59. The multilevel model revealed a significant average 
weighted effect size of r = .19, p < .001, 95% CI = .17 to .22. There was a clear 
indication of heterogeneity in the effect sizes, Q(174) = 244.44, p <.001. The 
estimated proportion of within-study variation equaled 𝐼(2) 
2 = 0.00 whereas the 
estimated proportion of between-study variation equaled 𝐼(3) 
2 = 0.23. Thus, 
whereas the heterogeneity between effect sizes originating from the same study 
was negligible, about one fourth of the heterogeneity in the data could be 
accounted for by differences in effect sizes between studies. We did not observe 
influential (outlying) data points in the dataset.  
Moderator Analysis 
Transformation of effect size. Effect sizes derived on the basis of 
statistical information reported in the study did not differ significantly from 
effect sizes that could be extracted directly from the article, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1. 
Type of implicit measurement. The mean average effect size was 
significantly qualified by an interaction with type of implicit measurement, 𝑄𝑚(1) 
= 7.34, p < .01. The mean average effect size in the evaluative priming paradigm 
(r = .22, p < .001, 95% CI = .19 to .26, k = 95) was higher than the average effect 
size in the approach-avoidance paradigm, (r = .16, p < .001, 95% CI = .12 to .19, k 
= 80). 
Relevance. The test of the moderator relevance was not significant, 
𝑄𝑚(2) = 1.77, p = 0.41. The estimated average correlation did not differ reliably 
between participants for whom attitude objects were irrelevant (r = .20, p < .001, 
95% CI = .17 to .23, k = 119), participants for whom the attitude objects were 
relevant (r = .19, p < .001, 95% CI = .09 to .29, k = 28), or for mixed-relevance 
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groups (r = .19, p < .001, 95% CI = .14 to .23, k = 28). The effect of relevance also 
did not differ between the evaluative priming procedure and approach-
avoidance paradigm, 𝑄𝑚(5) = 9.09, p = .11. 
Feature-Specific Attention Allocation. Results did not reveal a significant 
difference between the estimated aggregated correlation in studies in which 
participants were encouraged to assign selective attention toward evaluative 
features (r = .21, p < .001, 95% CI = .18 to .25, k = 95) relative to studies in which 
participants were not encouraged to assign selective attention to evaluative 
features (r = .17, p < .001, 95% CI = .13 to .21, k = 80), 𝑄𝑚(1) = 2.49, p = .11.  
We did observe that the effect of FSAA differed between the evaluative 
priming procedure and the approach-avoidance paradigm, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 9.36, p < .05. 
Follow-up analyses revealed, however, that the effect of attention allocation 
failed to reach significance both for the evaluative priming paradigm, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1, 
and the approach-avoidance task, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 2.10, p = .15. In addition, we did not 
observe a significant interaction between FSAA and relevance, 𝑄𝑚(5) = 8.90, p = 
.11. Indeed, follow-up analyses revealed that the effect of relevance was not 
statistically different in tasks that did, 𝑄𝑚(2) = 2.39, p = .30, or did not, 𝑄𝑚(2) = 
3.89, p = 0.14, encourage participants to assign attention to the evaluative 
features stimulus dimension. 
Next, we examined the three-way interaction between FSAA, relevance, 
and the type of implicit measurement. Interestingly, this three-way interaction 
reached significance, 𝑄𝑚(10) = 18.99, p < .05. The two-way interaction between 
relevance and FSAA was not significant in the evaluative priming paradigm, 
𝑄𝑚(4) < 1. However, the interaction between relevance and FSAA did reach 
significance in the approach-avoidance task, 𝑄𝑚(5) = 15.76, p < .01. Follow-up 
analyses revealed that the effect of relevance in the AAT was significant if 
participants assigned selective attention to non-evaluative features, 𝑄𝑚(2) = 
7.38, p < .05. Predictive validity did not differ between the mixed-relevance 
group and the irrelevant-evaluations group, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1, whereas the mixed-
relevance group and the irrelevant-evaluation group both differed from the 
relevant-evaluations group, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 3.73, p = .05, and 𝑄𝑚(1) = 4.16, p < .05, 
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respectively. In contrast to our expectations, the estimated correlation between 
inter-individual difference scores and behavior was smaller in the relevant-
evaluations group compared to the mixed-relevance and the irrelevant-
evaluations group. For participants who attended to evaluative stimulus features 
during attitude assessment, the main effect of relevance was only marginally 
significant, 𝑄𝑚(2) = 5.37, p = .07. Follow-up analyses revealed a significant 
difference in predictive validity between studies in which likes and dislikes were 
personally relevant and studies in which likes and dislikes were irrelevant, 𝑄𝑚(1) 
= 5.54, p < .05. Indeed, predictive validity was notably higher in the relevant-
evaluations as compared to the irrelevant-evaluations group. The difference in 
predictive validity between the mixed relevance group and the relevant-
evaluations group, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 2.26, p = .13, as well as the difference in predictive 
validity between the mixed group and the irrelevant-evaluations group, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 
1, did not reach significance (see Table 1).  
Finally, the four-way interaction between attention allocation, relevance, 
type of implicit measurement, and type of behavior reached significance, 𝑄𝑚(26) 
= 48.21, p < .01. However, we decided not to give too much weight to this finding 
as most cells of the interaction contained a only a few or even no observations at 
all. 
Type of Behavior. Overall, the estimated average effect size was not 
moderated by the nature of the behavioral outcome, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 3.41, p = .33. The 
effects sizes for concurrent objective behavior (r = .22, p < .001, 95% CI = .18 to 
.26, k = 76), retrospective self-reports of behavior (r = .16, p < .001, 95% CI = .19 
to .18, k = 75), concurrent self-reports of behavior (r = .22, p < .001, 95% CI = .09 
to .34, k = 7), and objective outcomes summarizing past behavior (r = .18, p < 
.001, 95% CI = .10 to .26, k = 17) were all very similar. Interestingly, the effect of 
domain of study was qualified by an interaction with type of implicit 
measurement, 𝑄𝑚(7) = 23.04, p < .01. Follow-up analysis revealed, that the 
effect of type of behavior did not reach significance in the evaluative priming 
paradigm, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 6.34, p = .10, but did reach significance in the approach 
avoidance task, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 8.46, p < .05. Follow-up analyses revealed that predictive   
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Table 2. Predictive validity in the AAT in function of type of behavior (CI in 
parentheses).  
Type of behavior r  (95 % CI) k 
Objective past behavior .09 (.02 to .16)a 12 
Retrospective self-reported behavior .13 (.10 to .17)a 50 
Concurrent objective behavior .24 (.14 to .33)b 17 
Concurrent self-reported behavior .22 (.09 to .34)b 7 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; correlations printed in bold reached significance 
(p < .05). The difference in predictive validity between types of behavior reached 
significance if superscripts were different but not when they were identical. 
 
validity in the AAT depends on whether behavior occurred at the same time of 
implicit measurement or whether it took place at an earlier time (see Table 2 and 
table 3). 
Type of research domain. There was no significant heterogeneity in the 
effect sizes based on the research domain in which the study was performed, 
𝑄𝑚(5) = 8.75, p = .12. Effects sizes between studies investigating prejudice (r = 
.24, p < .001, 95% CI = .17 to .31, k = 25), consumer preferences (r = .20, p < .01, 
95% CI = .10 to .28, k = 9), personality traits (r = .19, p < .001, 95% CI = .10 to .28, 
k = 23), impulsivity (r = .17, p < .001, 95% CI = .14 to .20, k = 79), clinical 
psychology (r = .14, p < .001, 95% CI = .07 to .21, k = 24), and other topics (r = .24, 
p < .001, 95% CI = .17 to .31, k = 15) were very similar. Interestingly, the effect of 
domain of study was qualified by type of implicit measurement, 𝑄𝑚(8) = 24.88, p 
< .01. The effect of type of research domain was not significant in the evaluative 
priming paradigm, 𝑄𝑚(4) = 3.48, p = .48; but did reach significance in the 
approach-avoidance task, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 11.41, p < .01. Studies examining studies 
belonging to the ‘other’ category differed significantly from studies examining 
clinical behavior, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 8.87, p < .01 or impulsive behavior, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 6.58, p < 
.05. The difference in predictive validity between studies examining clinical 
behavior and impulsive behavior did not reach significance, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1. Indeed, 
studies classified as belonging to the ‘other’ category (r = .36, p < .001, 95% CI = 
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.23 to .47, k = 4) revealed the highest effect size, followed by impulsive behavior 
(r = .15, p < .001, 95% CI = .11 to .18, k = 51), and clinical psychology (r = .14, p < 
.001, 95% CI = .07 to .21, k = 24). It may be noted that strong effect found for 
non-specified topics was based on just four effect sizes, originating from just two 
different studies. We are therefore reluctant to assign much weight to this 
finding. For studies concerning prejudice, consumer behavior, or personality 
traits, the number of studies in which the approach-avoidance task was used was 
simply too low (i.e., 0 or 1 study) to allow for reliable analyses. 
Publication year. The estimated correlation between implicit measures and 
behavior was moderated by the year of publication, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 7.93, p < .01, β = -
0.01. Interestingly, predictive validity decreased with increasing publication year. 
This effect was qualified by an interaction with type of implicit measurement, 
𝑄𝑚(3) = 21.71, p < .01, with the effect reaching significance in the approach-
avoidance paradigm, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 13.92, p < .001, β = -0.03, but not in the evaluative 
priming paradigm, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1. 
Time of behavioral assessment. Effect sizes were not dependent on 
whether behavior was assessed at the same time of the implicit evaluation 
assessment or at a later point in time, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1. The effect of behavioral 
assessment did differ between the  evaluative priming procedure and the 
approach-avoidance procedure, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 10.20, p < .05. However, follow-up 
analyses revealed that the effect of time of assessment failed to reach 
significance both in the evaluative priming paradigm, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 1.10, p = .29, and 
the approach avoidance task, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 1.31, p = .25 (see Table 4).  
Methodological parameters. 
 Evaluative priming paradigm. The relationship between inter-
individual difference score as measured with the  evaluative priming paradigm 
and behavior was not moderated by prime duration (ranging between 15 ms and 
1000 ms), 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1, whether the prime was presented subliminally or 
supraliminally, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 2.05, p = .15, target modality, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1, type of 
evaluative priming paradigm, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 3.99, p = .26, and whether the 
presentation time of the target stimulus and ITI were fixed or not, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 1.24,   
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Table 4. Predictive validity as a function of type of implicit measurement and 
time of behavioral assessment (Confidence intervals in parentheses). 
 
Behavioral assessment at the same time of implicit 
attitude assessment? 
Type of implicit 
measurement task t 
Yes No 
 r (95 % CI) k r (95 % CI) k 
Evaluative priming 
paradigm 
.23 (.19 to .27) 72 .17 (.11 to .23) 23 
Approach- Avoidance task .15 (.12 to .19) 70 .20 (.12 to .29) 10 
Note: k = number of effect sizes; correlations printed in bold reached significance (p 
< .05).  
 
p = .27 and 𝑄𝑚(1) = 2.86, p = .09, respectively. Interestingly, we did find a 
significant effect of SOA, β = -0.0001, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 8.82, p < .01. The longer the time 
interval between prime and target (ranging between 36 ms and 2015 ms), the 
lower the correlation between inter-individual difference scores and behavior. In 
addition, we also observed that a higher number of trials (ranging between 20 
and 432 trials), β = 0.001, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 6.00, p < .05, a longer target duration (ranging 
between 220 ms and 750 ms), β = 0.001, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 4.47, p < .05, and a longer ITI 
(ranging between 0 ms and 2500 ms), β = 0.0001, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 6.64, p < .01, increased 
the correlation between inter-individual difference scores and behavior. Finally, 
this correlation was also more pronounced when pictures (r = .23, p < .001, 95% 
CI = .20 to .27, k = 59) instead of words (r = .20, p < .001, 95% CI = .13 to .26, k = 
36) were used as primes, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 3.99, p < .05. For exploratory purposes, we 
examined the interaction between the above mentioned moderators, FSAA and, 
relevance. The results of these analyses are reported in the Appendix (Table 4 – 
11). If the three-way interaction between moderator, FSAA, and relevance did 
not reach significance, we report the effect of FSAA. We do not report the main 
effect of relevance because this effect only reached significance for the variable 
SOA (p = .05). However, this effect was not interpretable due to insufficient data. 
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 Approach-avoidance paradigm. We found a significant effect of number 
of trials, β = 0.001, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 6.35, p < .05. Results revealed an increasing degree of 
association between inter-individual difference scores and behavior with an 
increasing number of trials (ranging between 12 and 256 trials). Neither the 
effect of target modality, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1, nor the effect of type of approach-avoidance 
task, 𝑄𝑚(2) < 1, reached significance. Interestingly, the estimated correlation in 
the AAT was moderated by scoring algorithm, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 34.21, p < .001. Predictive 
validity was highest if an RT based compatibility score was used (r = .25, p < .001, 
95% CI = .19 to .32, k = 21) and differed significantly from the predictive validity 
when inter-individual difference scores were calculated via the restricted RT 
based compatibility score, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 7.96, p < .01, the D-measure, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 15.80, p 
< .001, or a restricted RT based compatibility score that was corrected for the 
approach bias to neutral stimuli, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 18.75, p < .001. The second highest 
relation between inter-individual difference scores and behavior was obtained, 
using the restricted RT based compatibility score, (r = .15, p < .001, 95% CI = .12 
to .18, k = 36). This correlation was significantly different from the estimated 
correlation using the D- measure, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 10.07, p < .01, or the restricted RT 
based compatibility score corrected for the approach bias to neutral stimuli, 
𝑄𝑚(1) = 5.56, p < .05. Finally, we did not find a difference between the estimated 
correlation when using the D-measure (r = .06, p = .10, 95% CI = -.01 to .13, k = 9) 
or the restricted RT based compatibility corrected for responses to neutral 
stimuli (r = .08, p < .01, 95% CI = .03 to .13, k = 14), 𝑄𝑚(1) = 1.17, p = .28. Note, 
however, that the latter two results were based on 9 and 14 effect sizes 
originating from just three and two different studies, respectively. Therefore, it is 
hard to make strong claims on the basis of these observations. Similar to the 
evaluative priming task, we examined the three-way interaction between each of 
these moderators, FSAA and relevance. Results are reported in the Appendix 
(Table 12 – 17). 
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Figure 1. Funnel plot based on the complete dataset, with Fisher’s z 
transformations of the effect size on the x-axis and standard errors on the y-axis. 
Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval around the mean. 
 
Figure 2. Funnel plot based on studies examining the predictive validity of the  
evaluative priming paradigm, with Fisher’s z transformations of the effect size on 
the x-axis and standard errors on the y-axis. Dotted lines represent the 95% 
confidence interval around the mean. 
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Figure 3. Funnel plot based on studies examining the predictive validity of the 
approach-avoidance paradigm, with Fisher’s z transformations of the effect size 
on the x-axis and standard errors on the y-axis. Dotted lines represent the 95% 
confidence interval around the mean. 
The impact of Publication Bias 
The funnel plot based on the entire dataset is given in Figure 1 and appears 
to be asymmetric. The interpretation of the funnel plots was confirmed by the 
results of the Egger’s test which revealed a significant intercept, β = 0.08, z = 
4.44, p < .001. Publication bias was found both for studies examining the 
predictive validity of the evaluative priming procedure, β = 0.11, z = 3.13, p < .01, 
and studies examining the predictive validity of the approach-avoidance 
paradigm, β = 0.07, z = 3.30, p < .01 (see Figure 2 and 3, respectively). 
DISCUSSION 
The main aim of the present meta-analysis was to examine the influence 
of FSAA on the predictive validity of implicit measurement techniques. It was 
hypothesized that predictive validity would be higher if participants were 
encouraged to attend to non-evaluative stimulus features during implicit attitude 
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measurement as compared to implicit measurement tasks in which attention to 
evaluative stimulus features is maximized, especially in participants for whom 
the attitudes under examination were personally relevant. The results of this 
meta-analysis did not confirm our main hypotheses, in several ways. First, there 
was no evidence for an overall dependency of predictive validity of implicit 
attitude measures on FSAA. Second, while we did find evidence for a significant 
interaction between FSAA and personal relevance in the approach-avoidance 
task, the nature of this interaction was opposite to our expectations. More 
specifically, whereas the predictive validity of the AAT that maximizes attention 
to non-evaluative stimulus features did not differ between the mixed-relevance 
group and the irrelevant-evaluations group, predictive validity was significantly 
lower in the relevant-evaluations group as compared to the mixed-relevance 
group and the irrelevant-evaluations group. It must be noted, however, that this 
finding does not necessarily imply that predictive validity is less outspoken in 
participants for whom the attitude object is personally relevant. After all, this 
finding might as well be an artifact of a reduced amount of variance in the inter-
individual difference scores in this group. If most participants in the relevant 
group had very similar likes and dislikes toward the attitude object, than this low 
amount of variability could have attenuated the correlation between likes and 
dislikes and behavior.  
In sum, the results of the present meta-analysis do not favor our 
hypothesis that predictive validity is influenced by FSAA. Nonetheless, at least for 
the evaluative priming paradigm, our meta-analysis might at best only provide 
inconclusive evidence. Note, that we hypothesized that the moderating role of 
FSAA on predictive validity in implicit attitude measurements would be 
particularly outspoken in the mixed relevance and relevant groups. Yet, the 
majority of studies that examined the predictive validity of the evaluative 
priming paradigm examined likes and dislikes that were not personally relevant 
(i.e. 90.5 % ). Thus, only 9.5 % (i.e., nine effect sizes) of the included studies 
examined the predictive validity of the evaluative priming paradigm in groups in 
which the attitude object was personally relevant for at least a significant part of 
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participants (i.e., the relevant-evaluations group or mixed-relevance group). Five 
of these effect sizes were obtained in studies in which participants were 
encouraged to assign selective attention to evaluative features. The other four 
effect sizes were obtained in studies that encouraged participants to attend to 
non-evaluative semantic features. Thus, it could be argued that we simply lacked 
sufficient statistical power to test the modulating influence of FSAA on the 
predictive validity of the evaluative priming paradigm.  
This state of affairs indicates much more research is needed on the 
predictive validity of the evaluative priming paradigm in individuals for whom the 
attitude object is personally relevant. Implicit measurement techniques were 
developed to understand and predict meaningful behavior. That is, we are 
primarily interested whether implicit measurement techniques can be employed 
to predict, for example, drinking behavior in alcoholics or dietary behavior in 
individuals suffering from anorexia. In contrast, it seems less informative to 
predict drinking behavior in non-alcohol abusing students, or to predict dietary 
behavior in a student population. Moreover, one could argue that both the 
predictive validity and reliability of implicit measurement techniques will be 
underestimated if examined in individuals for whom these evaluations are not 
personally relevant. It seems therefore essential that the reliability and validity of 
these techniques are assessed in samples for whom the measured likes and 
dislikes are highly meaningful. 
Finally, it is important to stress that the current findings should be 
interpreted with caution as inspection of the funnel plots as well as results of the 
Egger’s test indicated the presence of publication bias. The presence of 
publication bias in our sample might not only have amplified our estimates of the 
predictive validity of implicit attitude measurements, it also impedes the 
conclusions that can be drawn about the moderating role of various procedural 
variables. Importantly, it is possible that the reported publication bias specifically 
effected our analyses about the moderating role of FSAA in the evaluative 
priming task. That is, a selective underreporting of null findings in the evaluative 
priming task in which attention to evaluative stimulus features is maximized, 
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would specifically enhance the estimate of the predictive validity in these sort of 
tasks. Consequently, the estimated difference in predictive validity between 
evaluative priming tasks that maximize attention to non-evaluative stimulus 
features and evaluative priming tasks that maximize attention to evaluative 
stimulus features, would be biased. Note, that this scenario is not unlikely as far 
more studies have examined the predictive validity of the evaluative priming 
paradigm in which selective attention to evaluative features was maximized as 
compared to the evaluative priming paradigm in which selective attention to 
non-evaluative features was maximized. Unfortunately, we were unable to use 
the trim-an-fill method (Duval & Tweedie, 2000) to correct for publication bias as 
this method has not yet been developed for multilevel meta-analyses. The 
presence of publication bias was probably aggravated or even induced because 
we did not include any unpublished work in our analysis. Taken together, our 
observation strongly suggest that the field of implicit attitude measurement 
suffers from selective publishing of significant results while ignoring non-
significant findings. It thus becomes critical for the advancement of this field to 
publish the null-findings that have probably disappeared in file drawers. 
The evaluative priming paradigm 
Based on 30 studies (95 effect sizes), we observed an estimated 
correlation of .22 between implicit likes and dislikes obtained with the evaluative 
priming paradigm and behavior. This correlation is somewhat smaller than the 
analogous correlation of .28 reported by Cameron et al. (2012). At least two 
possible account can be proposed to explain why these two meta-analysis 
arrived at different estimates. First, in the present meta-analysis only a subset of 
the priming tasks considered in the meta-analysis of Cameron et al. (2012) were 
included. For example, we did not include the AMP, the Eriksen Flanker task, or 
the shooter task. These tasks were not included because they did not meet our 
inclusion criteria. That is, none of these tasks can be administered both under 
conditions that maximize attention to evaluative stimulus features and 
conditions that minimize attention to evaluative stimulus features. Second, we 
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adopted a very rigorous definition of behavior in the sense that we restricted our 
meta-analysis to behavior that was or could have been observed by an 
independent observer. We adopted this definition to avoid the inclusion of 
behaviors that were in part explicit measures of evaluations. For example, the 
intention to perform a certain act (e.g., to quit smoking) was conceived of as a 
self-assessment of an unobservable construct, not as a behavior in the strict 
sense. Likewise, we discarded self-reports of anxiety (Spalding & Hardin, 1999) or 
marital satisfaction (Mcnulty, Olson, Meltzer, & Shaffer, 2013) because these 
outcome measures are quite likely to be influenced by explicit evaluations.  
Although the correlation between behavior and inter-individual 
difference scores in our study is only small to moderate, our findings suggests 
that the priming paradigm is indeed a valid measure of implicit likes and dislikes. 
Importantly, our results also reveal that predictive validity in the evaluative 
priming paradigm is a very general phenomenon, given that it is unaffected by 
variables such as the type of evaluative priming paradigm, the research topic, as 
well as the type of behavioral outcome measure. Corroborating the results of 
Cameron et al. (2002), we also did not observe any moderation by target 
modality, time of behavioral assessment, prime duration, or whether primes 
were presented subliminal or supraliminal. Moreover, as was observed by 
Cameron et al. (2002), predictive validity was found to be moderated by target 
duration, i.e., the predictive validity of evaluative priming scores increased with 
increasing target duration. Interestingly, the effect of target duration observed 
by Cameron et al. (2012) was opposite to the effect of target duration in the 
present meta-analysis. Cameron et al. (2012) observed that increasing target 
durations was associated with decreased predictive validity. The authors 
attributed this effect to increased processing of the prime stimulus in order to 
help disambiguate a briefly presented target (see De Houwer, Hermans, & 
Spruyt, 2001 for related findings). This discrepant finding could be explained by 
comparing the variability observed for the variable target duration in the study 
of Cameron et al. (2012) and in our study. Cameron et al. (2012) observed a lot 
more variance in the variable target duration (SD = 2280.94 ms) than we did in 
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the present meta-analysis (SD = 217.61 ms). It can be concluded, that Cameron 
et al. (2012) included a much broader range of target durations in their meta-
analysis than we included in the present study which could explain our opposite 
findings. 
Interestingly, some variables proved to be significant moderators of 
predictive validity in our study but failed to reach significance in the study of 
Cameron et al. (2012). First, in the present meta-analysis, predictive validity 
decreased with increasing duration of the interval between prime onset and 
target onset. This finding is in line with multiple studies demonstrating that 
evaluative priming effects are observed at short SOA’s but not at long SOA’s 
(e.g., Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001). Second, predictive 
validity was depended on the ITI. A longer ITI was predictive of a higher 
correlation between inter-individual difference scores and the behavioral 
outcome measures. Third, we observed that a higher number of trials was 
associated with an increase in predictive validity. This finding is unsurprising as it 
has been generally observed that a higher number of trials increases the 
reliability of the measurement which leads to stronger relations between implicit 
attitude measures and behavior (Wentura & Degner, 2010). Fourth, we observed 
higher predictive validity if pictures instead of words were used as prime stimuli. 
This results is in line with the memory model of Glaser and Glaser (1989) stating 
that pictorial information has privileged access to the semantic system as 
compared to words (see also Spruyt, et al., 2002) 
The approach-avoidance paradigm. 
Although many studies have used the AAT to measure implicit likes and 
dislikes, there have been no quantitative reviews about the predictive validity of 
this task. The present meta-analysis revealed an estimated correlation of .16 
between inter-individual difference scores and behavioral outcome measures 
based on 28 studies and 80 effect sizes. While the estimated correlation is rather 
small, the available data suggests that the AAT is a valid measure of implicit likes 
and dislikes. Moreover, the relation between inter-individual difference scores 
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and behavior revealed to be fairly general. That is, predictive validity was 
insensitive to variations in the type of AAT that was used (i.e., abstract manikin 
task, the joystick task, or the joystick feedback task), target modality, and 
whether behavior was assessed at the same time of attitude assessment or not.  
Interestingly, we did observe some variables that significantly moderated 
predictive validity in the AAT. First, the estimated correlation between inter-
individual difference scores and behavior was dependent on the domain of 
study. More specifically, predictive validity was smaller in studies that examined 
clinical behavior or impulsive behavior as compared to studies that examined 
topics that were unrelated to either clinical behavior, impulsive behavior, 
politics, consumer behavior, prejudice, or personality traits. However, because 
the moderating effect of type of study domain was based on only a small amount 
of studies, we are reluctant to assign much weight to this finding. Second, in 
correspondence with our findings in the evaluative priming paradigm, predictive 
validity in the AAT increased with an increasing number of trials. This finding 
suggests that the amount of trials used in the AAT will influence the reliability of 
the task. As mentioned above, the reliability of a task will positively affect the 
predictive validity of this task (see Wentura & Degner, 2010). Third, we observed 
that the predictive validity in the AAT was dependent on the scoring algorithm 
that was used to compute inter-individual difference scores. In terms of 
predictive validity, it seems that the RT-based compatibility measure (i.e., the 
difference score between congruent and incongruent blocks) outperforms the 
restricted RT-based compatibility measure (i.e., an RT based compatibility 
measure that is based on only a subset of the presented stimuli). Unfortunately, 
only a few studies used the D-measure (i.e., 3 studies) or the restricted RT based 
compatibility measure corrected for responses to neutral stimuli (i.e., 2 studies). 
Consequently, we lacked sufficient power to make strong claims about the 
usefulness of these algorithms to measure inter-individual difference scores in 
the AAT. Fourth, our findings suggest that the association between inter-
individual difference scores obtained with the AAT and behavior decreases as the 
time between the moment of behavior was measured and the moment behavior 
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took place increases. Indeed, the relation between inter-individual difference 
scores and retrospective reports of behavior was smaller as compared to the 
relation between inter- individual difference scores and concurrent reports of 
behavior. This finding is in line with Schwarz (2007) who stated that retrospective 
reports of behavior are often biased memories that lack detail and precision (see 
also Robinson & Clore, 2002; Schwarz, 1999; Strube, 1987). Finally, the predictive 
validity of the AAT was moderated by the publication year of the experiment. 
Predictive validity decreased over time suggesting that initial reports about the 
predictive validity of the AAT were too optimistic. More recent reports might 
provide a more realistic perspective on the predictive power of the AAT.  
Importantly, the results of the present meta-analysis revealed that the 
magnitude of the relationship between behavioral outcome measures and 
behavior was significantly lower in the AAT as compared to the evaluative 
priming paradigm. However, it would be preliminary to conclude that the 
evaluative priming paradigm should be preferred over the AAT if one wants to 
measure implicit likes and dislikes in order to predict behavior. Although 
predictive validity in both tasks was fairly general, we did observe various 
procedural variables that significantly moderated predictive validity in the AAT 
and the evaluative priming paradigms. Consequently, an evaluative priming 
design using detrimental procedural parameters might not necessarily show a 
higher predictive validity than an AAT in which the most optimal procedural 
parameters are used. Therefore, more research is necessary to determine the 
optimal design both for the AAT and the evaluative priming paradigm before 
strong conclusions can be drawn about the relative magnitude of the 
relationship between behavior and inter-individual difference scores obtained 
with these two tasks. 
Conclusion 
The results of the present meta-analysis reveal a small to moderate 
relation between inter-individual difference scores as measured with the  
evaluative priming paradigm or the AAT.  While the estimated correlation in the 
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AAT was significantly lower than the estimated correlation in the evaluative 
priming paradigm, it seems premature to conclude that the  evaluative priming 
paradigm outperforms the AAT in terms of predictive validity because a host of 
moderating variables proved to impact the predictive validity both in the 
evaluative priming paradigm and AAT.  
Importantly, the hypothesis that the predictive validity of implicit 
measurement techniques is moderated by feature-specific attention allocation 
was not confirmed. Predictive validity did not differ between tasks in which 
participants were or were not encouraged to assign selective attention to 
evaluative features. It should be noted, however, that we were unable to identify 
a substantial amount of studies in which the predictive validity of the  evaluative 
priming paradigm was studied in individuals for whom the to-be-measured likes 
and dislikes were personally relevant. In sum, more research is needed to test 
the influence of FSAA on the predictive validity of the evaluative priming scores. 
Importantly, we also observed strong evidence indicative of a publication bias. 
Researchers active in this field are thus encouraged to report unpublished null-
findings to increase confidence in future meta-analyses on this topic. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 5. The effect of number of trials on predictive validity in the evaluative 
priming task as a function of FSAA and Relevance 
 FSAA: attention to valence 
 No 
 
Yes 
Relevance β 𝑄𝑚(df) k 
 
β 𝑄𝑚(df) k 
Irrelevant group -0.002 5.13(1) 25 
 
0.001 9.28 (1) 52 
Relevant Group 0.23 4.60(2) 3  NA NA NA 
Mixed group NA NA NA 
 
0.003 .24 (1) 5 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; beta-coefficients printed in bold reached 
significance (p < .05). The three-way interaction between FSAA, relevance, and 
number of trials reached significance, 𝑄𝑚 (7) = 16.36, p =.02, k = 86. Follow-up 
analyses revealed that the two-way interaction between relevance and number 
of trials reached significance if selective attention was assigned to evaluative 
features, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 10.37, p = .02, k = 57, but not when selective attention was 
assigned to non-evaluative semantic features, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 5.13, p = .16, k = 29. 
 
Table 6. The effect of prime duration on predictive validity in the evaluative 
priming task as a function of FSAA 
FSAA: attention to valence β 𝑄𝑚(df) k 
 
No -0.00 .04(1) 31 
 
Yes 0.0001 .17(1) 60 
 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; beta-coefficients printed in bold reached 
significance (p < .05). The two-way interaction between FSAA and prime duration 
did not reach significance, 𝑄𝑚(3) < 1. 
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Table 7. The effect of target duration on predictive validity in the evaluative 
priming task as a function of FSAA and Relevance 
 FSAA: attention to valence 
 No 
 
Yes 
Relevance β 𝑄𝑚(df) k 
 
β 𝑄𝑚(df) k 
Irrelevant group 0.0006 8.23(1) 8 
 
0.004 .49(1) 7 
Relevant Group NA NA NA 
 
NA NA NA 
Mixed group NA NA NA 
 
NA NA NA 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; beta-coefficients printed in bold reached 
significance (p < .05). The three-way interaction between FSAA, relevance, and 
target duration reached significance, 𝑄𝑚 (4) = 20.20, p < .001, k = 16. Follow-up 
analyses revealed that the two-way interaction between relevance and target 
duration reached significance if selective attention was assigned to non-
evaluative semantic features, 𝑄𝑚(2) = 8.33, p < .05, k = 9. The two-way 
interaction between relevance and target duration did not reach significance if 
selective attention was assigned to evaluative stimulus features, 𝑄𝑚(1) < .1. 
 
Table 8. The effect of SOA on predictive validity in the evaluative priming task as 
a function of FSAA 
FSAA: attention to valence β 𝑄𝑚(df) k 
 
No -0.0001 5.78(1) 31  
Yes -0.0001 .55(1) 35  
Note. k = number of effect sizes; beta-coefficients printed in bold reached 
significance (p < .05). The two-way interaction between FSAA and prime duration 
reached significance, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 9.47, p < .05, k = 66. 
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Table 9. The effect of ITI on predictive validity in the evaluative priming task as a 
function of FSAA and Relevance 
 FSAA: attention to valence 
 No  Yes 
Relevance β 𝑄𝑚(df) k 
 
β 𝑄𝑚(df) k 
Irrelevant group 0.0002 9.87(1) 20  0.00 1.44(1) 34 
Relevant Group 0.23 2.43(1) 3  NA NA NA 
Mixed group NA NA NA  -0.0001 .24(1) 5 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; beta-coefficients printed in bold reached 
significance (p < .05). The three-way interaction between FSAA, relevance, and 
ITI reached significance, 𝑄𝑚 (6) = 13.34, p < .05, k = 62. Follow-up analyses 
revealed that the two-way interaction between relevance and ITI reached 
significance if selective attention was assigned to evaluative features, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 
1.92, p = .59, k = 39, and if selective attention was assigned to non-evaluative 
semantic features, 𝑄𝑚(2) = 9.94, p < .01, k = 23 
 
Table 10. The effect of prime visibility on predictive validity in the evaluative 
priming task as a function of FSAA 
 FSAA: attention to valence 
 No  Yes 
Prime 
visibility 
r (95 % CI ) 𝑧 k  r (95 % CI ) 𝑧 k 
Subliminal 
presentation 
.20 (.09 to .30) 3.59 14  .31 (.22 to .40) 6.09 16 
Supraliminal 
presentation 
.23 (.16 to .29) 6.91 17  .19 (.15 to .23) 8.61 48 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; correlations printed in bold reached significance 
(p < .05). The two-way interaction between FSAA and prime visibility reached 
significance, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 5.90, p = .13, k = 95. The effect of prime visibility reached 
significance if selective attention was assigned to evaluative features, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 
4.94, p < .05, k = 64, but not when selective attention was assigned to non-
evaluative semantic features, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1. 
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Table 11. The effect of prime modality on predictive validity in the evaluative 
priming task as a function of FSAA 
 FSAA: attention to valence 
 No  Yes 
Prime 
visibility 
r (95 % CI ) 𝑧 k  r (95 % CI ) 𝑧 k 
Pictures .23 (.17 to .29) 7.35 22  .24 (.20 to .28) 10.18 37 
Words .20 (.05 to .33) 2.66 9  .19 (.12 to .27) 5.01 27 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; correlations printed in bold reached significance 
(p < .05). The two-way interaction between FSAA and prime modality did not 
reach reach significance, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 4.02, p = .26, k = 95. Follow-up analyses 
revealed that the effect of prime modality did not reach significance if selective 
attention was assigned to evaluative features, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 2.13, p = .14, k = 64, nor 
when selective attention was assigned to non-evaluative semantic features, 
𝑄𝑚(1) = 1.07, p = .30, k = 31. 
 
 
Table 12. The effect of target modality on predictive validity in the evaluative 
priming task as a function of FSAA 
 FSAA: attention to valence 
 No  Yes 
Prime 
visibility 
r (95 % CI ) 𝑧 k  r (95 % CI ) 𝑧 k 
Pictures .22 (.15 to .29) 5.85 14  .21 (.11 to .31) 3.95 12 
Words .21 (.12 to .29) 4.97 17  .23 (.19 to .28) 9.85 52 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; correlations printed in bold reached significance 
(p < .05). The two-way interaction between FSAA and target modality reached 
significance, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 1.26, p = .74, k = 95. The effect of target modality did not 
reach significance if selective attention was assigned to evaluative features, 
𝑄𝑚(1) < 1, nor when selective attention was assigned to non-evaluative semantic 
features, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1. 
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Table 14. The effect of fixed or variable ITI on predictive validity in the evaluative 
priming task as a function of FSAA 
 FSAA: attention to valence 
 No  Yes 
ITI r (95 % CI ) 𝑧 k  r (95 % CI ) 𝑧 k 
variable .21 (.13 to .28) 5.25 10  .08 (-.05 to .22) 1.19 4 
fixed .20 (.08 to .32) 3.17 13  .26 (.22 to .30) 11.51 35 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; correlations printed in bold reached significance 
(p < .05). The two-way interaction between FSAA and fixed or variable ITI 
reached significance, 𝑄𝑚(3) = 7.02, p = .07, k = 62. The effect of fixed or variable 
ITI did not reach significance if selective attention was assigned to evaluative 
features, 𝑄𝑚(1) = 5.95, p < .05, k = 39, nor when selective attention was assigned 
to non-evaluative semantic features, 𝑄𝑚(1) < 1, k = 23. 
 
 
Table 15. The effect of number of trials on predictive validity in the approach 
avoidance task as a function of FSAA and Relevance 
 FSAA: attention to valence 
 No  Yes 
Relevance β 𝑄𝑚(df) k 
 
β 𝑄𝑚(df) k 
Irrelevant group 0.001 4.38(1) 15 
 
0.001 1.02(1) 14 
Relevant Group 0.0004 .13(1) 20 
 
0.009 3.79(1) 5 
Mixed group 0.001 1.54(1) 12  0.002 5.54 (1) 10 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; beta-coefficients printed in bold reached 
significance (p < .05). The three-way interaction between FSAA, relevance, and 
number of trials reached significance, 𝑄𝑚 (11) = 42.55, p < .001, k = 76. Follow-up 
analyses revealed that the two-way interaction between relevance and number 
of trials reached significance if selective attention was assigned to evaluative 
features, 𝑄𝑚(5) = 15.96, p < .01, k = 29 but not when selective attention was 
assigned to non-evaluative semantic features, 𝑄𝑚(5) = 21.38, p < .001, k = 47. 
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Table 17. The effect of type of task on predictive validity in the approach 
avoidance task as a function of FSAA and Relevance 
 FSAA to valence 
 Yes  No 
Type of AAT r (95 % CI ) 𝑧 k  r (95 % CI ) z k 
 Irrelevant-evaluations group 
Manikin task .14 (.08 to .20)a 4.60 12  .07 (-.10 to .24)a .84 2 
Joystick task .18 (.06 to .30)a 2.90 6  NA NA NA 
Joystick 
feedback task 
NA NA NA  .16 (.10 to .22)a 5.55 15 
 Relevant-evaluations group 
Manikin task NA NA NA  .08 (.02 to .14)a 2.75 8 
Joystick task NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
Joystick 
feedback task 
NA NA NA    .12 (-.02 to.26)a 1.70 12 
 Mixed-relevance group 
Manikin task .14 (.06 to .22) 5.12 9  .15 (.09 to .21)a 4.94 8 
Joystick task NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
Joystick 
feedback task 
NA NA NA  .28 (.14 to .40)a 4.03 4 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; correlations printed in bold reached significance 
(p < .05). The three-way interaction between FSAA, relevance, and type of task 
reached significance, 𝑄𝑚 (11) = 35.01, p < .001, k = 80. Follow-up analyses 
revealed that the two-way interaction between relevance and number of trials 
reached significance if selective attention was assigned to evaluative features, 
𝑄𝑚(5) = 11.70, p < .05, k = 31, and when selective attention was assigned to non-
evaluative semantic features, 𝑄𝑚(5) = 18.56, p < .001, k = 49. The difference in 
predictive validity between type of tasks reach significance if superscripts were 
different but not when they were identical. 
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Table 18. The effect of type of scoring algorithm on predictive validity in the approach -
avoidance task as a function of FSAA and Relevance 
 FSAA to valence 
 Yes  No 
Type of scoring algorithm r (95 % CI ) 𝑧 k  r (95 % CI ) z k 
 Irrelevant-evaluations group 
RT based compatibility task .22 (.10 to .34)a 3.52 4  .37 (.22 to .50)a 4.62 2 
Restricted RT based 
compatibility task 
.13 (.07 to .18)a 4.65 10  .14 (.09 to .19)a 5.10 13 
D-measure .13 (-.03 to .28)a 1.64 2  .08 (-.08 to .23)b .99 2 
Restricted RT based 
compatibility task controlled 
for approach bias to neutral 
stimuli 
NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
 Relevant-evaluations group 
RT based compatibility task .48 (.23 to .65)a 4.28 3  .24 (.09 to .37)a 3.16 7 
Restricted RT based 
compatibility task 
NA NA NA  .23 (-.16 to .55)b 1.15 2 
D-measure .20 (.00 to .39)b 1.99 2  .01 (-.04 to .07)b .43 3 
Restricted RT based 
compatibility task controlled 
for approach bias to neutral 
stimuli 
NA NA NA  .08 (.02 to .14)a 2.75 8 
 Mixed-relevance group 
RT based compatibility task NA NA NA  .19 (.06 to .30)a 2.98 4 
Restricted RT based 
compatibility task 
.29 (.17 to .41)a 4.54 3  .16 (.10 to .22)a 5.36 8 
D-measure NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
Restricted RT based 
compatibility task controlled 
for approach bias to neutral 
stimuli 
.08 (-.02 to .18)b 1.53 6  NA NA NA 
Note. k = number of effect sizes; correlations printed in bold reached significance (p < 
.05). The three-way interaction between FSAA, relevance, and type of task reached 
significance, 𝑄𝑚 (16) = 54.93, p < .001, k = 80. The two-way interaction between 
relevance and number of trials reached significance if selective attention was assigned 
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to evaluative features, 𝑄𝑚(7) = 18.32, p < .05, k = 31, and when selective attention was 
assigned to non-evaluative semantic features, 𝑄𝑚(8) = 33.32, p < .001, k = 49. The 
difference in predictive validity between type of scoring algorithms reach significance if 
superscripts were identical but not when they were different. 
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THE EFFECT OF FEATURE-SPECIFIC ATTENTION ALLOCATION 
ON EXTINCTION OF RECENTLY ACQUIRED LIKES AND DISLIKES 
Evaluative Conditioning (EC) refers to the change in the liking of a neutral 
stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with another stimulus that has a clear evaluative 
meaning (US). In two experiments, we examined whether extinction of EC effects 
is moderated by feature-specific attention allocation (FSAA). In both experiments, 
CSs were abstract Gabor patches that varied along two orthogonal, perceptual 
dimensions (i.e., spatial frequency and orientation). During the acquisition phase, 
one of these dimensions was predictive of the valence of the USs and participants 
were encouraged to assign selective attention to this dimension. During the 
extinction phase, CSs were presented alone and participants were asked to 
categorize the CSs either according to their valence (evaluative condition), the 
perceptual dimension that was task-relevant during the acquisition phase 
(relevant condition), or a perceptual dimension that was task-irrelevant during 
the acquisition phase (irrelevant condition). As predicted, both implicit and 
explicit measures of stimulus valence revealed a linear increase in the extinction 
rate of the EC effect as participants were encouraged to assign selective attention 
to non-evaluative stimulus features of the CSs during the extinction phase. 
4 
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INTRODUCTION 
Attitudes drive behavior (Allport, 1935). Our interpersonal interactions, the 
activities we pursue, the products we buy, etc., are all, to some extent, guided by 
our personal likes and dislikes. Because (most) attitudes are acquired during the 
lifetime of an organism (Walther, Nagengast, & Trasselli, 2005) it is of great 
theoretical and practical relevance to study the mechanisms that drive attitude 
acquisition and attitude change.  
One way in which attitudes can be acquired or changed is through 
Evaluative Conditioning (i.e., EC). In this paradigm, a neutral stimulus is paired 
with a stimulus that has a clear positive or negative meaning. Typically, this 
procedure causes the valence of the initially neutral stimulus (i.e., Conditioned 
Stimulus or CS) to shift toward the valence of the positive or negative stimulus 
with which it was paired (i.e., Unconditioned Stimulus or US). This phenomenon, 
also referred to as the Evaluative Conditioning effect (i.e., EC effect), has now 
been replicated in a large number of studies (for a review, see Hofmann, De 
Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). From a classical-conditioning 
perspective, one might expect that a CS will lose its valence and become neutral 
again when it is repeatedly presented alone during an extinction session (i.e., CS-
only trials). In line with this viewpoint, Lipp, Oughton, and LeLievre (2003) 
demonstrated that the unpleasantness ratings of a CS that was predictive of an 
aversive electric stimulus (i.e., US) increased during acquisition but decreased 
back to neutral during extinction (see also Hofmann et al., 2010). Other 
researchers, however, reported evidence showing that the EC effect is highly 
resistant to extinction. Consider, for example, the findings of De Houwer, 
Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, and Eelen (2000). These authors assigned participants 
to either a standard EC group or an extinction group. Participants in the 
conditioning group were exposed to seven presentations of eight CS-US pairs 
each. The extinction group received the same set of CS-US pairs but these were 
followed by five CS-only trials. De Houwer et al. (2000) found no significant 
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difference between the size of the EC effect in the conditioning group and the 
extinction group. One way to account for these inconsistent findings is to assume 
that the degree to which the EC effect is sensitive to extinction is dependent 
upon moderating variables.  
The aim of the present research was to examine the extent to which the 
extinction of EC effects depends upon one potential moderator, i.e. Feature-
Specific Attention Allocation (FSAA). This research question was inspired by the 
FSAA framework developed by Spruyt and colleagues (Everaert, Spruyt, & De 
Houwer, 2013; Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, Pourtois, & De Houwer, 2013; Spruyt, De 
Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007). 
Drawing on earlier work by Nosofsky (1986), this framework includes two central 
assumptions. First, it is assumed that stimulus dimensions are processed only if 
and to the extent that they are selectively attended to. Second, selective 
attention assignment is assumed to be dependent upon current goals and task 
demands. In line with this idea, various markers of automatic evaluative stimulus 
processing have been found to depend on the extent to which attention is 
assigned to the evaluative stimulus dimension, including the dot probe effect 
(Everaert et al., 2013), the emotional Stroop effect (Everaert et al., 2013), and 
the evaluative priming effect (Spruyt et al., 2009).  
Building further on these findings, we hypothesized that the degree to 
which the EC effect is resistant to extinction must also depend on the degree to 
which the evaluative stimulus dimension is selectively attended to during 
extinction. A crucial element in our reasoning is the assumption that the 
resistance to extinction of the EC effect results from the fact that CSs, once they 
have acquired a clear valence, evoke a spontaneous evaluative response that is 
in line with the information that was acquired during the evaluative learning 
phase (Martin & Levey, 1978). In fact, it could be argued that this spontaneous 
evaluative response maintains or even strengthens the acquired valence because 
it co-occurs with the evoking CS and thus confirms the emotional nature of the 
CS (see Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992). According to the FSAA account, 
however, participants will process the valence of CSs to a lesser degree if they 
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assign attention to another (non-evaluative) stimulus dimension. Hence, when 
attending to non-evaluative properties of the CSs during extinction, the 
presentation of a CS is no longer accompanied by a spontaneous evaluative 
response, which could result in novel learning that the CS is neutral.  
To test this hypothesis, we manipulated the extent to which participants 
assigned attention to specific features of CSs, both during the acquisition phase 
and the extinction phase of the experiment. CSs were artificial, grayscale figures 
(Gabor patches, see below) that varied on two perceptually separable 
dimensions (i.e., spatial frequency and orientation). In the acquisition phase, 
participants were encouraged to assign selective attention to one of these 
dimensions because they were required to categorize the CSs according to either 
frequency or orientation (see Spruyt, Klauer, Gast, De Schryver, & De Houwer, 
2015). Crucially, the to-be-judged dimension was predictive of the valence of the 
USs so that one CS category was always paired with negative USs while the other 
CS category was always paired with positive USs. Next, during the extinction 
phase, participants were asked to categorize CSs either according to the 
evaluative dimension (evaluative condition), the same perceptual dimension 
(relevant condition), or the other perceptual dimension (irrelevant condition). 
Participants thus assigned selective attention to valence in the evaluative 
condition, to a feature that was correlated with valence in the relevant 
condition, and to a nonevaluative semantic dimension in the irrelevant 
condition.  
Extinction was expected to occur in the irrelevant condition but not in the 
evaluative condition. Because participants in the relevant condition were 
encouraged to assign attention to a perceptual feature that was still related to 
valence, we expected extinction to be less pronounced in this condition relative 
to the irrelevant condition. To assess the efficacy of this new approach, 
extinction was assessed by means of two different attitude measures. First, 
evaluative ratings were administered to capture more deliberate evaluations. 
Second, more spontaneous evaluations were captured by the Affect 
Misattribution Paradigm (i.e., AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005).  
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EXPERIMENT 1  
Method  
Participants  
Ninety-six students (28 men, 68 women) at Ghent University with a mean 
age of 21.45 years (SD = 4.6 years) participated for course credit or were paid €5. 
Three participants made a large number of errors during the acquisition phase of 
the experiment (i.e., 32.5 %, 37.5 %, and 52.5 %) and were therefore exposed to 
just 67.5 %, 62.5 %, and 47.5 %, respectively, of the CS-US pairings (see below). 
Because these participants were clearly outliers compared to the complete 
sample (M = 7.63 %, SD = 8.46 %), the data of these participants were excluded 
from the analyses. Two additional participants were excluded because they 
responded exceptionally fast (i.e., less 200 ms) on a large number of AMP trials 
(i.e., 15.63 % and 25.00 %). Again, these participants were clear-cut outliers in 
comparison with the complete sample (M = 1.01 %, SD = 4.70 %). Note, however, 
that the conclusions reported below were not contingent upon the inclusion or 
exclusion of these participants.  
Materials  
Based on norm data collected by Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, and Eelen 
(2002), 15 positive and 15 negative color pictures were selected to be used as 
USs (all 512 pixels wide and 384 pixels high). Several of these pictures originated 
from the International Affective Picture System (i.e., IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2008). On a scale ranging from -5 (“very negative”) to + 5 (“very 
positive”), the mean valence rating of negative USs was significantly smaller than 
zero, M = -3.08, SE = 0.20, t(14) = -15.34, p < .001. The mean valence rating of 
positive USs was significantly larger than zero, M = 2.36, SE = 0.18, t(14) = 12.78, 
p < .001. Eight grayscale Gabor patches (384 × 384 pixels) were used as CSs. 
These Gabor patches varied on two orthogonal, perceptual dimensions: spatial 
frequency and orientation (see Figure 1). Values used for the spatial frequency 
dimension were 4.25, 5.5, 10.5, and 11.75 cycles. Values used for the orientation  
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Figure 1. Examples of Gabor Patches. 
 
dimension were 11.25, 22.5, 67.5, and 78.75 degrees. For the AMP, 200 different 
Chinese pictographs were used as targets. All Chinese pictographs were 
presented in white and were 256 pixels wide and 256 pixels high.  
An Affect 4.0 program (Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & 
Hermans, 2010) controlled the presentation of the stimuli as well as the 
registration of the responses. The experiment was run on a Dell Optiplex GX520 
computer. All stimuli were presented against the black background of a 19 inch 
computer monitor (100 Hz).  
Procedure 
For the acquisition phase, participants from each experimental condition 
(see extinction phase) were divided in two counterbalancing groups. The first 
group was encouraged to assign attention to the spatial frequency of CSs (i.e., 
frequency Group). Participants in the second group were encouraged to 
131  CHAPTER 4 
 
selectively attend to the orientation of CSs (i.e., orientation Group). To 
manipulate FSAA, we used the procedures developed by Spruyt et al. (2014). 
More specifically, we asked participants to categorize the CSs in two arbitrary 
categories, i.e., “Category A” and “Category B”. In the frequency group, 
participants were informed that assigning attention to “the number of lines” 
would help them discriminate between the two CS categories. In the orientation 
group, participants were informed that assigning attention to “the orientation of 
the lines” would be an efficient strategy to optimize their performance. The 
cutoff values for assigning a particular CS to either Category A or Category B 
were 8 cycles and 45 degrees, for the frequency and orientation group 
respectively.  
For each participant separately, the computer program selected five 
positive and five negative USs from the complete list of available USs (random 
sampling without replacement). In the frequency group, the presentation of a 
positive or negative US was contingent upon the spatial frequency of the CSs. In 
the orientation group, the occurrence of a positive or negative US was 
contingent upon the orientation of the CSs. Four CSs (e.g., spatial frequency 
below eight cycles) were paired with all the positive USs and four CSs (e.g., 
spatial frequency above eight cycles) were paired with all the negative USs, 
leading to 40 EC trials. As such, each CS category was paired 20 times with either 
a positive or a negative US. The assignment of a specific CS category to a specific 
US category was counterbalanced across participants.  
Each trial started with the presentation of a CS, which participants were 
asked to categorize as fast as possible. In case of an erroneous response, a 3000-
ms error message (i.e., “FOUT!”) appeared. In case of a correct response, the US 
was presented for 3000 ms. CSs were displayed until a classification response 
was registered and participants were asked to learn which CS belonged to which 
category by relying on the feedback. Participants were thus required to guess on 
the first trial but quickly learned to classify CSs correctly (overall error rate = 6.56 
%). The inter-trial interval varied randomly between 1500 ms and 2500 ms.  
Following the acquisition phase, participants completed two rating phases 
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in which each CS was presented once in a random order. First, participants were 
asked to provide valence ratings for all CSs using a 21-point rating scale ranging 
from -10 to + 10. Second, they were asked to indicate, for each picture 
separately, whether they thought it would be followed, at that particular 
moment in time, by a negative US, a positive US, or by neither of these. Finally, 
participants completed a series of 16 AMP trials, modeled after the 
recommendations of Payne et al. (2005). Each trial started with a 500-ms 
presentation of a fixation cross. Next, 500 ms after the offset of the fixation 
cross, a CS was presented for 75 ms, followed by a blank screen for 125 ms, and 
the presentation of a Chinese pictograph for 100 ms. Following the Chinese 
pictograph, a black-and-white masking stimulus was presented until a response 
was registered. Participants were instructed to press the left key if they 
considered the Chinese pictograph to be less pleasant than average and the right 
key if they considered the Chinese pictograph to be more pleasant than average. 
The inter-trial interval varied randomly between 500 ms and 1500 ms.  
The AMP was followed by an extinction phase in which each CS was 
presented alone for five times (i.e., 40 trials). Participants were divided in three 
conditions and were again asked to categorize the CSs. In the relevant condition, 
participants were asked to categorize CSs according to the same CS dimension as 
in the acquisition phase. Thus, the orientation Group categorized CSs according 
to orientation whereas the spatial frequency group categorized CSs according to 
spatial frequency. In the irrelevant condition, participants were encouraged to 
focus attention to the perceptual dimension of CSs that was irrelevant during the 
acquisition phase. So, participants in the orientation group were now asked to 
categorize CSs according to spatial frequency whereas participants in the 
frequency group were now asked to categorize CSs according to orientation. In 
the evaluation condition, participants were asked to judge the evaluative 
meaning of CSs (i.e., positive vs. negative). Each CS was presented until a 
response was registered. During the extinction phase, participants did not 
receive any feedback concerning their performance. The inter-trial interval 
varied between 500 and 1500 ms.  
133  CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
  
134  CHAPTER 4 
 
Finally, participants were again asked to give evaluative ratings, expectancy 
ratings of CSs, and to complete the AMP.  
Results  
Acquisition effects  
A significant difference was found between expectancy ratings of positive 
CSs (M = 0.85, SD = 0.30) and negative CSs (M = -0.87, SD = 0.28), F(1, 90) = 
857.4, p < .001, η² = .91. Likewise, we found a significant difference between the 
mean valence ratings of positive CSs (M = 2.89, SD = 3.51) and negative CSs (M = 
-2.77, SD = 3.72), F(1, 90) = 65.99, p < .001, η² = .42. The AMP data corroborated 
these findings. The proportion of pleasant judgments was significantly higher on 
positive-CS trials (M = .69, SD = .24) than on negative-CS trials (M = .32, SD = .27),  
F(1, 90) = 57.62, p < .001, η² = .39. None of these effects was qualified by an 
interaction with counterbalancing group (attention to either orientation or 
spatial frequency during the acquisition phase), all F’s < 3.14, nor did any of 
these EC effects differ between conditions, all F’s < 1.81. For ten participants, at 
least two of the dependent measures (i.e., expectancy ratings, valence ratings, or 
AMP scores) did not reveal an EC effect in the expected direction after the 
acquisition phase (i.e., CS paired with a positive US were to be evaluated more 
positively than CS paired with a negative US). As it makes little sense to study 
extinction effects in the absence of a normal EC effect, the data of these eleven 
participants were excluded from all further analyses.  
Extinction effects 
For each participant, an extinction effect was calculated by subtracting the 
EC effect obtained after the extinction phase from the EC effect obtained after 
the acquisition phase. Extinction effects were calculated for each dependent 
measure and were subjected to a one way ANOVA with condition (irrelevant 
condition vs. relevant condition vs. evaluative condition) as a between subjects 
factor. Because we expected a gradual decrease in the magnitude of the 
extinction effect from the evaluative condition over the relevant condition to the 
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irrelevant condition, the between-subject factor “condition” was treated as a 
linear factor. Expectancy ratings did not reveal a significant difference in the 
extinction effect between the three experimental conditions, F < 1. The valence 
ratings, however, revealed a clear effect of condition, F(1, 78) = 6.99, p < .01, η² = 
.08. As predicted, follow-up analyses showed a significant extinction effect in the 
irrelevant condition, t(27) = 2.28, p < .05, d = 0.43. As can be seen in Table 1, the 
EC effect was smaller after the extinction phase than after the acquisition phase. 
In contrast, the EC effect was more or less unaffected by the extinction 
procedure in both the relevant condition, t(26) =1.62, p = 0.12, d = 0.31, and the 
evaluative condition, t < 1. In fact, as can be seen in Table 1, the evaluative 
condition revealed a small increase in the EC effect from post-acquisition to post-
extinction. The AMP data11 mimic these results, albeit the main effect of 
condition just missed conventional significance levels, F(1, 78) = 3.37, p = .07, η² 
= .04. Follow-up analyses revealed that the extinction effect was far from 
significant in both the relevant condition and the evaluative condition, t’s < 1. 
The extinction effect was also non-significant in the irrelevant condition, but 
numerically there was a trend in the anticipated direction, t(27) = 1.66, p = .11, d 
= 0.312.  
Discussion  
The results of Experiment 1 are straightforward. Exposing participants to 
CS only trials resulted in a reduction of the EC effect when participants attended 
to an irrelevant CS feature during the extinction phase of the experiment (i.e., 
irrelevant condition) but not when participants attended to stimulus valence 
                                                     
1
 There is some debate concerning the extent to which AMP effects are driven by 
participants who rate the primes intentionally (see Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012). We examined this 
possibility using the procedures described by Payne et al. (2013). In both experiments, AMP 
scores did not differ between participants who claimed that they had rated the primes 
intentionally and participants who did not claim that they had rated the primes intentionally, all 
t’s < 1. 
2
 When we included the ten participants who did not show an EC effect following 
acquisition, the valence ratings still revealed a significant effect of Condition , F(1, 88) = 4.07, p < 
.05, η² = .04. Significant effects were absent in the AMP, F(1, 88) = 1.32, p = .25, η² = .01, and the 
expectancy ratings, F < 1 
136  CHAPTER 4 
(i.e., evaluative condition) or to a CS feature that was correlated with stimulus 
valence during the acquisition phase (i.e., relevant condition). Both the explicit 
and implicit valence measure revealed this data pattern. The results of 
Experiment 1 thus provide initial support for the hypothesis that extinction of EC 
effects is moderated by FSAA.  
It must be noted, however, that the critical effect of condition just missed 
conventional significance levels for the AMP data (p = .07). For a number of 
reasons, we are inclined to attribute this null-finding to a Type-II error. First, AMP 
scores were numerically in perfect accordance with our expectations (see Table 
1). Second, implicit measures are typically more noisy than explicit measures 
(e.g., Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). Accordingly, given that the number 
of AMP trials was limited to just 16 trials, it could be argued that we simply 
lacked sufficient power to capture a significant modulation of the extinction 
effect with the AMP. Note, however, that we deliberately opted for the use of a 
small number of AMP trials because the AMP requires participants to assign 
attention to the evaluative stimulus dimension. The administration of the AMP 
might thus have interfered with the FSAA manipulation had we used a higher 
number of trials. Finally, we examined whether the extinction effects as 
measured by the AMP and the explicit valence measure were correlated across 
participants. Reassuringly, this correlation was reliable, r = .23, p < .05, adding 
further weight to the idea that the effects captured by the AMP were indeed 
meaningful.  
In sum, the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that 
FSAA is a key moderator of the extinction effect. Still, because a direct 
measurement of FSAA was not included in the design of Experiment 1, the 
argument that we manipulated FSAA is purely based on the fact that our 
experimental procedures produced the anticipated effects. One may thus argue 
that the findings of Experiment 1 are insufficient to conclude that our effects 
were causally driven by variations in FSAA. Accordingly, to further corroborate 
and extend the findings of Experiment 1, we conducted a replication study in 
which a direct measure of FSAA was administered at the very end of the 
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experiment. More specifically, participants were presented with pairs of CSs and 
for each pair they were asked to judge the similarity of the two CSs. The INDSCAL 
algorithm, a multidimensional scaling approach that allows for the estimation of 
individual attention weights (Carroll & Chang, 1970; Carroll & Wish, 1974), was 
then used to verify whether the FSAA manipulation had been successful. Overall, 
participants in the relevant and irrelevant condition were expected to assign 
selective attention to the relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimension, 
respectively. Participants in the evaluative condition were expected to assign 
selective attention to the dimension that was relevant during the acquisition 
phase because the acquired valence of the CSs and the relevant dimension were 
perfectly confounded. Finally, we expected to find a reliable extinction effect 
only in participants who were able to shift their attention from the relevant to 
the irrelevant stimulus dimension.  
EXPERIMENT 2  
Method  
Participants 
Eighty-five female and eleven male Ghent University students with a mean 
age of 22.24 years (SD = 3.35 years) were paid €5 in exchange for their 
participation. Two participants made a large number of errors during the 
acquisition phase of the experiment (i.e., 37.5 % and 35.0 %) and were thus 
exposed to a limited number of CS-US pairings (i.e., 62.5 % and 65.0 %, 
respectively). Because these participants were clearly outliers compared to the 
complete sample (M = 5.76 %, SD = 6.09 %), their data were excluded from the 
analyses. We also excluded the data of one participant who was familiar with the 
Chinese language and knew the meaning of the Chinese ideographs used in the 
AMP. Finally, we excluded the data of two participants who responded 
exceptionally fast (i.e., less 200 ms) on a large number of AMP trials (i.e., 34.38 % 
and 37.50 %). Again, these participants were clear-cut outliers in comparison 
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with the complete sample (M = 1.27 %, SD = 5.36 %). Note, however, that none 
of the critical extinction effects reported below were contingent upon inclusion 
or exclusion of these participants.  
Materials and Procedure  
The materials and procedures used in Experiment 2 were identical to those 
used in Experiment 1, except for the inclusion of a similarity judgment task at the 
very end of the experiment. Each trial of the similarity judgment task started 
with the presentation of a fixation cross in the center of the screen for 500 ms 
that was immediately followed by the presentation of two identical black-and-
white masking stimuli (420 × 420 pixels) displayed 296 pixels apart on the left 
and the right side of the fixation cross. After 200 ms, the masks were replaced by 
two different Gabor patches that were presented for 500 ms. Each Gabor patch 
was then replaced with a mask that was displayed for 200 ms. Participants were 
asked to rate the similarity of the two Gabor patches on a four-point scale using 
an (AZERTY) keyboard. The scale ranged from very similar (response key “x”) over 
slightly similar (response key “v”) and slightly different (response key “n”) to very 
different (response key “;”). Participants were asked to respond within 2 
seconds. If participants failed to respond within this deadline, a 300-ms message 
informed them that they were too slow (i.e., “TE TRAAG!”, meaning “too slow” in 
Dutch). The inter-trial interval varied between 500 and 1500 ms. Every possible 
pairing (28 pairs) of the eight CSs was presented twice, leading to a total of 56 
similarity judgment trials.  
Results  
Acquisition effects  
The overall error rate in the acquisition phase equaled 5.05 %. Expectancy 
ratings revealed a significant difference between positive CSs (M = 0.91, SD = 
0.19) and negative CSs (M = -0.94, SD = 0.17), F(1, 90) = 2830.9, p < .001, η² = .97. 
In addition, a significant difference was found between the mean valence ratings 
of positive CSs (M = 2.84, SD = 2.86) and negative CSs (M = -3.12, SD = 3.65), F(1, 
90) = 86.67, p < .001, η² = .49. The AMP data corroborated these findings. The 
139  CHAPTER 4 
 
proportion of pleasant judgments was significantly higher on positive-CS trials (M 
= .72, SD = .24) than on negative-CS trials (M = .35, SD = .25), F(1, 90) = 61.68, p < 
.001, η² = .41. Reassuringly, these EC effects were not moderated by the 
condition factor, all F’s < 2.12. Likewise, neither the EC effect in the valence 
ratings, F(1, 89) = 3.35, p = .07, η² = .04, nor the EC effect in the AMP data, F(1, 
89) = 1.04, p = .31, η² = .01, was dependent upon the counterbalancing group 
that participants were assigned to (i.e., attention allocation to the orientation or 
spatial frequency dimension during the acquisition phase). The expectancy 
ratings, however, did show a larger EC effect for participants who attended to 
spatial frequency (M = 1.93, SD = 0.17) as compared to participants who 
attended to orientation (M = 1.76, SD = 0.42), F(1, 89) = 6.13, p < .05, η² = .06. 
For six participants, at least two of the dependent measures (i.e., expectancy 
ratings, valence ratings, or AMP scores) did not reveal an EC effect in the 
expected direction after the acquisition phase. The data of these six participants 
were excluded from all further analyses.  
Extinction effects  
For each participant and each dependent measure, extinction effects were 
calculated by subtracting the EC scores obtained after the extinction phase from 
the EC scores obtained after the acquisition phase. Individual extinction effects 
were then subjected to a one way ANOVA with condition (irrelevant condition vs. 
relevant condition vs. evaluative condition) as a between subjects factor. As in 
Experiment 1, the between-subject factor condition was treated as a linear 
factor.  
Whereas the expectancy ratings revealed no effect of condition, F < 1, the 
valence ratings were clearly affected by the condition factor, F(1, 82) = 11.61, p < 
.01, η² = .12. As expected, follow-up analyses revealed a reliable extinction effect 
in the irrelevant condition, t(29) = 5.02, p < .001, d = 0.92, but not in the relevant 
condition, t < 1 (for summary statistics, see Table 2).  
A different degree of extinction across different conditions was not picked 
up, however, by the AMP, F(1, 82) = 1.92, p = 0.17, η² = .02. Nevertheless, given 
our a priori hypothesis, follow-up analyses were performed to examine the 
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extinction effect in each experimental condition. The extinction effect was far 
from significant both in the irrelevant condition, t < 1, and the relevant condition, 
t( 25) = -1.16, p = .26, d = -0.13. Interestingly, a reversed extinction effect 
emerged in the evaluative condition, t(28) = - 2.76, p < .05, d = -0.51. In line with 
the idea that reactivation of the CS-US relationship can strengthen the acquired 
valence of the CS (see Lewicki et al., 1992), the EC effect following extinction was 
larger, not smaller, than the EC effect after acquisition. Moreover, an exploratory 
analysis revealed that the effects obtained with the AMP were highly contingent 
on the extent to which the CSs were clear-cut instances of the experimental 
stimulus categories. Remember that participants were presented with eight 
Gabor patches, only four of which were characterized by extreme values both on 
the spatial frequency dimension and the orientation dimension (see Figure 2). 
  
 
Figure 2. Multidimensional representation derived from participants’ similarity 
judgments.  
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Given that the Gabor patches were presented for just 75 ms during the AMP, one 
might argue that participants may have been unable to discriminate between 
different stimulus categories unless these categories were instantiated by salient 
exemplars. In line with this reasoning, the two-way interaction between stimulus 
salience and experimental condition was reliable, F(1, 82) = 4.21, p < .05, η² = 
.05. Follow-up analyses confirmed that the anticipated moderation of the 
extinction effect was reliable when restricting the analyses to the AMP trials with 
salient stimuli, F(1, 82) = 6.11, p < .05, η² = .07. When the analyses were 
restricted to the AMP trials with non-salient stimuli, there was no indication 
whatsoever of a differential extinction rate across different experimental 
conditions, F < 1. A similar moderation by stimulus salience was not picked up by 
the explicit measures.  
Manipulation Check: FSAA after extinction 
The similarity data were entered into the SPSS V22.0 statistical package 
(SPSS Inc., 1997) and were analyzed using the INDSCAL algorithm (Carroll & 
Chang, 1970; Carroll & Wish, 1974). Given the use of two-dimensional stimuli 
(i.e., Gabor patches that varied in terms of orientation and spatial frequency), 
the analysis was constrained to two dimensions. The algorithm reached 
convergence after 11 iterations (i.e., S-stress decrease smaller than 0.0001). The 
eventual representation had an S-stress of .19, and explained, on average, 79.1% 
of the variance of each individual participant. In sum, both measures of model fit 
showed that a two-dimensional model reached an acceptable fit. As can be seen 
in Figure 2, the dimensions of this two-dimensional space correspond to the 
orientation dimension and the spatial frequency dimension.  
Individual attention weights were coded such that negative values signaled 
selective attention for the orientation dimension and positive values signaled 
selective attention for the spatial frequency dimension. We thus expected the 
mean attention weight to be negative in participants who were required to focus 
attention on the orientation dimension during the extinction phase. Likewise, the 
mean attention weight was expected to be positive in participants who were 
required to focus attention on the spatial frequency dimension. Participants who 
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were asked to evaluate the CSs during the extinction phase (i.e., evaluative 
condition) were expected to focus their attention upon the stimulus dimension 
that was predictive of the valence of the USs during the acquisition phase. 
Accordingly, depending on whether the orientation dimension or the spatial 
frequency dimension was predictive of the valence of the USs, we expected the 
attention weights in this group to be negative or positive, respectively.  
Individual attention weights were subjected to a 2 (FSAA group: attention to 
orientation versus attention to spatial frequency) × 3 (condition: irrelevant 
condition vs. relevant condition vs. evaluative condition) ANOVA. While the main 
effect of FSAA reached significance, F(1, 79) = 9.26, p < .05, η² = .10, a significant 
interaction between FSAA group and condition revealed that the impact of the 
FSAA manipulation was dependent upon condition, F(2, 79) = 10.46, p < .01, η² = 
.21. As can be seen in Table 3, the mean attention weights were in line with the 
FSAA manipulation both in the relevant condition, F(1, 24) = 14.22, p < .001, η² = 
.37, and the evaluative condition, F(1, 27) = 11.46, p < .01, η² = .30. In the 
irrelevant condition, however, the mean attention weights were numerically in 
the opposite direction, albeit not significantly so, F(1, 28) = 3.94, p = 0.06, η² = 
.12. We will discuss this observation at length shortly.  
 
Table 3 
Mean attention weights as a function of FSAA during the extinction phase and 
condition in Experiment 2 (SD’s in parentheses).  
Condition  Attention to frequency  Attention to orientation 
Irrelevant  -0.21 (0.98)  0.39 (0.66) 
Relevant  0.66 (0.68)  -0.59 (0.99) 
Evaluative  0.43 (0.73)  -0.76 (1.12) 
Note: Positive weights signal selective attention for the spatial frequency 
dimension whereas negative weights signal selective attention for the 
orientation dimension. 
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Extinction effects as a function FSAA.  
Based on individual attention weights obtained through the MDS approach, 
participants were divided in two groups. Participants were assigned to the 
successful group if individual attention weight concurred with the FSAA 
manipulation during the extinction phase. Participants were assigned to the 
unsuccessful group if their attention weights revealed attention assignment 
opposite to the FSAA manipulation during the extinction phase. For each of the 
three dependent measures (i.e., expectancy ratings, explicit valence ratings, and 
AMP scores), extinction scores were subjected to a two-way ANOVA with 
condition (irrelevant condition vs. relevant condition vs. evaluative condition) 
and manipulation check (successful vs. unsuccessful FSAA manipulation) as 
between subjects factors. Results showed that the interaction between 
manipulation check and condition was neither reliable for the expectancy 
ratings, F < 1, nor for the evaluative ratings, F(1, 79) = 2.40, p = .13, η²= .03, or 
the AMP scores, F < 1.  
Discussion  
Taken together, the present results replicate the results obtained in 
Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, the evaluative ratings revealed that the 
extinction rate of the EC effect was dependent upon variations in FSAA during 
the extinction phase. In line with our hypotheses, exposure to a series of CS-only 
trials resulted in a reliable drop of the EC effect only if participants were 
encouraged to assign selective attention to a stimulus dimension that was 
orthogonal to evaluative stimulus information (i.e., the irrelevant condition).  
The results obtained with the AMP corroborate and extend this 
observation in two ways. First, while the overall analyses of the AMP data failed 
to reveal a clear-cut effect of the FSAA manipulation on the extinction rate of the 
EC effect, the AMP scores did reveal a significant increase in the EC effect from 
post-acquisition to post-extinction in the evaluative condition. This observation is 
in perfect accordance with the hypothesis that reactivation of the CS-US 
relationship can strengthen the acquired valence of the CS (see Lewicki et al., 
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1992). Second, exploratory analyses showed that the anticipated pattern of 
results was reliable if the analyses were restricted to CSs that were clear-cut 
instances of the experimental stimulus categories. This data pattern is readily 
accounted for if one assumes that the very brief presentation time of the CSs 
(i.e., 75 ms) prevented participants from discriminating between different 
stimulus categories unless these categories were instantiated by salient 
exemplars.  
Importantly, the present experiment included a direct assessment of FSAA 
at the very end of the experiment. As anticipated, both in the relevant condition 
and evaluative condition, participants were inclined to assign attention to the 
stimulus dimension that was task-relevant during the preceding extinction phase. 
In the irrelevant condition, however, the mean attention weights were 
numerically in the opposite direction. That is, participants who were asked to 
judge the orientation dimension during the extinction phase were, on average, 
inclined to assign attention to the spatial frequency dimension. Likewise, if the 
extinction phase required participants to judge the CSs in terms of spatial 
frequency, attention weights captured at the very end of the experiment were 
indicative of selective attention for the orientation dimension. To account for 
this (unexpected) data pattern, the order in which participants completed the 
different measures is key. Remember that, immediately prior to the 
measurement of FSAA, participants were asked to provide expectancy ratings for 
each of the CSs. For participants in the irrelevant condition, by definition, the 
stimulus dimension that was predictive of the USs was orthogonal to the 
stimulus dimension that was task-relevant during the extinction phase. It can 
thus be argued that the requirement to retrieve knowledge about the CS-US 
relationship may have triggered selective attention for the stimulus dimension 
that was task-relevant during the acquisition phase, as was evidenced by the 
FSAA scores obtained in this group.  
Clearly, this reasoning implies that the FSAA scores were not an accurate 
reflection of selective attention assignment during the extinction phase. It is 
therefore not surprising that, despite our initial hypotheses, no relationship was 
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found between the FSAA scores and the extent to which our experimental 
manipulation impacted the extinction rate of the EC effect in different 
conditions. Still, the pattern of results obtained with the FSAA measure is 
important, for two reasons. First, it shows that FSAA is highly volatile and that 
relatively subtle procedural details can be sufficient to induce changes in FSAA. 
Given that FSAA has been shown to modulate automatic evaluative stimulus 
processing (Everaert, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2011; Spruyt et al., 2009, Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012), spatial attention allocation (Everaert, et 
al., 2013), as well as the generalization of EC effect (Spruyt, Klauer, Gast, De 
Schryver, & De Houwer, 2015), it could thus be worthwhile to scrutinize in future 
research the (situational and/or person specific) factors that determine (the 
flexibility of) FSAA. Second, both in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the AMP was 
administered after the explicit ratings. It may thus be hypothesized that stronger 
AMP effects may have occurred had we administered the explicit ratings after 
the AMP. As will become clear in the General Discussion, such an observation 
would also be highly informative about the nature of the underlying mechanism 
that is responsible for the observation that FSAA modulates the extinction rate of 
EC effects.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
Whereas some researchers have argued that the EC effect is highly 
resistant to extinction, others have argued that repeated presentations of a CS in 
the absence of a US do lead to a reduction of the EC effect. Based on the FSAA 
framework developed by Spruyt and colleagues (Everaert et al., 2013; Spruyt et 
al., 2007, 2009, 2012; Spruyt, 2014; Spruyt & Tibboel 2015), we hypothesized 
that the extinction rate of the EC effect must be dependent upon the degree to 
which selective attention is assigned to the evaluative stimulus dimension during 
extinction. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two experiments in which 
participants were asked to focus their attention on different aspects of CSs 
during the extinction phase. Participants were either asked to assign selective 
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attention to the evaluative tone of the CSs (i.e., evaluative condition), to a 
(perceptual) stimulus dimension that was related to stimulus valence (i.e., 
relevant condition), or to a (perceptual) stimulus dimension that was unrelated 
to stimulus valence (i.e., irrelevant condition). Both experiments were identical, 
except for the fact that, in Experiment 2, an attempt was made to include a 
direct measure of FSAA at the end of the extinction phase.  
In line with our expectations, the explicit valence ratings obtained in 
Experiment 1 revealed a reduction of the EC effect in the irrelevant condition, 
but not in evaluative condition or the relevant condition. The same pattern was 
observed for the AMP data, albeit the effect just missed conventional 
significance levels (p = .06). Experiment 2 corroborated and extended these 
findings in two ways. First, as in Experiment 1, the explicit valence ratings 
revealed a significant reduction of the EC effect in the irrelevant condition only. 
Second, the results obtained with the AMP suggested that this effect was 
mediated by the extent to which the CS were clear-cut instances of the 
experimental stimulus categories. The anticipated moderation of the extinction 
effect was reliable for salient but not for non-salient stimuli.  
Interestingly, our findings also hint to the possibility that the impact of 
FSAA on the extinction rate of the EC effect might be two-fold. First, assigning 
selective attention to a stimulus dimension that is orthogonal to valence seems 
to promote a rapid decay of the EC effect. Second, both in Experiment 1 (i.e., 
evaluative ratings) and Experiment 2 (i.e., AMP), a reliable increase (not a 
decrease) of the EC effect was observed in the evaluative condition. That is, 
repeated evaluation of a CS seems to result in a strengthening of its evaluative 
tone (see Lewicki et al., 1992). Further research would be required, though, to 
substantiate the generality of this interesting finding.  
Likewise, further research would be needed to shed light on the 
mechanism(s) underlying our effects. In fact, at least five different accounts can 
be given for the observation that the magnitude of the EC effect was affected by 
the nature of the classification task that was performed during the extinction 
phase of the experiment. As a first possibility, given that a clear-cut data pattern 
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was obtained with the evaluative ratings but not with the AMP, one might simply 
argue that our results resulted from demand effects. For two reasons, however, 
this possibility seems unlikely. First, the anticipated pattern of results was 
present in the evaluative ratings but not in the US expectancy ratings. An 
explanation in terms of demand effects would predict the same pattern of 
results for both explicit measures as there is no obvious reason why participants 
would use their assumptions about the critical hypotheses to strategically bias 
their evaluative ratings but not their US expectancy ratings.  
Second, additional linear mixed effect analyses showed that the EC effect 
in Experiment 1 (but not in Experiment 2) researched significance even if the US 
expectancy ratings were not in line with the actual CS-US pairings during the 
acquisition phase (see Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007)3. It must be 
noted, however, that the vast majority of the US expectancy ratings did 
correspond with the actual CS-US parings (i.e., 90 %), so these results should be 
interpreted with caution. A second explanation of our findings implies that the 
association between a CS and its corresponding summary evaluation is subject to 
decay only if and to the extent that evaluative stimulus processing is hampered. 
Because the degree to which evaluative stimulus processing occurs is known to 
depend upon FSAA (see above) and assuming that decay of associations is 
promoted by events in which CSs are experienced without a concurrent 
emotional response, this account can readily explain why significant extinction 
emerged in the irrelevant condition only.  
Third, it might be argued that occasion setting was responsible for the 
                                                     
3
 To examine whether the EC effect was dependent upon (explicit) US expectancy, valence 
ratings were subjected to a linear mixed effects model. Fixed effects were CS type (positive vs. 
negative), US expectancy (in line with actual pairings vs. not in line with actual pairings), and the 
interaction between these factors. Participants and stimuli were defined as crossed random 
effects. The mixed-model F tests were computed using Kenward-Roger’s adjusted degrees of 
freedom (Kenward & Roger, 1997). The analysis revealed a strong in interaction between CS and 
US expectancy both in Experiment 1, F(1, 1486.07) = 252.15, p < 0.001, and in Experiment 2, 
F(1,1526.02) = 102.43, p < 0.001. In Experiment 1, however, a significant EC effect emerged 
irrespective of whether the US expectancy ratings were in line with the actual CS-US pairings, F(1, 
1197.26) = 785.32, p < 0.001, or were not in line with the actual CS-US pairings, F(1, 241.93) = 
24.18, p < .001. In Experiment 2, a reliable EC effect was found only if the US expectancy ratings 
were in line with the actual CS-US pairings, F(1, 1297.57) = 1142.80, p < 0.001. 
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extinction effect observed in the irrelevant condition (see Rydell & Gawronski, 
2009). According to this viewpoint, the requirement to assign attention to 
different stimulus properties during the acquisition and extinction phase of the 
experiment resulted in the formation of contextualized representations of CSs. 
Accordingly, it might be hypothesized that the EC effect might have surfaced 
again had we tested participants under conditions that promoted selective 
attention for the stimulus dimension that was task-relevant during acquisition 
(i.e., ABA renewal). The results obtained with the FSAA measure suggest that this 
possibility is certainly a viable route for future studies.  
A fourth account is based on exemplar-based models of categorization and 
memory (Hintzman, 1984; Smith & Zarate, 1992). According to these models, 
when memory is probed with a target stimulus (e.g., a CS), memory traces of 
specific objects, persons, or experiences contribute to the overall memory 
response as a function of their similarity to the target stimulus. The stronger the 
overlap between a target stimulus and a particular exemplar representation, the 
stronger the influence of that exemplar representation on the memory response. 
Crucially, FSAA is assumed to determine the weight of each stimulus dimension 
in the computation of the similarity between the target stimulus and the 
exemplar representations (Smith & Zarate, 1992). One can thus expect a 
significant reduction of the EC effect for two reasons. First, because positive and 
negative CS categories were equivalent in terms of the stimulus dimension that 
was task-irrelevant during the acquisition phase, both positive and negative 
exemplars contributed to the overall memory response as soon as participants 
focused their attention on this stimulus dimension. Second, given that evaluative 
stimulus processing is reduced under conditions that promote selective attention 
for a neutral stimulus dimension, exemplar information stored during the 
extinction phase must have been relatively neutral in the irrelevant condition as 
compared to the relevant condition and the evaluative condition. In sum, the net 
memory response at the time of testing would thus be based on a mixture of 
neutral and non-neutral memory traces, thereby reducing the EC effect.  
Finally, our findings may also be accounted for in terms of a propositional 
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model of EC (see De Houwer, 2009). According to this framework, EC effects are 
mediated by propositional knowledge about the CS-US relation. One might thus 
argue that the emergence of an extinction effect must involve the formation of 
new propositions about the (absence of a) relationship between CSs and USs 
and/or the valence of the CSs. Crucially, such a corrective process would be more 
likely to occur in the irrelevant condition as compared to the relevant condition 
and the evaluative condition because participants experience the CS without a 
concurrent evaluative response only in the former condition.  
In sum, while our findings suggest that the EC effect can be reduced by an 
extinction regimen that requires participants to assign attention to a stimulus 
dimension that is unrelated to stimulus valence, it remains an open question 
how this effect can be accounted for at the mental-process level. Nevertheless, 
our findings are important as EC procedures are increasingly used to modify likes 
and dislikes in applied settings (e.g., Houben, Schoenmakers, & Wiers, 2010). It 
seems particularly interesting, for example, to verify whether the outcome of 
exposure treatment programs is dependent upon the extent to which patients 
are encouraged to assign selective attention to nonevaluative stimulus 
information. It thus seems a viable approach to further scrutinize the underlying 
mechanisms and operating conditions of the extinction effect reported in the 
present paper. 
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CHAPTER  
 
 
Implicit evaluations as a function of Feature-
Specific attention allocation1 
 
We demonstrate that feature-specific attention allocation influences the 
way in which repeated exposure modulates implicit and explicit evaluations 
towards fear-related stimuli. During an exposure procedure, participants were 
encouraged to assign selective attention either to the evaluative meaning (i.e., 
Evaluative Condition) or a non-evaluative, semantic feature (i.e., Semantic 
Condition) of fear-related stimuli. The influence of the exposure procedure was 
captured by means of a measure of implicit evaluation, explicit evaluative ratings, 
and a measure of automatic approach/avoidance tendencies. As predicted, the 
implicit measure of evaluation revealed a reduced expression of evaluations in 
the Semantic Condition as compared to the Evaluative Condition. Moreover, this 
effect generalized toward novel objects that were never presented during the 
exposure procedure. The explicit measure of evaluation mimicked this effect, 
although it failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. No 
effects were found in terms of automatic approach/avoidance tendencies. 
Potential implications for the treatment of anxiety disorders are discussed. 
                                                     
1
 Based on Vanaelst, J., Spruyt, A., & De Houwer J. (2016). How to modify (implicit) 
evaluations of fear-related stimuli: Effects of feature-specific attention allocation. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 7, 717 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00717  
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INTRODUCTION 
Attitudes drive behavior (Allport, 1935) and are therefore often targeted 
as a leverage point for behavioral change. Importantly, behavior is determined 
not only by carefully constructed opinions of what we like or dislike but also by 
spontaneous evaluations that can take place under automaticity conditions 
(Fazio, 1990; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). To promote behavioral change, it may 
thus be beneficial or even necessary to develop intervention strategies that allow 
for a change of these implicit evaluations. In line with this reasoning, it has been 
demonstrated that experimentally induced changes in the automatic evaluation 
of alcohol-related stimuli can result in a corresponding change in alcohol 
consumption (e.g., Houben, Havermans, & Wiers, 2010). Similar findings have 
been reported in the domain of implicit self-esteem (e.g., Baccus, Baldwin, & 
Packer, 2004; Clerkin & Teachman, 2010; Conner & Barrett, 2005), consumer 
research (e.g., Gibson, 2008) and social cognition (e.g., Rydell & Mcconnell, 
2006). 
In the present research, we examined the viability of a novel strategy to 
reduce implicit evaluations towards fear-related stimuli. This new approach is 
based on the observation that automatic evaluative stimulus processing is 
dependent upon Feature-Specific Attention Allocation (i.e., FSAA), that is, the 
amount of attention assigned to a specific stimulus feature such as valence, 
threat-value, gender, size, etc. As an example, consider the evaluative priming 
studies by Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans (2009; for related findings see Spruyt, 
De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007; Spruyt, Klauer, Gast, De Schryver, & De 
Houwer, 2015; Spruyt & Tibboel, 2015; Spruyt, 2014; see also Kiefer & Brendel, 
2006; Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Spruyt, De Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012). 
Evaluative priming studies typically consist of a series of trials in which 
participants are asked to respond to a target stimulus (e.g., a picture of a cute 
baby) that is preceded by a briefly presented prime stimulus (e.g., a picture of a 
spider). Crucially, the evaluative congruence of the prime-target pairs is 
manipulated: whereas both stimuli share the same evaluative connotation on 
157  CHAPTER 5  
 
some trials (e.g., a positive prime followed by a positive target), other trials 
consist of incongruent prime-target pairs (e.g., a positive prime followed by a 
negative target). A typical observation is a performance benefit in speed and/or 
accuracy for congruent trials relative to incongruent trials. This effect can come 
about only if participants process the evaluative tone of the primes and can 
therefore be used as an index of stimulus evaluation. Despite numerous studies 
attesting to the unconditional, automatic nature of this so-called ‘evaluative 
priming effect’ (see Klauer & Musch, 2003), Spruyt and colleagues demonstrated 
that the occurrence of this effect is restricted to conditions that maximize 
selective attention for the evaluative stimulus dimension. Moreover, adding to 
the generality of the FSAA framework, a number of recent studies confirmed that 
FSAA exerts similar effects on various other behavioral (Everaert, Spruyt, & De 
Houwer, 2013) and neuropsychological markers (Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, 
Pourtois, & De Houwer, 2013) of implicit evaluation. 
Based on the FSAA framework, one can identify two different pathways 
to reduce implicit evaluations towards fear-related stimuli. First, it may be 
hypothesized that experimentally induced changes in FSAA at time 1 can 
determine the likelihood that one engages in automatic processing of a stimulus 
feature at time 2. More specifically, the FSAA framework naturally predicts that 
evaluative responses towards fear-related stimuli at time 2 are less likely to 
come about in individuals who have learned to refrain from evaluative stimulus 
processing at time 1. Second, the impact of FSAA upon implicit evaluations may 
be exploited as a means to increase the efficacy of an extinction treatment. 
Research has repeatedly shown that evaluative responses are highly resistant to 
extinction (Craske, 1999; De Houwer, Thomas, & Frank, 2001; Hallion & Ruscio, 
2011; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010; Krypotos, 
Arnaudova, Effting, Kindt, & Beckers, 2015). This resistance-to-extinction could 
be due to the fact that, during an extinction treatment, the attitude object 
automatically evokes an evaluative response that consistently reaffirms the 
information acquired during the preceding evaluative learning episodes (Lewicki, 
Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992; Martin & Levey, 1978). The FSAA framework predicts, 
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however, that an encounter with an attitude object is less likely to result in an 
evaluative response if attention is directed away from the evaluative stimulus 
dimension, thereby allowing for a potential disconfirmation of the preceding 
evaluative learning episodes (e.g., Lovibond, 2011, see also Sanbonmatsu, 
Posavac, Vanous, Ho, & Fazio, 2007). Accordingly, one may predict that the 
extinction rate of evaluative responses toward fear-related stimuli must be 
contingent upon the degree to which attention is assigned to other, non-
evaluative (semantic) stimulus features.  
To shed light on these issues, we conducted an exposure study in which 
FSAA was either directed towards or away from the evaluative stimulus 
dimension during the exposure phase. Participants were presented with a series 
of real-life pictures, the content of which varied along two orthogonal semantic 
dimensions: valence (positive vs. negative) and animacy (living vs. nonliving). 
Participants were asked to categorize all stimuli either as living vs. nonliving (i.e., 
the Semantic Condition) or as positive vs. negative (i.e., the Evaluative 
Condition). Participants in the Semantic Condition were thus encouraged to 
assign selective attention to the non-evaluative semantic features of the stimulus 
materials whereas participants in the Evaluative Condition were encouraged to 
assign selective attention to the evaluative tone of the stimulus materials. 
Crucially, the category of negative, living stimuli included pictures of spiders only, 
thereby allowing for a test of the hypothesis that a manipulation of FSAA can be 
exploited as a means to reduce evaluations towards fear-related stimuli. 
To register the impact of this intervention strategy, we used both a 
measure of implicit evaluation (i.e., the Affect Misattribution Paradigm; Payne, 
Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) and explicit evaluative ratings. In addition, 
because positive and negative evaluations are assumed to promote automatic 
approach and avoidance behavior, respectively (Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, De 
Houwer, & De Raedt, 2010; Solarz, 1960), we also included a Relevant-Stimulus 
Response Compatibility task aimed at capturing these motivational response 
tendencies (i.e., the R-SRC task; Mogg, Bradley, Field, & Houwer, 2003). We 
hypothesized that each of these measures would reveal less negative evaluations 
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towards spiders in the Semantic Condition as compared to the Evaluative 
Condition. In addition, we included (novel) exemplars that were not presented 
during the exposure phase to examine the extent to which the impact of our 
manipulation would generalize to novel (transfer) stimuli. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty-one students of Ghent University (13 men, 48 women) participated 
in the experiment and received €5 in exchange for their help. In total, two 
participants in the Evaluative Condition and two participants in the Semantic 
Condition were excluded from analysis. One participant was excluded due to a 
technical error. Two other participants were excluded because their error rates 
in the R-SRC task (i.e., 22.66 % and 21.09 %) exceeded the outlier criterion of 2.5 
standard deviations above the sample mean (M = 8.49 %, SD = 4.69 %). Finally, 
one participant was excluded because her mean reaction time in the R-SRC-task 
(i.e., 992 ms) exceeded the outlier criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the 
grand mean (M = 713 ms, SD = 100 ms). Unless otherwise mentioned, results 
were not contingent upon inclusion or exclusion of these participants. The final 
sample consisted of 11 men and 46 women ranging between 18 and 36 years of 
age (M = 23.39, SD = 3.27). Power analyses revealed that, given this sample size, 
the power to detect a small effect (i.e., Cohen’s d = 0.2), a medium-sized effect 
(i.e., Cohen’s d = 0.5), or a large effect (i.e., Cohen’s d = 0.8) was .12, .46, or .84, 
respectively. The reported research was conducted in accordance with the 
ethical standards of the institutional ethics committee and with the 1964 Helsinki 
declaration and its later amendments. All participants gave their informed 
consent prior to their inclusion in the study.  
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Materials 
The stimulus materials used for the main dependent measures were eight 
positive and eight negative color pictures (328 pixels wide and 246 pixels high), 
13 of which (i.e., eight positive and five negative) were chosen based on norm 
data collected by Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, and Eelen (2002). Several of 
these pictures originated from the International Affective Picture System (i.e., 
IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). On a scale ranging from -5 (“very 
negative”) to + 5 (“very positive”), the mean valence rating of the negative 
stimuli was significantly smaller than zero, M = -2.08, SD = 1.05, t(4) = -4.44, p < 
.05. The mean valence rating of positive stimuli was significantly larger than zero, 
M = 2.00, SD = 0.72, t(7) = 7.85, p < .001. In addition to these IAPS pictures, three 
pictures of spiders were included. The final sample of 16 stimuli varied on two 
orthogonal semantic dimensions (i.e., valence and animacy), creating four 
stimulus categories. The category of living, negative stimuli was represented by 
four pictures of spiders. Each of the other three categories was represented by a 
mixture of pictures depicting different themes (see Appendix). For each 
individual participant, these 16 pictures were split in two semi-random subsets, 
each consisting of two pictures from each stimulus category. One of these 
subsets was used during the exposure phase of the experiment (hereafter 
referred to as experimental stimuli). The second set was used to test for transfer 
effects after the exposure phase (hereafter referred to as transfer stimuli). 
For the AMP, 200 different Chinese pictographs served as target stimuli. 
All Chinese pictographs were presented in white and were 256 pixels wide and 
256 pixels high. During the R-SCR-task, participants were asked to make a (white) 
manikin move away or towards the stimuli presented in the center of the 
computer screen (see below). The manikin was about 51 pixels wide and 79 
pixels high. 
All computer tasks were run on a Dell Optiplex GX520 computer. An 
Affect 4.0 program (Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 
2010) controlled the presentation of the stimuli as well as the registration of the 
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responses. All stimuli were presented against the black background of a 19 inch 
computer monitor (100 Hz).  
For exploratory reasons, we also administered a series of questionnaires. 
First, the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS, Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) was 
used to measure levels of depression, anxiety and stress in the week preceding 
the experiment. The DASS consists of 42 statements (e.g., I found it difficult to 
relax) which are to be rated on a four-point Likert Scale ranging from 0 (not at all) 
to 3 (very much). The internal consistency of the DASS is typically very good, with 
Cronbach’s alpha’s for the different subscales ranging between .83 and .91 (de 
Beurs, Van Dyck, Marquenie, Lange, & Blonk, 2001). In the present sample, 
Cronbach’s alpha’s were .86, .89, and .88 for the anxiety, stress, and depression 
subscales, respectively. Second, to capture the extent to which participants 
tended to experience, on average, a positive or negative mood, they were asked 
to complete the Positive and Negative Affect Schedules (PANAS, Watson & Clark, 
1988). Each mood scale included 10 mood descriptors (e.g., proud, guilty) and 
participants were asked to rate each item on a five-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The internal consistency of the PANAS is high, 
both for the English version (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha’s equal or larger than .80; 
Watson & Clark, 1988) and the Dutch version (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha’s equal or 
larger than .79; Engelen, De Peuter, Victoir, Van Diest, & Van Den Bergh, 2006). 
In the present sample, Cronbach’s alpha equaled .85 for the positive subscale 
and .78 for the negative subscale. Third, to capture state anxiety, participants 
completed the Dutch version of the state anxiety subscale of the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S, Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Van der Ploeg, 
Defares, & Spielberger, 2000). Each item of the STAI-S (e.g., I feel frightened) was 
scored on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much). 
Both the original and the Dutch version of the STAI-S exhibit good internal 
consistency (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha’s equals or larger than 0.89; Barnes, Harp, & 
Jung, 2002; Van der Ploeg et al., 2000). In the present sample, Cronbach’s alpha 
was .92. Finally, the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ, Szymanski & Donohue, 
1995) was administered to assess spider fear. The FSQ consists of 18 statements 
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(e.g., I do anything to avoid a spider) which are to be rated on an eight-point 
Likert scale ranging from 0 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Both 
Szymanski and Donohue (1995) and Muris and Merkelbach (1996) reported very 
high internal consistency estimates for the FSQ (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha’s equal or 
larger than .92). Likewise, Cronbach’s alpha in the present sample equaled .97. 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of an exposure phase followed by an 
assessment phase (see Figure 1). During the exposure phase, the experimental 
stimuli were each presented 8 times in a random order (i.e., 64 trials). 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the Evaluative Condition (n = 28) 
or the Semantic Condition (n = 29). Participants assigned to the Evaluative 
Condition were asked to categorize these stimuli on the basis of their evaluative 
meaning (i.e., positive vs. negative). Participants assigned to the Semantic 
Condition were asked to categorize these stimuli in terms of the animacy 
dimension (i.e., living or not living). Selective attention for the evaluative 
stimulus dimension was thus maximized in the Evaluative Condition and 
minimized in the Semantic Condition.  
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms. 
Next, after an inter-stimulus interval of 500 ms, a stimulus was presented until a 
response was registered. Participants in the Evaluative Condition pressed the left 
key if the stimulus was negative and the right key if the stimulus was positive. 
Participants in the Semantic Condition pressed the left key if the stimulus 
depicted an object and the right key if the stimulus depicted a living creature. In 
case of an erroneous response, a 500-ms error message (i.e., ‘FOUT!’)  appeared. 
The inter-trial interval varied randomly between 500 ms and 1500 ms. 
During the subsequent measurement phase, participants first completed 
an AMP, modeled after the recommendations of Payne et al. (2005). Both the 
experimental stimuli and the transfer stimuli were used as primes and were 
presented once in an intermixed, random order (i.e., 16 trials in total). It may be  
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of the experimental procedure. 
 
noted that we deliberately chose to implement a small number of AMP trials as 
the AMP requires participants to evaluate stimuli. Using a higher number of trials 
might thus have interfered with the attention manipulation. Each trial started 
with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by an inter-
stimulus interval of 500 ms and a 75-ms presentation of a prime stimulus. Next, 
125 ms after the offset of the prime stimulus, a randomly selected Chinese 
pictograph was presented for 100 ms. Finally, immediately following the 
presentation of the Chinese pictograph, a black-and-white masking stimulus was 
presented until a response was registered. Participants were instructed to press 
the left key if they considered the Chinese pictograph to be less pleasant than 
the average Chinese pictograph and the right key if they considered the Chinese 
pictograph to be more pleasant than average. The inter-trial interval varied 
randomly between 500 ms and 1500 ms.  
Following the AMP, participants were asked to rate the evaluative 
meaning of the experimental and the transfer stimuli using a rating scale ranging 
from -100 to + 100. Each stimulus was presented until a response was triggered 
and the trial list was completely random. The inter-trial interval varied randomly 
between 500 ms and 1500 ms.  
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Next, participants completed the R-SRC-task, modeled after Spruyt et al. 
(2013). On each trial, either an experimental stimulus or a transfer stimulus was 
presented in the middle of the computer screen. Simultaneously, a manikin was 
presented either below or above the position of the stimulus (i.e., 
counterbalanced across trials and individual stimuli). During a first block of trials, 
participants were asked to move the manikin away from positive stimuli and 
toward negative stimuli (i.e., incongruent trials) using the arrow keys of a 
standard computer keyboard. In a second block of trials, participants were asked 
to move the manikin away from negative stimuli and toward positive stimuli (i.e., 
congruent trials). They were allowed to move the manikin in any direction, but a 
loud beeping sound was delivered if the initial movement of the manikin was 
incorrect. A trial ended if the manikin reached either its highest or its lowest 
possible position in the accurate direction (i.e., the upper/lower edge of the 
computer or picture, ten steps in each direction). Each stimulus was presented 
exactly twice during each block, leading to a total of 64 trials. The inter-trial 
interval varied randomly between 500 ms and 1500 ms.  
Finally, at the end of the experiment, participants were asked to 
complete the FSQ, the STAI-S, the DASS, and the PANAS (fixed order). 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses revealed that none of the critical effects was 
qualified by an interaction with stimulus type (i.e., experimental versus transfer 
stimuli) or animacy (i.e., living versus non-living stimuli), all F’s < 2.70. 
Accordingly, the data were collapsed across these variables. Note, however, that 
summary statistics for each cell of the design are provided in Table 1. 
AMP scores were calculated by subtracting the proportion of pleasant 
judgments on trials depicting negative stimuli from the proportion of pleasant 
judgments on trials depicting positive stimuli. Likewise, evaluative rating scores 
were calculated by subtracting the mean rating of negative stimuli from the 
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mean rating of positive stimuli. For the R-SRC task, individual scores were 
obtained using the so-called D600 algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). 
First, all reaction times slower than 300 ms and higher than 10,000 ms were 
removed (0.16 %). Second, for each block of trials, reaction times observed on 
error trials (8.47 %) were replaced by the mean of correct latencies plus a 600-
ms penalty. Third, a pooled SD was calculated based on correct trials and 
corrected error trials. Fourth, the mean response latency observed on congruent 
trials was subtracted from the mean response latency observed on incongruent 
trials. Finally, this difference score was divided by the pooled SD. For all 
dependent measures, higher values correspond with a more marked difference 
between positive and negative stimuli.  
A bootstrapping approach was adopted to examine the reliability of the 
AMP effect and the R-SRC effect. For each measure and for each of 10,000 runs, 
the data of each individual participant were split in two equally-sized, random 
sets. Two AMP scores and two R-SRC scores were then calculated, one for each 
subset. Next, for each measure and for each individual run, the correlation 
between the two scores was computed and Spearman-Brown corrected. The 
split-half reliability coefficient was then obtained by computing the average of 
these 10,000 correlations. For the AMP effect, the split-half reliability coefficient 
equaled .76. The split-half reliability coefficient for the R-SRC effect was.71. 
Overall, each of the three dependent measures revealed a more 
favorable evaluation of positive stimuli as compared to negative stimuli, t(56) = 
4.08, p < .001, d = 0.54, t(56) = 30.30, p < .001, d = 4.01, t(56) = 9.02, p < .001, d = 
1.19, for the AMP, the evaluative ratings and the R-SRC, respectively. More 
importantly, a one-way ANOVA with Condition as a between subjects factor 
revealed that the AMP scores were reliably different in both conditions, F(1, 55) 
= 9.74, p < .01, η² = 0.15. Follow-up analysis revealed a significant AMP effect in 
the Evaluative Condition, t(27) = 4.70, p < .001, d = 0.89, but not in the Semantic 
Condition, t(28) = 1.10, p = .28, d = 0.20.  
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Numerically, the rating data mimic these results, but the main effect of Condition 
failed to reach statistical significance, F(1, 55) = 2.53, p = .12, η² = 0.04 . In 
contrast, the R-SRC scores did not reveal a reliable difference between the two 
conditions, F < 1 (see Table 1). For each of the dependent measures (i.e., 
evaluative ratings, AMP scores and R-SRC scores), we also examined whether the 
effect of the attention manipulation was moderated by inter-individual 
differences as measured by the questionnaires. While there was no evidence for 
such a moderation for the PANAS, the DASS, and the STAI-S, all F’s < 1, an 
ANCOVA did reveal a significant interaction between the Condition factor and 
the FSQ score, at least for the AMP data, F(1, 53) = 4.72, p < .05, η² =.08. 
Reassuringly, more extreme levels of spider fear were associated with a more 
pronounced difference in AMP Scores between the Evaluative and the Semantic 
Condition. A similar effect did not emerge for the evaluative ratings and the R-
SRC data. 
Finally, correlational analyses revealed a significant correlation (r = 0.36) 
between the AMP scores and the evaluative ratings, t(55) = 2.86, p < .01. In 
contrast, neither the AMP scores nor the evaluative ratings correlated with the 
R-SRC scores, t’s < 1. Interestingly, the correlation between the FSQ scores and 
the AMP scores was substantial in the Evaluative Condition, r = 0.47, t(26) = 2.70, 
p < .05. More extreme levels of spiders fear were associated with more extreme 
AMP Scores. The correlation between the AMP scores and the FSQ scores did not 
reach significance in the Semantic Condition, r = .06, t < 1. 
DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present research was to test the viability of a new method 
to reduce the negativity of the (implicit) evaluation of fear-related stimuli. Based 
on the FSAA-framework developed by Spruyt and colleagues (Everaert, et al., 
2013; Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009), it was hypothesized that the requirement to 
engage in a non-evaluative processing style during an exposure procedure would 
impact measures of evaluation during a subsequent measurement phase, for two 
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reasons. First, the attentional focus on non-evaluative stimulus information may 
carry over from the exposure phase to the test phase, thereby reducing the 
likelihood and/or intensity of the evaluative response towards fear-related 
stimuli. Second, participants may be more likely to experience corrective 
emotional information during an exposure procedure if the likelihood and/or 
intensity of an evaluative response is minimized during the exposure phase. 
To obtain a proof-of-principle for these ideas, we conducted an exposure 
study in which participants were asked to categorize fear-related pictures (e.g., 
pictures depicting spiders) either in terms of their evaluative meaning (i.e., 
Evaluative Condition) or in terms of the animacy dimension (i.e., Semantic 
Condition). Participants were thus encouraged to assign selective attention to 
the evaluative and non-evaluative semantic features of stimuli, respectively. In 
line with our predictions, we observed that implicit evaluations as measured by 
the AMP were less pronounced in the Semantic Condition as compared to the 
Evaluative Condition, both for stimuli used during the manipulation phase and 
novel transfer stimuli. A similar result was obtained with the explicit evaluative 
ratings, although it must be noted that this effect was statistically not 
unequivocal (p = .12, but see Footnote 1). Given that the AMP and the explicit 
evaluative ratings were substantially correlated, however, we are inclined to 
attribute the absence of a reliable effect in the explicit valence ratings to a Type-
II error.  
Interestingly, we also observed that the correlation between the AMP 
scores and the FSQ scores (i.e., an explicit measure of spider fear) was 
dependent upon our experimental manipulation. Whereas a strong correlation 
was found in the Evaluative Condition (r = .47), there was no evidence for such a 
relationship in the Semantic Condition (r = .06). This finding strengthens our 
claim that FSAA can modulate the automatic evaluation of fear-related stimuli as 
it suggests that individual differences in automatic evaluation were picked up 
reliability by the AMP in the Evaluative Condition but not in the Semantic 
Condition.  
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The current findings are important because they shed new light on the 
mixed results that have been reported in the field of Attention Bias Modification 
(i.e., ABM; Beard, Sawyer, & Hofmann, 2012; Hertel & Mathews, 2011; MacLeod, 
Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). In a typical ABM procedure, 
participants are encouraged to divert their spatial attention away from fear-
related stimuli using an adapted version of the dot-probe task (MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Participants are presented with two briefly presented 
stimuli (i.e., cues), one of which is a fear-relevant stimulus whereas the other is 
emotionally neutral. On the majority of the trials, the emotionally neutral 
stimulus is replaced by a visual probe that requires a response. On the remaining 
trials, the probe is preceded by the fear-related stimulus. It is expected that the 
predictive relationship between the nature of the cue and the probe causes 
participants to selectively direct their spatial attention away from threatening 
stimuli (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 
2007), thereby promoting therapeutic change. Whereas several studies attesting 
to the therapeutic value of ABM training have appeared in the literature (e.g., 
Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008), some authors reported that they 
were unable to obtain supporting evidence for the idea that ABM training can 
reduce attention bias and subsequent vulnerability to psychological stressors 
(e.g., Julian, Beard, Schmidt, Powers, & Smits, 2013). Recent meta-analytical 
studies also raised concern about the therapeutic efficacy of ABM training 
(Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Heeren, Mogoase, McNally, Schmitz, & Philippot, 2015; 
Mogoaşe, David, & Koster, 2014). 
Importantly, this mixed pattern of results is readily accounted for on the 
basis of the FSAA framework. According to this framework, different stimulus 
dimensions attract attention as a function of current goals and task demands. In 
a traditional ABM training, attending to the threat value of the cues is beneficial 
for the task at hand as soon as the difference between threatening and neutral 
cues is predictive for the location of the target probes. As a result, somewhat 
ironically, one can expect participants to assign selective attention to the 
difference between threatening and neutral stimuli as soon as they pick up a 
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contingency between the threat value of the cues and the location of the targets. 
The observation that successful attempts to change attention bias were not 
always accompanied by corresponding changes in symptoms (Browning, Holmes, 
Murphy, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010) or even increased reported symptomatology 
(Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010) is consistent with this viewpoint. 
The logic developed here differs from the ABM approach in the sense that 
participants are (a) encouraged to assign spatial attention to fear-relevant stimuli 
while (b) prioritizing non-evaluative (semantic) stimulus processing over 
evaluative stimulus processing. Likewise, there is a marked difference between 
the current approach and the Emotional Processing Theory (i.e., EPT) of exposure 
therapy (Foa & Kozak, 1986). According to EPT, fear is represented in a fear 
structure that can be modified only if it is activated. Accordingly, therapeutic 
sessions often comprise a controlled confrontation with the fear-evoking 
stimulus, either in vivo or in vitro. Therapeutic change is then expected to occur 
only if and to the extent that participants can integrate corrective information 
during such an experience. In line with such an approach, the intervention 
developed here requires participants to focus spatial attention on a threat-
evoking stimulus. Nevertheless, our approach is novel in the sense that 
participants were encouraged to selectively process non-evaluative instead of 
evaluative stimulus features. As demonstrated by the present findings, this 
approach may provide an additional means to combat pathological fear, but we 
hasten to confirm that more research would be needed to firmly substantiate 
this claims.  
Further research would also be needed to deal with two limitations of our 
study. First, it is insufficiently clear why exactly the R-SRC task failed to pick up a 
difference between the Evaluative Condition and the Semantic Condition. 
Importantly, given that the overall R-SRC effect did reach significance in both 
conditions (i.e., performance was consistently better in the compatible block as 
compared to the incompatible block), we can safely rule out the possibility that 
the specific version of the R-SRC task used in this study was simply unsuited to 
detect automatic approach/avoidance tendencies. It also seems unlikely that a 
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(successful) manipulation of FSAA would selectively affect the (implicit) 
evaluation of a stimulus but not the degree to which this stimulus triggers 
automatic approach/avoidance tendencies. After all, the (automatic) evaluation 
of a stimulus can be defined as a necessary precursor of the (automatic) 
tendency to approach or to avoidance that stimulus (Deutsch & Strack, 2006; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Therefore, as an alternative explanation, we 
suspect that the temporal order of the implicit measures may have been critical. 
The AMP was always performed first, followed by the evaluative rating task and 
the SRC-task, respectively. We deliberately opted for a fixed order of assessment 
tasks because (a) we were primarily interested in the influence of FSAA on 
implicit evaluations (i.e., the AMP) and (b) we wanted to avoid carry-over effects 
from other tasks while participants completed the AMP. However, because all 
three dependent measures required participants to evaluate stimuli, one might 
argue that each of these tasks may have counteracted the effects of the 
experimental manipulation to some degree. As a logical consequence, it could be 
argued that the effects of our exposure procedure were abolished by the time 
participants completed the R-SRC- task. It would thus be interesting to replicate 
the present experiment while counterbalancing the order of the measurement 
tasks. Alternatively, it could be worthwhile to use an adaptation of the R-SRC 
that is semantically neutral. For example, participants might be asked to respond 
on the basis of the picture format of the target stimuli (e.g., portrait vs. 
landscape, see Reinecke, Becker, & Rinck, 2010). 
As a second limitation of our study, one may argue we restricted our 
sample to non-clinical, unselected participants. It thus remains an open question 
whether the current findings would replicate in a clinical sample. It may be 
noted, however, that the effect of FSAA was slightly larger, not smaller, when the 
analyses were restricted to data stemming from participants with elevated levels 
of (self-reported) fear of spiders (i.e., FSQ Scores > 55, see Huijding and de Jong 
(2006), F(1, 19) = 15.41, p < .001, η² = .45. More research will be necessary, 
however, to document the clinical validity of the current findings as well as the 
life-time of the extinction effect observed in the present study. 
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These limitations notwithstanding, our findings support the idea that 
(implicit) evaluations become less intense if participants are encouraged to 
assign attention to (non-evaluative) semantic stimulus information. This effect 
was found for generic evaluative stimuli and fear-related stimuli alike and 
transferred to non-trained exemplars. More research is needed, however, to 
establish the generality of this effect, its boundary conditions, and underlying 
mechanisms. 
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APPENDIX 
Description of stimulus materials used for the main dependent measures 
Pictures depicting negative objects: car, gun, garbage, fire 
Pictures depicting negative beings: spider, spider, spider, spider 
Pictures depicting positive objects: balloons, lollipop, present, air balloon 
Pictures depicting negative beings: dolphin, squirrel, baby, kitten 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Zajonc (1980) proclaimed that ‘preferences need no inferences’, 
numerous researchers have systematically investigated the hypothesis that all 
incoming evaluative information is processed in an automatic and unconditional 
fashion. (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Barlett, 1932; Lazarus, 1966; Wundt, 1907). 
Experimental support for the automatic evaluation hypothesis has grown 
steadily over the last decades, both in the behavioral sciences (e.g., Fazio, 2001) 
and the affective neurosciences (e.g., Vuilleumier, 2005). Recent studies have 
shown, however, that automatic evaluative processing is not unconditional but is 
moderated by feature-specific attention allocation (hereafter referred to as 
FSAA; Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & 
Eelen, 2007; Spruyt, Klauer, Gast, De Schryver, & De Houwer, 2015; Spruyt & 
Tibboel, 2015; Spruyt, 2014). Generally, the FSAA framework states that stimulus 
dimensions are processed only if and to the extent that they are selectively 
attended to. Thus, evaluative processing will only take place to the extent that 
selective attention is allocated to evaluative stimulus features. Corroborating the 
FSAA framework, Spruyt et al. (2009) showed that the evaluative priming effect, 
a classic marker of automatic evaluative stimulus processing, occurs only if 
attention to the evaluative stimulus dimension is maximized. Since this seminal 
finding, it has been shown that FSAA exerts similar effects on various other 
markers of automatic evaluative stimulus processing (Everaert, Spruyt, & De 
Houwer, 2011, 2013, 2016; Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, Pourtois, & De Houwer, 2013; 
Spruyt, De Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012; see also Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; 
Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Kiefer, 2012; Martens & Kiefer, 2009 for related findings 
in the non-evaluative semantic domain). 
 The idea that automatic evaluative processing is moderated by FSAA 
implies that FSAA may also moderate phenomena that are known to depend on 
evaluative processing and the extant literature is consistent with this viewpoint. 
For example, Gast and Rothermund (2011) showed that the acquisition of new 
likes and dislikes through evaluative conditioning (i.e., EC) can be modulated by 
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FSAA. Participants were presented with a mixture of EC trials and categorization 
trials. During the categorization trials, participants were asked to categorize the 
CS-US pair based on their evaluative features or non-evaluative semantic 
features and were thus encouraged to selectively attend either to evaluative or 
non-evaluative stimulus features, respectively. The authors observed a reliable 
EC effect if participants assigned selective attention to evaluative features during 
the conditioning phase. However, the EC effect was absent if participants 
assigned attention to non-evaluative stimulus features (see also Olson, Kendrick, 
& Fazio, 2009). In this dissertation project, we examined the moderating role of 
FSAA on both the measurement and modification of (implicit) likes and dislikes. 
First, it was hypothesized that FSAA would be a moderating factor in the 
predictive validity of implicit attitude measures as it has been show that FSAA is 
not only influenced by explicit task instructions (Everaert, 2012; Spruyt et al., 
2009) but also by personal goals. Several studies have revealed stable inter-
individual differences in the extent to which FSAA is deployed to the evaluative 
meaning of attitude-relevant stimuli. For example, it has been shown that spider-
fearful participants assign greater weight to the evaluative meaning of spider-
related objects than control participants (Cavanagh & Davey, 2001). In addition, 
individuals with symptoms of bulimia assign more weight to stimulus dimensions 
reflecting body size compared to control participants (Viken, Treat, Nosofsky, 
McFall, & Palmeri, 2002, see also Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Mogg, Mathews, & 
Weinman, 1989). Thus, there seem to exist important inter-individual differences 
in the extent to which evaluative stimulus features of attitude-relevant objects 
are automatically processed. In a second research line, we examined whether  
FSAA moderates the extinction rate of implicit likes and likes, and therefore the 
treatment of certain classes of psychopathology (i.e., specific phobia). Various 
studies have shown that likes and likes are resistant to extinction (Craske, 1999; 
Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Krypotos, Arnaudova, Effting, Kindt, & Beckers, 2015). 
One possible reason is that the spontaneous evaluative response evoked by an 
attitude object consistently reaffirms the evaluative tone of this object (Lewicki, 
Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992; Martin & Levey, 1978). Based on the FSAA-framework 
one can predict that participants will process the valence of an attitude-object to 
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a lesser degree if they assign attention to another (non-evaluative) stimulus 
dimension. Consequently, the degree of extinction of likes and dislikes would be 
dependent on the degree to which participants assign selective attention to non-
evaluative stimulus dimensions.  
In sum, based on the FSAA framework of Spruyt and colleagues, we 
hypothesized that FSAA would moderate various phenomena that are dependent 
on evaluative processing. Over the course of this dissertation project, we 
systematically scrutinized the moderating role of FSAA on both the measurement 
and modification of (implicit) likes and dislikes. First, I will give a short overview 
of the experiments we conducted and the data we collected during the 
dissertation project.  Second, I will interpret the data in the discussion section of 
this Chapter.  
OVERVIEW 
After the general introduction presented in Chapter 1, we described two 
experiments aimed at testing the hypothesis that FSAA moderates the predictive 
validity of evaluative priming scores (Chapter 2). In Experiment 1, a picture-
picture naming task designed to measure likes and dislikes towards fruit and 
candy, was presented on half of the trials. On the other half of the trials, target 
pictures were surrounded with a colored rectangle. In these induction trials, 
participants were asked to categorize target pictures either in terms of valence 
(i.e., evaluative condition), animacy (i.e., semantic condition), or the color of the 
rectangle (i.e., non-semantic condition). Participants were thus encouraged to 
assign attention to evaluative stimulus features, non-evaluative semantic 
features, or perceptual features, respectively. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were given the choice between a piece of fruit or a piece of candy as 
a little thank-you-present. As expected, we observed that predictive validity was 
more pronounced in the semantic condition than in the non-semantic condition 
or evaluative condition. Surprisingly, however, the relation between inter-
individual difference scores obtained in the semantic condition and behavior was 
187  CHAPTER 6  
 
in the opposite direction of what was predicted. The more inter-individual 
difference scores revealed a preference for fruit over candy, the higher the 
likelihood that participants would choose a piece of candy at the end of the 
experiment. 
In Experiment 2, participants performed both an evaluative categorization 
task and a semantic categorization task aimed at examining implicit evaluations 
towards spiders. Thus, participants were encouraged to assign selective 
attention to evaluative stimulus features in one task and to (non-evaluative) 
semantic stimulus features in the other task. At the end of the experiment, 
participants performed a behavioral assessment task (i.e., BAT) designed to 
measure behavioral avoidance towards a spider. In line with the findings in 
Experiment 1, we observed higher predictive validity in the semantic decision 
task as compared to the evaluative decision task, at least if the semantic decision 
task was performed prior to the evaluative decision task. Interestingly, the 
relationship between inter-individual difference scores and behavior was again 
counterintuitive. The more inter-individual difference scores indicated a 
profound dislike of spiders, the more likely that participants were prepared to 
approach an (allegedly living) spider. The within-subjects design of Experiment 2 
also enabled us to test a second hypothesis. Building further on the FSAA 
framework, we hypothesized that spider-fearful participants would process the 
evaluative features of spider-related stimuli independent of whether they were 
encouraged to assign selective attention to evaluative stimulus features or to 
non-evaluative stimulus features. Consequently, we did not expect a significant 
difference between inter-individual difference scores obtained in the evaluative 
categorization task and the semantic categorization task in spider-fearful 
participants. In contrast, we hypothesized that individuals in the control group 
would process the evaluative features of stimuli depicting spiders only if and to 
the extent that they were encouraged to assign attention to these evaluative 
features. Therefore, we did expect a reliable difference between inter-individual 
difference scores obtained in the evaluative categorization task and semantic 
categorization task in the control group. Interestingly, results were again 
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opposite to what we had expected. Whereas we did not observe a significant 
difference between inter-individual difference scores obtained in the semantic 
and the evaluative categorization task in the control group, a reliable difference 
between these scores was found in the spider-fearful group. 
In sum, the results in Chapter 2 were twofold. On the one hand, we 
observed preliminary evidence that predictive validity in the evaluative priming 
task is dependent on FSAA. Whereas inter-individual difference score obtained in 
the evaluative decision task and outcome measures were unrelated, we did 
observe a reliable relation between outcome measures and inter-individual 
difference scores obtained in a non-evaluative semantic decision task. On the 
other hand, the predictive relationship in the non-evaluative semantic decision 
task was opposite to what we had expected. Inter-individual difference scores 
indicative of a clear liking were associated with avoidance behavior whereas 
inter-individual difference scores indicating clear dislikes were associated with 
approach behavior.  
In Chapter 3, we describe a meta-analysis in which we again examined the 
hypothesis that FSAA moderates the predictive validity of implicit measurement 
techniques. To this end, predictive validity in both the evaluative priming 
paradigm (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) and the approach-
avoidance task was examined (i.e., AAT; Solarz, 1960). Note that we deliberately 
opted to include only these two paradigms in the analysis as we wanted to 
compare implicit measures that involve an evaluative focus with implicit 
measures that prevent such a processing goal. Both the evaluative priming 
paradigm and the AAT meet this criterion because participants can be asked to 
respond to task-relevant stimuli either based on their evaluative features or 
based on their non-evaluative features. An example of an implicit measure that 
does not meet the criterion is the implicit association task (i.e., IAT, Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) as it is inherent to this paradigm that participants 
evaluate (at least a number of) task-relevant stimuli. Again, we predicted that 
the predictive validity would be higher for implicit measures that maximize 
selective attention assignment to non-evaluative stimulus features as compared 
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to tasks that encourage participants to assign attention to evaluative stimulus 
features. Moreover, we examined whether the effect of FSAA on predictive 
validity was modulated by the personal relevance of attitude objects. Whereas 
we did not expect relevance to be an important moderator of the predictive 
validity in assessment tasks that maximize attention to evaluative stimulus 
features, we did hypothesize that personal relevance would impact predictive 
validity in attitude measurement tasks that maximize selective attention for non-
evaluative stimulus features.  
Overall, the meta-analysis revealed no evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that the predictive validity of implicit attitude measures is contingent upon the 
degree to which participants are encouraged to assign selective attention to 
evaluative features. Moreover, the effect of FSAA was not moderated by the 
personal relevance of the attitude objects. These results were obtained both for 
the AAT and the evaluative priming paradigm. However, it should be noted, that 
the number of studies focusing on implicit attitudes towards goal-relevant 
attitude objects were extremely limited. Therefore, one could argue that we 
lacked sufficient power to evaluate the hypothesis that FSAA moderates the 
predictive validity of the evaluative priming task. In sum, Chapter 2 and Chapter 
3 provided mixed evidence concerning the moderating role of FSAA on the 
predictive validity of implicit attitude measurement techniques. These findings 
will be discussed in detail in the discussion section of the current Chapter. 
In Chapter 4, we set out to demonstrate that FSAA can moderate the 
extinction rate of recently acquired likes and dislikes. In two experiments, 
participants learned new likes and dislikes through an evaluative conditioning 
procedure. Conditioned Stimuli (i.e., CSs) were abstract Gabor patches that 
varied along two orthogonal, perceptual dimensions; i.e., orientation and spatial 
frequency. During the acquisition phase, one of these dimensions was predictive 
of the valence of the unconditioned stimuli (i.e., US) and participants were thus 
encouraged to assign selective attention to this dimension. In a following 
attention manipulation phase, CS were presented alone. Participants were asked 
to categorize CSs according to their evaluative features (i.e. evaluative 
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condition), the stimulus dimension that was correlated with valence during the 
acquisition phase (i.e., relevant condition), or the stimulus dimension that was 
unrelated to valence (i.e. irrelevant condition). Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
were identical, except for the fact that, in Experiment 2, a direct measure of 
FSAA was included at the end of the experiment. We expected a reduction in the 
expression of likes and dislikes to take place in the irrelevant condition but not in 
the evaluative condition. Because participants in the relevant condition were 
encouraged to assign attention to a perceptual feature that was correlated with 
valence, we expected the reduction in the expression of likes and dislikes to be 
less pronounced in the relevant condition relative to the irrelevant condition. 
In line with our hypotheses, explicit measures revealed a linear reduction 
of the EC effect as selective attention to non-evaluative stimulus features of the 
CSs was maximized during the attention manipulation phase. In both 
experiments, we observed a reduction in the expression of likes and dislikes in 
the irrelevant condition, but not in evaluative condition or the relevant 
condition. In Experiment 1, the implicit attitude measure corroborated this 
finding, although the linear effect just missed conventional significance levels (p 
= .06). The results of Experiment 2 suggested that the effect of FSAA on the 
implicit measure of likes and dislikes was moderated by the extent to which the 
CS were clear-cut instances of the experimental stimulus categories in the sense 
that the anticipated effect of FSAA was reliable for salient but not for non-salient 
stimuli. Interestingly, both in Experiment 1 (i.e., explicit measure) and 
Experiment 2 (i.e., implicit measure), a significant increase of the EC effect from 
post-acquisition to post-attention manipulation was observed in the evaluative 
condition. This observation is in perfect accordance with the hypothesis that 
reactivation of emotional tone of the CS can strengthen the acquired valence of 
the CS (see Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992). 
Building further on the findings in Chapter 4, we examined whether FSAA 
can also impact implicit evaluations of fear-related stimuli (Chapter 5). 
Participants were presented with a series of real-life pictures depicting generic 
positive or negative contents. Stimuli varied on two orthogonal dimensions: 
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valence (positive versus negative) and animacy (living versus nonliving). Crucially, 
the category of negative, living stimuli included pictures of spiders only. During 
an attention manipulation procedure, participants were asked to categorize 
stimuli either according to their valence (i.e. evaluative condition) or animacy 
(i.e. semantic condition) and were thus encouraged to assign selective attention 
to evaluative stimulus features or non-evaluative stimulus features, respectively. 
We expected reduced expression of likes and dislikes in the semantic condition 
compared to the evaluative condition. 
Confirming our hypothesis, implicit likes and dislikes as captured by the 
AMP were less pronounced in the semantic condition as compared to the 
evaluative condition. Importantly, this effect generalized toward novel stimuli 
that were never presented during the attention manipulation procedure. An 
explicit measure of likes and dislikes corroborated this finding, although it missed 
conventional levels of statistical significance (p = .12). However, a relevant 
stimulus-response compatibility tasks designed to capture automatic approach-
avoidance tendencies failed to pick up a difference between the evaluative 
condition and the semantic condition.  
In sum, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 provide convincing evidence that FSAA 
can impact the extinction of likes and dislikes. However, the effects of the FSAA 
manipulation seem to be short-lived as they were reliable only when the attitude 
measurement was administered immediately following the manipulation. These 
findings as well as possible implications for therapeutic interventions are 
discussed at length in the following section. 
DISCUSSION 
The effect of FSAA on the predictive validity of implicit attitude measures 
In a first line of research, we examined the moderating role of FSAA on the 
relationship between inter-individual difference scores obtained with implicit 
attitude measures and behavioral outcome measures. Taken together, our 
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findings do not allow for a firm conclusion regarding the impact of FSAA on the 
predictive validity of implicit attitude measures, for three reasons. First, while we 
did observe an impact of FSAA on the predictive validity of evaluative priming 
scores in two empirical studies, the relationship between behavior and the 
evaluative priming scores observed in these studies was opposite to what we had 
expected (i.e., Chapter 2). Implicit likes were associated with avoidance behavior 
whereas implicit dislikes were associated with approach behavior. Second, we 
hypothesized that the extent to which evaluative stimulus features are 
spontaneously processed depends upon the personal relevance of the attitude 
objects. For goal-relevant objects, evaluative stimulus processing was expected 
to take place regardless of whether participants focused attention on the 
evaluative stimulus dimension. Conversely, attitude objects that are personally 
unimportant were expected to trigger automatic evaluative stimulus processing 
only under conditions that promoted selective attention for the evaluative 
stimulus dimension. However, the opposite data pattern was observed in 
Chapter 2. That is, FSAA impacted the implicit evaluation of goal-relevant 
attitude objects, not the implicit evaluation of goal-irrelevant attitude objects. 
Third, a meta-analysis revealed no impact of FSAA on the relationship between 
behavior and inter-individual difference scores obtained with either the AAT or 
the evaluative priming paradigm (i.e., Chapter 3). 
However, there are a few caveats that should be discussed before one can 
conclude that FSAA does not moderate the predictive validity of the evaluative 
priming paradigm. First, the number of studies reported in the literature in which 
the evaluative priming paradigm was used to capture implicit attitudes towards 
goal-relevant attitude objects is extremely scarce. It could thus be argued that a 
different pattern may have occurred had we been able to include more studies in 
the meta-analysis. In this respect, it is important to emphasize that we obtained 
strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that the literature concerning the 
predictive validity of evaluative priming measures is plagued by a publication 
bias. This observation not only limits the scope of the meta-analysis, it also sheds 
new light on the absence of a meaningful relationship between behavior and the 
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evaluative priming scores obtained with the evaluative decision task in Chapter 
2. Instead of two unlucky failures to replicate, our observation might very well 
reflect the true state of affairs, i.e., that the evaluative priming scores obtained 
with the evaluative decision task lack the validity currently suggested in the 
literature. 
Second, it deserves note that, in two independent experiments, the 
predictive validity of evaluative priming scores was found to be more 
pronounced under conditions that promoted participants to assign selective 
attention to non-evaluative semantic stimulus features (i.e., animacy) as 
compared to conditions that promoted participants to assign selective attention 
to evaluative stimulus information (i.e., Chapter 2). On the one hand, the results 
of the meta-analysis seem to contradict this pattern as no effects of FSAA were 
found. On the other hand, it must be noted that the vast majority of studies in 
which evaluative priming scores were obtained in the absence of an evaluative 
processing goal were studies in which a non-evaluative semantic processing goal 
was also absent. In the lexical decision task (Campos-Melady & Smith, 2012), for 
example, participants, are simply asked to decide whether target stimuli are 
words or not. Overall, predictive validity might thus be more pronounced in 
studies in which participants are encouraged to assign attention to non-
evaluative semantic features compared to studies in which participants are 
encouraged to assign selective attention to evaluative stimulus features or non-
evaluative non-semantic stimulus features. 
Third, our results did not confirm the hypothesis that FSAA moderates the 
predictive validity of the AAT. A meta-analysis did not reveal a significant 
difference in predictive validity between studies in which attention to evaluative 
features was maximized and studies in which attention to non-evaluative 
stimulus features was maximized (Chapter 3). However, the AAT studies that met 
the criteria for inclusion in the meta-analysis were either studies in which 
selective attention to evaluative stimulus was maximized or studies in which 
selective attention to non-evaluative non semantic stimulus features (i.e., the 
format or orientation of stimuli) was maximized. Thus, in accordance with our 
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findings in the evaluative priming task, it is possible that predictive validity in the 
AAT would be most pronounced under conditions that maximize attention to 
non-evaluative semantic stimulus features as compared to conditions that 
maximize selective attention to evaluative stimulus features or non-evaluative 
non-semantic stimulus features.  
In sum, in order to conclude that FSAA does not moderate the predictive 
validity of implicit measurement techniques, much more research would be 
needed. First, more research is needed to substantiate the idea that the 
predictive validity of evaluative priming scores is dependent upon the degree of 
goal-relevance of the attitude objects. Second, additional research is necessary 
to examine the predictive validity of implicit attitude measures in which selective 
attention to non-evaluative semantic stimulus features was maximized. Finally, 
as the relationship between behavior and inter-individual difference scores 
obtained in the semantic decision task was in the opposite direction of what was 
expected, further research will be needed to systematically scrutinize the 
underlying mechanisms of this effect as well as its boundary conditions. As was 
discussed in Chapter 2, one explanation for this unexpected findings is that the 
requirement to assign selective attention to non-evaluative semantic stimulus 
features resulted in a reversal of the evaluative priming effect (i.e., participants 
responded faster to incongruent trials compared to congruent trials, see Klauer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, & Spruyt, 2009 for an overview). To ascertain that the 
counterintuitive relation between behavior and inter-individual difference scores 
in the semantic decision task was indeed due to a reversed priming effect in 
attitude-relevant stimuli, one could experimentally manipulate the relevance of 
generic positive and negative stimuli, for example, by pairing stimuli with either a 
high or low reward (see Shen and Chung, 2011). One would expect a reversed 
evaluative priming effect in the semantic decision task for goal-relevant stimuli 
but a standard evaluative priming effect for goal-irrelevant stimuli. 
Lifetime of the FSAA manipulation: spontaneous extinction or reinstatement? 
During the dissertation project, we provided convincing evidence that FSAA 
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can modulate the extinction of likes and dislikes. Participants performed an 
attention manipulation phase in which they were encouraged to repeatedly 
process evaluative stimuli in a non-evaluative manner or an evaluative manner. 
Next, likes and dislikes were captured by an explicit and an implicit attitude 
measure. In Chapter 4, we observed a reduction of the evaluative conditioning 
effect (i.e., EC) obtained by an explicit attitude measure (i.e. evaluative ratings) if 
participant attended to non-evaluative semantic features during the attention 
manipulation phase. In contrast, we did not observe a reduction of the EC effect 
if participants were encouraged to assign attention to evaluative information. 
The same pattern was observed using an implicit measure of likes and dislikes 
(i.e., the AMP), although the effect missed conventional levels of significance 
(i.e., Experiment 1) or emerged only if the analysis was restricted to CSs that 
were clear-cut examples of the stimulus categories (i.e., Experiment 2). 
Interestingly, the results of Chapter 5 revealed a clear extinction of likes and 
dislikes measured by an implicit measure of likes and dislikes (i.e., the AMP) if 
participants repeatedly categorized stimuli according to their non-evaluative 
stimulus features during the preceding attention manipulation phase. However, 
the effect of the FSAA manipulation failed to reach conventional levels of 
significance on a measure of explicit evaluations (i.e., evaluative ratings). Thus, 
whilst the effect of the attention manipulation was most pronounced in an 
explicit measure of likes and dislikes in Chapter 4, the attention manipulation 
effect was most pronounced in an implicit measure of likes and dislikes in 
Chapter 5. These inconsistent findings could be explained if one takes the order 
in which the explicit and implicit attitude measures were administered into 
account. In Chapter 4, participants first performed an explicit measure of likes 
and dislikes (i.e., evaluative ratings) before completing an implicit attitude 
measure (i.e., the AMP). In Chapter 5, the order of these two tasks was reversed. 
Participants first performed an implicit attitude measure (i.e., the AMP) which 
was immediately followed by an explicit attitude measure (i.e., evaluative 
ratings). Thus, it seems that the effect of the FSAA manipulation is most 
pronounced in the attitude measure that is administered immediately following 
this manipulation, suggesting that the attention manipulation only induced 
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short-term effects. However, further research will be necessary to ascertain that 
the effect of the attention manipulation was indeed dependent on the order in 
which attitude measurements were administered. For example, one might 
counterbalance the presentation order of the attitude measurement tasks in our 
studies. The hypothesis that the effect of FSAA was moderated by the 
presentation order of the attitude measures would be supported if the effect of 
the attention manipulation would be moderated by the counterbalancing factor 
in both the explicit and implicit measure.  
Similar volatile effects of attention manipulation have been observed in an 
unpublished study of Spruyt and Van Bockstaele. The authors used an adapted 
version of the dot probe paradigm (see Van Bockstaele, Koster, Verschuere, 
Crombez, & De Houwer, 2012) to simultaneously measure and influence FSAA. In 
the standard dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), two cue stimuli 
are presented simultaneously at different locations on the computer screen. One 
of the cues is threatening whereas the other is not. After the cues disappear, a 
target stimulus is presented at the location of the neutral cue (i.e., incongruent 
trial) or the location of the threatening cue (i.e., congruent trial). Typically, 
responses to target stimuli are faster and lead to less errors in congruent as 
compared to incongruent trials. In the adapted dot-probe version of Spruyt and 
Van Bockstaele, cues were presented either in landscape or portrait format. 
During the attention manipulation phase, the format of the cue was predictive of 
the target location. Thus, participants were encouraged to assign attention to 
the non-evaluative feature of the cues. Immediately following the attention 
manipulation phase, participants performed a measurement phase in which the 
format of the cue were no longer predictive of the target location. Results 
revealed that the attention manipulation was successful in inducing selective 
attention to the format of the cues during the attention manipulation phase. 
However, selective attention to the format of the cue disappeared as soon as 
cue-format was no longer predictive of target location.  
Interestingly, there are indications that selective attention allocation to 
non-evaluative stimulus features during an attention manipulation phase could 
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also lead to long-term extinction effects. Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, Vanous, Ho, 
and Fazio (2007) observed extinction effects the day following an attention 
manipulation phase. The authors presented participants with a slowly unmasking 
stimulus and asked them to press a fixed key upon recognition of the word. The 
following day, an evaluative priming task was administered in which the 
previously recognized words (i.e., the experimental stimuli) as well as new words 
(i.e., the control stimuli) were used as primes. Results revealed a significant 
evaluative priming effect for the control stimuli whereas the evaluative priming 
effect was absent for the experimental stimuli. Thus, while the design of 
Sanbonmatsu et al. (2007) led to a long-term reduction in likes and dislikes, the 
effect was limited to stimuli that were presented during the attention 
manipulation phase. Sanbonmatsu et al. (2007) attributed their effects to the 
repeated absence of evaluative processing of attitude-objects. Note, that such an 
account fits perfectly with the FSAA framework as it could be argued that the 
absence of a requirement to evaluatively process attitude objects discourages 
participants to assign selective attention to evaluative stimulus features. One 
possible reason for the difference in the lifespan of the attention manipulation 
effect between the study of Sanbonmatsu et al. (2007) and our studies, could be 
found in the number of trials presented during the attention manipulation 
phase. In the study of Sanbonmatsu et al. (2007), each experimental stimulus 
was presented 40 times during the recognition task. In contrast, in our studies, 
each experimental stimulus was presented either five times (i.e., Chapter 4) or 
eight times (i.e., Chapter 5) during the attention manipulation phase. Clearly, the 
number of stimulus presentations during the attention manipulation phase could 
explain the marked difference in the lifetime of the attention manipulation 
effects observed in our studies and the studies of Sanbonmatsu et al. (2007) (see 
Kalish, 1954).  
At least three different accounts can explain why our attention 
manipulation would only induce short-term effects. First, it is possible that the 
effect of our attention manipulations just reduced due to the passing of time. 
One could simply test this account by manipulating the length of the interval 
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between the attention manipulation and the measurement phase. The account 
would be supported if the magnitude of the attention manipulations effect is 
dependent on the length of this interval. Second, it seems only logical that the 
lifespan of the FSAA manipulation effect would be dependent on FSAA. More 
specifically, it is possible that participants were attending to evaluative stimulus 
features during the measurement phase thereby abolishing the effects of an 
attention manipulation in which attention to non-evaluative stimulus features 
was maximized. During the measurement phase participants are asked to 
evaluate stimuli. This procedure might encourage participants to pay selective 
attention to evaluative stimulus features (see Everaert et al., 2011). However, 
this process might take some time to complete, thus influencing the attitude 
measure that is performed second while leaving the effect of the attention 
manipulation intact on the attitude measure that is performed immediately 
following the attention manipulation. Third, the attention manipulation effect 
might be due to occasion setting (see, for example, Bouton, 2004, Rydell & 
Gawronski, 2009). During a measurement phase, participants are generally asked 
to evaluative stimuli and are therefore encouraged to assign attention to 
evaluative stimulus features. In contrast, during the attention manipulation 
phase, participants are encouraged to assign selective attention to non-
evaluative stimulus features. The requirement to assign attention to different 
stimulus properties during the measurement phase and attention manipulation 
phase of the experiment could result in the formation of contextualized 
representations of stimuli. It could be hypothesized that likes and dislikes will be 
reduced in a context that maximizes attention to evaluative stimulus features 
but will resurface in a context that maximizes attention to non-evaluative 
stimulus features. Note, that this account is in accordance with numerous studies 
showing that the Pavlovian extinction effect is context-dependent (Bouton, 
2004). The latter two accounts could be examined by adopting a ‘renewal-
procedure’ which is frequently used to study context-effects in Pavlovian 
extinction (see Bouton, 2004). In this procedure, participants first perform an 
evaluative conditioning phase in context A (e.g., a blue background), which is 
then followed by an extinction phase in context B (e.g., a yellow background). 
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Extinction is shown to be context-dependent if evaluative responding to the CSs 
returns when CSs are presented in the original conditioning context (i.e., ABA 
renewal) or in an entirely new context (i.e., ABC renewal) but not when the CS is 
presented in the same context as during extinction (i.e., context B) (for example, 
see Bouton & Peck, 1989). To differentiate between the ‘occasion setting 
account’ and the ‘FSAA account’, one could encourage participants to assign 
attention to evaluative stimulus features in a context A (e.g., a blue background) 
during an acquisition phase. Next, during an extinction phase, participants could 
be encouraged to assign selective attention to a non-evaluative stimulus 
dimension in a context B (e.g., a yellow background). Finally, participants would 
be asked to perform an evaluatively neutral measurement task (e.g., a naming 
task or an irrelevant stimulus-response compatibility task) in either context A 
(i.e., ABA condition) or context B (i.e., ABB condition). Based on the occasion 
setting account, we would predict a significant difference between likes and 
dislikes in the ABA condition and the ABB condition. Because participants are not 
encouraged to assign attention to evaluative stimulus features during the 
measurement phase, we would not expect a difference in likes and dislikes 
between the ABA condition and the ABB condition based on the FSAA-account. 
In sum, the attention manipulation paradigm discussed in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 led to a short-term reduction in likes and dislikes. However, a study of 
Sanbonmatsu et al. (2007) suggests that attention manipulation can also lead to 
a long-term reduction in likes and dislikes. Further research should systematically 
examine which procedural variables influence the lifespan as well as the 
generalizability of the attention manipulation effect. These studies could also 
offer important insights about the underlying mechanisms and boundary 
conditions of the attention manipulation effect. 
Psychopathology 
The finding that FSAA moderates the extinction of likes and dislikes, raises 
the question whether FSAA could also play an important role in the treatment of 
psychopathology. As mentioned above, individuals might differ in the extent to 
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which selective attention is chronically assigned to the evaluative features of 
attitude objects (Cavanagh & Davey, 2001; Viken et al., 2002). This chronic 
deployment of selective attention might even lead to an attention bias (Everaert, 
et al., 2013) which is claimed to play an important role in the etiology, 
maintenance and treatment of anxiety disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997; Van 
Bockstaele et al., 2014). Various therapeutic interventions have been developed 
aimed at reducing attention bias in order to reduce pathological symptoms. In a 
typical Attention Bias Modification procedure (i.e., ABM, Beard, Sawyer, & 
Hofmann, 2012; Hertel & Mathews, 2011; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, 
Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002, see Bar-Haim, 2010; Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 
2010 for a recent review), participants are presented with a modified version of 
the standard attention bias assessment task, i.e. the dot-probe task (MacLeod et 
al., 1986). In the ABM procedure, attention bias is manipulated by encouraging 
participants to divert their attention away from threatening information by 
presenting them with a high number of incongruent trials. This procedure leads 
to a reduction in attention bias thereby inducing therapeutic change. However, 
despite various studies attesting to the therapeutic value of the ABM procedure 
(e.g., Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008; Bar-Haim, 2010), several 
other studies raised doubts about the robustness of this effect (see Hallion & 
Ruscio, 2011; Heeren, Mogoase, McNally, Schmitz, & Philippot, 2015; Mogoaşe, 
David, & Koster, 2014; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). These inconsistent findings 
can be readily explained if one takes into account the effects of FSAA. Note, that 
FSAA manipulation approach differs markedly from the ABM procedure. Whilst 
in the FSAA approach, participants are encouraged to attend to non-evaluative 
features of attitude-objects , participants in the ABM procedure are encouraged 
to divert their attention from attitude objects as a whole. However, one can only 
divert attention from a stimulus if that stimulus has been processed. 
Furthermore, in the dot probe paradigm, it becomes beneficial to attend to the 
threat value of the cue as soon as the content of the cue is predictive of the 
target location, that is, as soon as the proportion of congruent and incongruent 
trials is different from 50 %. This could explain why successful attempts to 
change attention bias were not always accompanied by corresponding changes 
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in symptoms (Browning, Holmes, Murphy, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010) or even 
led to an increase in reported symptomatology (Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & 
Koster, 2010).  
The FSAA manipulation approach also differs from the Emotional 
Processing Theory (i.e., EPT) of exposure therapy (Foa & Kozak, 1986). Exposure 
therapy typically involves controlled exposure to a feared stimulus, either in vitro 
or in vivo. During the intervention, participants are encouraged to attend to the 
threatening stimulus in order to activate corresponding memory traces. 
Therapeutic change is expected to occur if participants adjust these memory 
traces with corrective information during the exposure session. Thus, while 
participants are encouraged to direct attention to attitude objects as a whole 
during exposure therapy, participants in the FSAA manipulation approach are 
encouraged to attend to the non-evaluative features. However, as the underlying 
mechanisms of exposure therapy are not well understood (Hofmann, 2008), we 
do not know exactly what participants are doing during the exposure session. For 
example, it might well be that exposure therapy is particularly effective in 
participants who spontaneously attend to the non-evaluative features of 
threatening stimuli when confronted with these stimuli during an exposure 
session. 
Exposure therapy has proven to be a very successful intervention 
technique for treating, for example, specific phobias (Parsons & Rizzo, 2008), 
post-traumatic stress disorder (Taylor et al., 2003), and social phobia (Heimberg 
& Barlow, 1988) (see also Deacon & Abramowitz, 2004; Foa, Keane, & Friedman, 
2000). However, in many cases it is impossible to present the original fear-
evoking stimuli during an exposure session (e.g., an aggressive dog). Therapist 
therefore usually rely on the presentation of aperceptual similar fear-evoking 
stimuli (e.g., the image of an aggressive dog or an imagined aggressive dog). 
Unfortunately, the extinction of fear does not always generalize to the original 
fear-evoking stimulus or related fear-evoking stimuli (Barry, Griffith, Vervliet, & 
Hermans, 2016, Rowe, & Craske, 1998; Vervliet, et al., 2005). Whether or not 
generalization takes place seems to be dependent on the perceptual similarity 
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between the original stimulus and the stimulus presented during the exposure 
session, with higher similarity increasing the probability of generalization 
(Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 2006). A recent study of Barry and Hermans 
(2016) examined whether the reduction of fear in generalization stimuli could be 
attenuated by encouraging participants to attend to the commonalities between 
stimuli used during the exposure session and generalization stimuli. First, fear 
was acquired by pairing a stimulus with an ectro-cutaneaous shock. Next, during 
an exposure session, participants were encouraged to assign attention to the 
communalities (e.g., color ) between the acquisition stimulus and exposure 
stimulus (i.e., common condition) or to the unique features of the exposure 
stimulus (i.e., unique condition). Barry and Hermans (2016) observed that fear in 
response to a generalization stimulus in terms of skin conductance returned in 
the unique condition but not in the common condition. However, there was no 
difference between conditions when fear was measured via self-report ratings of 
shock expectancy or via fear potentiated startle. A similar mechanism could 
explain why the effect of our FSAA manipulation generalized to stimuli that were 
not presented during the attention manipulation phase (i.e., Chapter 6). That is, 
one could suggest that participants were encouraged to assign selective 
attention to the communalities between generalization stimuli and stimuli 
presented during the attention manipulation phase in terms of a higher order 
categorization (i.e., animacy). Therefore, one could expect that the effect of the 
FSAA manipulation would generalize to all stimuli that fall within this 
categorization.  
Taking into account the limitations of both the EPT and ABM, the FSSA 
approach might well provide a promising new avenue for combating pathological 
fear and anxiety in addition to the EPT and ABM. The studies discussed in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 provide preliminary support this idea, showing that the 
FSAA manipulation can indeed lead to changes in likes and dislikes. Moreover, 
the importance of FSAA in combating anxiety and fear was supported by an 
unpublished study of Spruyt and Van Bockstaele in which the authors tested the 
efficacy of a modified dot probe paradigm designed to maximize attention to 
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non-evaluative stimulus features. Half of the participants were assigned to an 
Avoid Training condition in which the threat value of the cue was predictive for 
the location of the target. The other half of the participants was assigned to an 
Irrelevant training condition in which a threat-unrelated dimension of the cues 
(i.e., the format of the cues) was predictive of the location of the target stimulus. 
Interestingly, participants in the Irrelevant training condition exhibited less 
emotional reactivity to a stressful situation than participants in the Avoid 
Training condition. Of course, much more research will be needed to confirm the 
potential use of the FSAA manipulation approach as a new intervention 
technique. There are at least three limitations of the studies discussed in Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5 that should be addressed.  
First, the FSAA manipulation only led to changes in likes and dislikes. 
Future research should ascertain that the FSAA manipulation also leads to a 
reduction in behavior and/ or pathological symptoms. Second, we examined likes 
and dislikes in students. Therefore it is yet to be seen whether the FSAA 
manipulation can affect likes and dislikes as well as behavior in clinical samples. 
Third, the FSAA manipulation in our studies only caused short-term changes in 
likes and dislikes. Further research should examine whether the FSAA 
manipulation can also lead to long-term changes in likes and dislikes as well as 
symptomology.  
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation project, we systematically tested whether the 
measurement and modification of (implicit) likes and dislikes are dependent on 
FSAA. According to the FSAA framework (Spruyt, et al., 2007, 2009, 2015; Spruyt 
& Tibboel, 2015; Spruyt, 2014), evaluative stimulus features are processed only 
and to the extent that they are selectively attended. Moreover, it seems likely 
that individuals differ in the extent to which selective attention is required to 
automatically process the evaluative features of attitude objects. Based on this 
assumption, it was hypothesized that inter-individual differences in implicit 
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evaluation will be most pronounced if individuals are encouraged to allocate 
selective attention to a non-evaluative stimulus feature. Our studies concerning 
the moderating role of FSAA on the predictive validity of implicit attitude 
measurement techniques yielded mixed results. In two studies, predictive 
validity was most pronounced in an evaluative priming task in which attention to 
non-evaluative semantic features was maximized compared to an evaluative 
priming task in which attention to evaluative semantic features was maximized. 
However, a meta-analysis revealed no significant impact of FSAA on the 
predictive validity of implicit measures. Importantly, the meta-analysis indicated 
that more research is necessary about the combined effects of personal 
relevance and FSAA onthe predictive validity of implicit measures before strong 
claims can be made about the moderating role of FSAA on the predictive validity 
of implicit attitude measures. 
The second part of the dissertation project was more successful. That is, 
we provided convincing evidence that FSAA can modulate the modification of 
likes and dislikes. We observed extinction of both recently acquired likes and 
dislikes as well as likes and dislikes toward fearful stimuli under conditions that 
maximized attention to non-evaluative stimulus features. The expression of likes 
and dislikes remained unchanged or even increased under conditions that 
maximized attention to evaluative stimulus features. However, more research 
will be necessary to examine the lifespan of this effect, its underlying 
mechanisms and boundary conditions as well as its therapeutic value. 
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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
INLEIDING 
Het is een klassieke hypothese dat de verwerking van evaluatieve 
informatie op een automatische en onvoorwaardelijke manier kan verlopen 
(Arnold, 1960; Barlett, 1932; Lazarus, 1966; Wundt, 1907). Het is echter pas sinds 
het invloedrijke werk van Zajonc (1980) dat evaluatieve prikkelverwerking op een 
systematische wijze onderzocht wordt. In het merendeel van dit onderzoek 
wordt gebruik gemaakt van het evaluatieve priming paradigma (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). In dit paradigma worden deelnemers 
doorgaans gevraagd om een serie van doelprikkels (bv., een afbeelding van een 
kitten) te categoriseren als zijnde ‘positief’ of ‘negatief’. Deze doelprikkels 
worden voorafgegaan door de presentatie van een taak-irrelevante primeprikkel 
(bv., de afbeelding van een spin). De evaluatieve congruentie van de doelprikkels 
en primeprikkels wordt gemanipuleerd zodat deze prikkels dezelfde evaluatieve 
connotatie hebben op sommige proefbeurten (i.e., congruente proefbeurten) 
maar verschillen in evaluatieve connotatie op andere proefbeurten (i.e., 
incongruente proefbeurten). Deelnemers reageren doorgaans sneller en maken 
minder fouten op congruente proefbeurten dan op incongruente proefbeurten 
(i.e., het evaluatieve primingeffect). Het is belangrijk om te begrijpen dat dit 
effect enkel kan optreden indien de evaluatieve connotatie van de irrelevante 
primeprikkels wordt verwerkt. Het evaluatieve primingeffect wordt dan ook vaak 
gebruikt als een index voor evaluative stimulusverwerking. Door te onderzoeken 
onder welke condities evaluative primingeffect voorkomt, kan men dus veel 
leren over de condities waaronder evaluatieve verwerking plaatsvindt. De laatste 
decennia is de experimentele evidentie voor de ‘automaticiteithypothese’ enkel 
gegroeid, zowel in de gedragswetenschappen (bv., Fazio, 2001) als in de 
neurowetenschappen (bv., Vuilleumier, 2005). Niettemin toonde recent 
onderzoek aan dat automatische evaluatieve prikkelverwerking geen 
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onvoorwaardelijk fenomeen is maar afhankelijk is van kenmerkspecifieke 
aandachtallocatie. (i.e., KSAA; Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007; Spruyt, Klauer, Gast, De Schryver, & De 
Houwer, 2015; Spruyt & Tibboel, 2015; Spruyt, 2014). Spruyt en collegas toonden 
aan dat de mate waarin evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken automatisch worden 
verwerkt een functie is van de mate waarin deelnemers selectieve aandacht aan 
deze kenmerken schenken. Bijvoorbeeld, Spruyt et al. (2009) gebruikten een 
beeld-beeld benoemingstaak om de invloed van KSAA op het evaluatieve 
primingeffect te onderzoeken. De auteurs maakten gebruik van de beeld-beeld 
benoemingstaak omdat deelnemers in deze taak de doelstimuli louter moeten 
benoemen waardoor de taak doorgaans als semantisch neutraal wordt 
aanschouwd. Benoemingsproefbeurten werden samen met 
categorisatieproefbeurten aangeboden. In de categorisatieproefbeurten werden 
deelnemers gevraagd om doelstimuli te categoriseren met betrekking tot hun 
evaluatieve kenmerken (i.e., positief of negatief) of met betrekking tot 
levendheid (i.e., levend of object). Deelnemers werden dus aangespoord om 
selectieve aandacht te besteden aan respectievelijk evaluatieve of niet-
evaluatieve semantische stimuluskenmerken. Spruyt et al. (2009) vonden een 
evaluatief primingeffect maar geen niet-evaluatief semantisch primingeffect op 
de benoemingsproefbeurten indien deelnemers aandacht besteedden aan 
evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken gedurende de categorisatietrials. Er werd echter 
een niet-evaluatief semantisch primingeffect gevonden maar geen evaluatief 
primingeffect indien deelnemers werden aangemoedigd om aandacht te 
besteden aan niet-evaluatieve semantische stimuluskenmerken. Ook andere 
indices van automatische evaluatieve verwerking blijken afhankelijk te zijn van 
de mate waarin selectieve aandacht wordt besteed aan de evaluatieve 
stimulusdimensies, zoals het dot probe effect (Everaert et al., 2013), het 
evaluatieve stroop effect (Everaert et al., 2013), en de P3a uitgelokt door 
onverwachte emotionele stimuli (Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, Pourtois, & De Houwer, 
2013). Gelijkaardige bevindingen werden ook gerapporteerd in het domein van 
niet-evaluatieve semantische stimulusverwerking (zie Ansorge, Kunde, & Kiefer, 
2014; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Kiefer, 2012; Martens & 
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Kiefer, 2009).  
Samen met het stijgend aantal studies die aantonen dat evaluatieve 
verwerking afhankelijk is van KSAA, rijst de vraag of KSAA ook een modererende 
factor is in fenomenen die afhankelijk zijn van evaluatieve verwerking. Zo 
toonden Gast and Rothermund (2011) reeds aan dat de acquisitie van voor- en 
afkeuren via evaluatieve conditionering afhankelijk is van KSAA. In het huidige 
doctoraatsproject onderzochten we systematisch of KSAA ook het meten en het 
veranderen van (spontane) voor-en afkeuren beïnvloedt. 
OVERZICHT 
De invloed van KSAA op het meten van impliciete voor- en afkeuren. 
Gedrag is een functie van voor-en afkeuren (Allport, 1935). Het is dan ook 
niet verrassend dat veelvuldig onderzoek gewijd werd aan het ontdekken van 
valide en betrouwbare meetinstrumenten van voor-en afkeuren. Oorspronkelijk 
werden voor-en afkeuren gemeten via expliciete attitudematen, i.e., 
proefpersonen werden gevraagd om hun voor-en afkeuren weer te geven via 
zelf-rapportering. Deze expliciete maten werden echter bekritiseerd omdat ze 
gebaseerd zijn op deelnemers hun capaciteiten om hun voor-en afkeuren via 
introspectie te bepalen. Er is echter geen garantie dat deelnemers hiertoe in 
staat zijn. Daarnaast is het zeer makkelijk voor deelnemers om hun voor-en 
afkeuren onjuist weer te geven op deze expliciete maten (zie Fazio & Olson, 
2003; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). In de voorbije decennia werd het ook steeds 
duidelijker dat gedrag niet enkel bepaald wordt door expliciete voor-en afkeuren 
maar ook door impliciete voor-en afkeuren, i.e., de spontane evaluatieve reacties 
die stimuli oproepen. Deze inzichten leidden tot de ontwikkeling van nieuwe 
meetinstrumenten die erop gericht zijn om deze spontane voor- en afkeuren te 
meten. Een voorbeeld van een dergelijk impliciet meetinstrument is de 
evaluatieve primingtaak. Door het gebruik van attituderelevante objecten als 
primestimuli kan de evaluatieve primingtaak aangewend worden als instrument 
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voor het meten van spontane voor- en afkeuren. Bijvoorbeeld, om spontane 
reacties ten opzichte van spinnen te meten, kan men afbeeldingen van spinnen 
als primestimuli gebruiken. Een typische observatie is dat personen die angst 
hebben voor spinnen sneller reageren en minder fouten maken indien de 
afbeelding van een spin gevolgd wordt door een negatieve doelstimulus dan 
wanneer de afbeelding gevolgd wordt door een positieve doelstimulus (bv., Klein 
et al., 2012). Andere welbekende taken voor het meten van spontane voor- en 
afkeuren zijn de Impliciete associatietest (i.e., IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998), de relational responding taak (i.e., RRT, De Houwer, Heider, 
Spruyt, Roets, & Hughes, 2015), en de Approach-Avoidance taak (i.e., AAT; 
Solarz, 1960).  
Ondanks dat verschillende studies hebben aangetoond dat 
interindividuele verschilscores gemeten via impliciete attitudematen kunnen 
gebruikt worden om gedrag te voorspellen (zie bijvoorbeeld, Degner & Wentura, 
2009; Descheemaeker, Spruyt, & Hermans, 2014; Klein et al., 2012; Spruyt et al., 
2015), bleken verscheidene onderzoekers niet in staat om dit effect te repliceren 
(Blanton et al., 2009; Falk, Heine, Takemura, Zhang, & Hsu, 2015; Neimeijer, de 
Jong, & Roefs, 2015; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandekerckhove, & Eelen, 
2007). Eén manier om deze inconsistente bevindingen te verklaren is om te 
veronderstellen dat de voorspellende validiteit van impliciete attitudematen 
beïnvloed wordt door modererende variabelen. In een eerste onderzoekslijn van 
het doctoraatsproject onderzochten we of KSAA een modererende rol speelt in 
het meten van spontane voor- en afkeuren. Deze hypothese is gebaseerd op de 
assumptie dat individuen niet enkel verschillen in de extremiteit of/en de 
richting van hun voor- en afkeuren maar ook in de mate waarin selectieve 
aandachtallocatie vereist is om de evaluatieve connotatie van attitudeobjecten 
automatisch te verwerken. Bijvoorbeeld, individuen die angst hebben voor 
spinnen zullen spinnen niet enkel als negatiever ervaren dan controlepersonen 
(Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2006), maar zij zullen de negatieve connotatie van 
spinnen ook verwerken indien zij aangespoord worden om aandacht te besteden 
aan niet-evaluatieve stimulusdimensies. Verschillende studies tonen inderdaad 
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aan dat KSAA niet enkel afhankelijk is van expliciete taakinstructies (Spruyt et al., 
2009) of meer subtiele aspecten van de taak (Everaert, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 
2011) maar ook van de persoonlijke relevantie van een attitudeobject (Cavanagh 
& Davey, 2001; Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Viken, Treat, Nosofsky, McFall, & Palmeri, 
2002). Men kan dus voorspellen dat interindividuele verschillen in automatische 
evaluatieve verwerking het meest uitgesproken zullen zijn onder condities die 
selectieve aandacht voor niet-evaluatieve stimulusdimensies stimuleren. Meer 
bepaald voorspellen we dat de voorspellende validiteit van impliciete 
attitudematen groter zal zijn wanneer deelnemers worden aangemoedigd om 
selectieve aandacht te besteden aan niet-evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken dan 
wanneer zij worden aangemoedigd om selectieve aandacht te besteden aan 
evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijven we twee studies waarin deze hypothese werd 
getest. In Experiment 1 werden deelnemers gevraagd om doelstimuli te 
benoemen in een beeld-beeld benoemingstaak in de helft van de proefbeurten 
(see Spruyt et al., 2009). Deze beeld-beeld benoemingstaak werd ontwikkeld om 
de spontane voor- en afkeuren ten opzichte van fruit en snoep te meten. In de 
andere helft van de proefbeurten, werden de doelstimuli omringd door een 
gekleurde rechthoek. In deze proefbeurten werden deelnemers gevraagd om de 
doelstimuli te categoriseren op basis van hun evaluatieve connotatie (i.e., 
evaluatieve conditie), hun levendheid (i.e., semantische conditie), of de kleur van 
de rechthoek (i.e., de niet-semantische conditie). Deelnemers werden dus 
aangemoedigd om aandacht te besteden aan respectievelijk de evaluatieve 
stimulusdimensie, een niet-evaluatieve semantische stimulusdimensie, of een 
niet-evaluative niet-semantische stimulusdimensie. Op het einde van de sessie 
werden deelnemers gevraagd om te kiezen tussen een stuk fruit of een stuk 
snoep als een bedankje voor hun deelname aan het experiment. Conform onze 
hypothesen, was voorspellende validiteit hoger in de semantische conditie dan in 
de niet-semantische conditie of de evaluatieve conditie. De geobserveerde 
relatie tussen het gedrag en de interindividuele verschilscores in de semantische 
conditie was echter tegen intuïtief. Hoe meer interindividuele verschilscores 
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indicatief waren voor een preferentie voor fruit relatief ten opzichte van snoep, 
hoe hoger de kans dat deelnemers een stuk snoep kozen op het einde van het 
experiment. 
In Experiment 2 voerden deelnemers zowel een evaluatieve 
categorisatietaak als een semantische categorisatietaak uit. Deelnemers werden 
dus aangemoedigd om selectieve aandacht te besteden aan evaluatieve 
stimulusdimensies en niet-evaluatieve semantische stimulusdimensies, 
respectievelijk. Beide taken werden ontwikkeld om voor- en afkeuren ten 
opzichte van spinnen te meten. Op het einde van de experimentele sessie 
werden deelnemers gevraagd om een gedragsbeoordelingstaak uit te voeren om 
zo hun vermijdingsgedrag ten opzichte van een spin te meten. We observeerden 
een hogere voorspellende validiteit indien de impliciete attitudemaat werd 
uitgevoerd onder condities die selectieve aandacht voor niet-evaluatieve 
semantische stimulusdimensies stimuleren vergeleken met condities die 
selectieve aandacht voor evaluatieve stimulusdimensies stimuleren, ten minste 
indien de semantische categorisatietaak voor de evaluatieve categorisatietaak 
werd aangeboden. Net zoals in Experiment 1 werd vastgesteld dat de relatie 
tussen gedrag en interindividuele verschilscores gemeten in de semantische 
categorisatietaak tegen intuïtief was. Hoe meer interindividuele verschilscores 
een afkeur voor spinnen weergaven, hoe groter de kans dat deelnemers een 
levende spin durfden benaderen. 
Het binnen-subjects design dat gebruikt werd in Experiment 2 stelde ons 
ook in staat om een tweede hypothese te testen, i.e., we voorspelden dat 
deelnemers die angst hadden voor spinnen, de evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken 
van spin-gerelateerde stimuli zouden verwerken onafhankelijk van 
taakinstructies. We verwachtten dus geen verschil tussen individuele 
verschilscores gemeten in de evaluatieve categorisatietaak en de semantische 
categorisatietaak bij deelnemers met spinnenangst. Een controlegroep, 
daarentegen, zou de evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken van spingerelateerde 
stimuli enkel verwerken mits inductie van selectieve aandacht voor evaluatieve 
stimuluskenmerken. We verwachtten dus een betrouwbaar verschil tussen 
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interindividuele verschilscores gemeten in de evaluatieve categorisatietaak en de 
niet-evaluatieve semantische categorisatietaak in een controle groep. De 
resultaten waren echter opnieuw tegen intuïtief. Het verschil tussen 
interindividuele verschilscores gemeten in de evaluatieve categorisatietaak en de 
niet-evaluatieve semantische categorisatietaak was significant in individuen die 
angst hadden voor spinnen maar niet in de controle groep. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijven we een meta-analyse waarin we opnieuw de 
hypothese onderzoeken dat KSAA een modererende rol speelt in de 
voorspellende validiteit van impliciete attitudematen. We onderzochten 
voorspellende validiteit in het evaluatieve priming paradigma (bv., Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) en de approach-avoidance taak (i.e., AAT; 
Solarz, 1960). In beide taken kunnen deelnemers gevraagd worden om op de 
doelstimuli te reageren op basis van hun evaluatieve stimulus connotatie of op 
basis van niet-evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken. Deze flexibiliteit in 
aandachtallocatie was één van de inclusiecriteria waaraan taken moesten 
voldoen om te worden opgenomen in de meta-analyse. De IAT, bijvoorbeeld, 
werd niet opgenomen omdat het inherent is aan deze taak dat deelnemers ten 
minste een deel van de taakrelevante stimuli evalueren. Naast het effect van 
KSAA op de voorspellende validiteit van impliciete attitudematen, onderzochten 
we in deze meta-analyse ook of het effect van KSAA gemodereerd wordt door de 
persoonlijke relevantie van de onderzochte attitudeobjecten. We voorspelden 
dat persoonlijke relevantie geen moderator zou zijn in impliciete attitudematen 
waarin selectieve aandacht voor evaluatieve stimulusdimensies wordt 
gemaximaliseerd. Persoonlijke relevantie zou echter wel een modererende rol 
spelen in impliciete attitudematen waarin selectieve aandacht voor niet-
evaluatieve stimulusdimensies wordt gemaximaliseerd. 
In tegenstelling tot onze verwachtingen was voorspellende validiteit 
onafhankelijk van KSAA. Het effect van KSAA werd ook niet gemodereerd door 
de persoonlijke relevantie van de attitudeobjecten. Het moet echter vermeld 
worden dat we slechts enkele studies observeerden waarin de voorspellende 
validiteit van de evaluatieve priming taak werd onderzocht in individuen voor 
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wie het bestudeerd attitudeobjecten persoonlijk relevant was. Het is dus 
mogelijk dat we onvoldoende statistische gegevens hadden om de modulerende 
invloed van KSAA op de voorspellende validiteit van de evaluatieve priming taak 
te onderzoeken. Daarnaast werd er in de literatuur geen enkele studie 
gerapporteerd waarin de voorspellende validiteit van de AAT werd gemeten 
onder condities die selectieve aandacht voor niet-evaluatieve semantische 
stimuluskenmerken stimuleerde (e.g., levendheid). Verder onderzoek is dus 
noodzakelijk naar (1) de impact van persoonlijke relevantie op de modulerende 
rol van KSAA op voorspellende validiteit in de evaluatieve primingtaak en (2) de 
voorspellende validiteit van de AAT onder condities die selectieve aandacht voor 
niet-evaluatieve semantische stimuluskenmerken stimuleren. 
De invloed van KSAA op het veranderen van spontane voor- en afkeuren. 
In een tweede onderzoekslijn van het huidige doctoraatsproject 
onderzochten we of KSAA een modererende rol kan spelen in het veranderen 
van (spontane) voor- en afkeuren. Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat voor- en 
afkeuren zeer resistent zijn tegen uitdoving (Craske, 1999; Hallion & Ruscio, 
2011; Krypotos, Arnaudova, Effting, Kindt, & Beckers, 2015). Een mogelijke reden 
hiervoor is dat de spontane evalutieve respons uitgelokt door een attitudeobject, 
de evaluatieve connotatie van dit object steeds bevestigt (Lewicki, Hill, & 
Czyzewska, 1992; Martin & Levey, 1978). Op basis van het KSAA-kader kan men 
echter voorspellen dat de kans dat het aanschouwen van een  attitudeobject tot 
een evaluatieve respons leidt kleiner is indien selectieve aandacht wordt 
weggericht van evaluative stimuluskenmerken.  De mate waarin er uitdoving van 
voor- en afkeuren optreedt zou dus afhankelijk zijn van de mate waarin 
individuen hun aandacht richten op niet-evaluatieve (semantische) 
stimuluskenmerken. We voorspelden een reductie in voor- en afkeuren indien 
deelnemers selectieve aandacht besteden aan niet-evaluatieve 
stimulusdimensies tijdens een aandachtmanipulatietaak. De expressie van voor- 
en afkeuren zou niet gereduceerd zijn of zelfs meer uitgesproken zijn indien 
deelnemers selectieve aandacht besteden aan evaluatieve stimulusdimensies 
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tijdens een aandachtmanipulatietaak. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 voerden we twee experimenten uit waarin deelnemers 
voor- en afkeuren aanleerden via een evaluatieve conditioneringsprocedure. 
Geconditioneerde stimuli (i.e., CSs) bestonden uit abstracte Gabor patches die 
varieerden op basis van twee orthogonale, perceptuele stimuluskenmerken, i.e., 
oriëntatie en spatiale frequentie. Gedurende de acquisitiefase was één van deze 
perceptuele kenmerken voorspellend voor de evaluatieve toon van de 
ongeconditioneerde stimulus (i.e., US). Deelnemers werden dus aangemoedigd 
om selectieve aandacht te besteden aan dit perceptueel kenmerk. In een 
volgende extinctiefase werden de CSs alleen aangeboden. Deelnemers werden 
gevraagd om de CSs te categoriseren op basis van hun evaluatieve 
stimuluskenmerken (i.e., evaluatieve conditie), het stimuluskenmerk dat 
correleerde met valentie gedurende de acquisitiefase (i.e., de relevante 
conditie), of het stimuluskenmerk dat niet gerelateerd was met valentie 
gedurende de acquisitiefase (i.e., irrelevant conditie). Experiment 1 en 
Experiment 2 waren identiek behalve dat op het einde van Experiment 2 een 
directe maat van KSAA werd toegevoegd. We verwachtten uitdoving van voor- 
en afkeuren in de irrelevante conditie maar niet in de evaluatieve conditie. 
Omdat deelnemers in de relevante conditie gestimuleerd werden om selectieve 
aandacht te schenken aan een perceptueel stimuluskenmerk dat gecorreleerd 
was met valentie voorspelden we dat de uitdoving van voor- en afkeuren in deze 
conditie minder uitgesproken zou zijn dan in de irrelevante conditie. 
Conform onze hypothesen, observeerden we een lineaire reductie in het 
EC effect gemeten in een expliciete attitudemaat in functie van selectieve 
aandacht voor niet-evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken. In beide experimenten, 
stelden we uitdoving van voor- en afkeuren vast in de irrelevante conditie maar 
niet in de evaluatieve conditie of de relevante conditie. De impliciete 
attitudemaat in Experiment 1 bevestigde deze bevinding al was het lineaire 
effect net niet significant (p = .06). De resultaten van Experiment 2 suggereerden 
dat het effect van KSAA op impliciete maten van voor- en afkeuren afhankelijk is 
van de mate waarin de CSs duidelijke exemplaren van de experimentele 
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stimuluscategorieën zijn. Het effect van KSAA was significant in uitgesproken 
exemplaren maar niet in onuitgesproken exemplaren. In zowel Experiment 1 
(i.e., expliciete maat) als Experiment 2 (i.e., impliciete maat) observeerden we 
eveneens een significante stijging in de expressie van voor- en afkeuren in de 
evaluatieve conditie. Deze observatie is helemaal in overeenstemming met de 
hypothese dat de reactivatie van de emotionele connotatie van de CS, de 
verworven valentie van de CS kan versterken (zie Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 
1992). 
In Hoofdstuk 5 onderzochten we of KSAA ook een belangrijke moderator 
is in de uitdoving van voor- en afkeuren ten opzichte van angstopwekkende 
stimuli. Deelnemers kregen een serie positieve en negatieve stimuli te zien die 
varieerden op basis van twee orthogonale dimensies: valentie (positief versus 
negatief) en levendheid (levend versus object). Om voor- en afkeuren ten 
opzichte van angstopwekkende stimuli te onderzoeken, bevatte de categorie van 
negatieve, levende stimuli enkel afbeeldingen van spinnen. Gedurende een 
aandachtmanipulatiefase werden deelnemers gevraagd om stimuli te 
categoriseren op basis van hun valentie (i.e., evaluatieve conditie) of hun 
levendheid (i.e., semantische conditie). Deelnemers werden dus gestimuleerd 
om selectieve aandacht te schenken aan evaluatieve stimulusdimensies of niet-
evaluatieve semantische stimulusdimensies, respectievelijk. We voorspelden 
minder uitgesproken voor- en afkeuren in de semantische conditie in vergelijking 
met de evaluatieve conditie. 
In lijn met onze hypothese, waren voor- en afkeuren gemeten door een 
impliciete attitudemaat minder uitgesproken in de semantische conditie in 
vergelijking met de evaluatieve conditie. Dit effect generaliseerde naar nieuwe 
stimuli die niet werden aangeboden gedurende de aandachtmanipulatiefase. De 
expliciete maat bevestigde deze bevinding al was het effect niet significant (p = 
.12). We vonden echter geen verschil tussen de evaluatieve conditie en de 
semantische conditie in automatisch toenaderings- en vermijdingsgedrag 
gemeten door en relevant stimulus-respons compatibiliteittaak.  
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CONCLUSIE 
In het huidige doctoraatsproject onderzochten we systematisch of het 
meten en het veranderen van (impliciete) voor- en afkeuren afhankelijk was van 
kenmerk-specifieke aandachtallocatie. In een eerste onderzoekslijn 
onderzochten we de hypothese dat interindividuele verschillen in impliciete 
voor- en afkeuren het meest uitgesproken zijn onder condities die aandacht voor 
niet-evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken stimuleren. Dit onderzoek leverde 
gemengde resultaten op. In twee studies vonden we dat voorspellende validiteit 
het hoogst was in een evaluatieve primingtaak waarin selectieve aandacht voor 
niet-evaluatieve semantische stimuluskenmerken werd gemaximaliseerd in 
vergelijking met een evaluatieve primingtaak waarin selectieve aandacht voor 
evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken werd gemaximaliseerd. Een meta-analyse 
toonde echter geen enkel verschil aan in voorspellende validiteit tussen 
impliciete maten waarin selectieve aandacht voor evaluatieve semantische 
stimuluskenmerken werd gemaximaliseerd en impliciete maten waarin geen 
semantische verwerkingsdoel werd geïnduceerd. Niettemin, al deze studies 
gaven aan dat meer onderzoek naar de impact van persoonlijke relevantie van 
attitudeobjecten op de relatie tussen KSAA en voorspellende validiteit nodig is 
vooraleer er sterke claims kunnen gemaakt worden over de modererende rol van 
KSAA op de voorspellende validiteit van impliciete attitudematen.  
In een tweede onderzoekslijn vonden we evidentie voor de hypothese dat 
KSAA een modulerende rol speelt in het veranderen van voor- en afkeuren. 
Zowel recent verworven voor- en afkeuren als voor- en afkeuren ten opzichte 
van angstopwekkende stimuli waren minder uitgesproken onder condities 
waarin selectieve aandacht voor niet-evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken werd 
gestimuleerd. Voor- en afkeuren waren onveranderd of meer uitgesproken 
onder condities waarin selectieve aandacht voor evaluatieve stimuluskenmerken 
werd gestimuleerd. Verdere studies zijn echter nodig om de levensduur van dit 
effect, de onderliggende mechanismen en de therapeutische waarde ervan te 
onderzoeken. 
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 - [] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: -  
[X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: Analysis_multilevel.R 
 - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
 - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
 - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be  
interpreted. Specify: The ‘read_me’ file contains clear discriptions of all stored files and 
syntax for the raw data. 
 - [] other files. Specify:  
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
 - [X] individual PC 
 - [X] research group file server 
 - [ ] other: ...   
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
 - [X] main researcher 
 - [X] responsible ZAP 
 - [X] all members of the research group 
 - [ ] all members of UGent 
 - [ ] other (specify): ...  
   
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
  - name:  
  - address:  
  - affiliation:  
  - e-mail:  
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
% Name/identifier study: Chapter 4: Extinction of recently acquired likes and dislikes 
% Author: Jolien Vanaelst 
% Date: 28/4/2016 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jolien Vanaelst 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Jolien.Vanaelst@Ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Adriaan.Spruyt@Ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email 
to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Chapter 4 of PhD 
dissertation: Extinction of recently acquired likes and dislikes 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: the sheet applies to all 
the data used in the publication 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
 - [X] researcher PC 
 - [X] research group file server 
 - [X] research group file server via DICT 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
 - [X] main researcher 
 - [X] responsible ZAP 
 - [X] all members of the research group 
 - [ ] all members of UGent 
 - [ ] other (specify): ... 
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3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
 - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
Information is available in the files: Aggregate_experiment1.r and 
Aggregate_experiment2.R for experiment 1 and 2, respectively 
 - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: full1.txt and full2.text: resulting output 
for experiment 1 and 2, respectively. These files can also be obtained by running the R 
scripts. 
 - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: analyse.experiment1.R and 
analyse.experiment2.R for experiment 1 and 2,respectively 
 - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
 - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
 - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: The 'read_me' file contains clear discriptions of all stored files and 
syntax used for the aggregated dataset 'full.txt' and the raw data, respectively. 
 - [X] other files. Specify: The files 'footnote3_experiment1.R and 
footnote3_experiment2.R' contain the code for the analyses described in footnote 3. 
   
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
 - [X] individual PC 
 - [X] research group file server 
 - [ ] other: ...   
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
 - [X] main researcher 
 - [X] responsible ZAP 
 - [X] all members of the research group 
 - [ ] all members of UGent 
 - [ ] other (specify): ...   
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
  - name:  
  - address:  
  - affiliation:  
  - e-mail:  
  
DATA STORAGE FACT SHEET  237 
 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
% Name/identifier study: Chapter 5: Implicit evaluations as a function of Feature-Specific 
attention allocation 
% Author: Jolien Vanaelst 
% Date: 28/4/2016 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jolien Vanaelst 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Jolien.Vanaelst@Ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Adriaan Spruyt 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Adriaan.Spruyt@Ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email 
to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Vanaelst, J., Spruyt, 
A., & De Houwer, J. (2016). How to modify (implicit) evaluations of fear-related stimuli: 
Effects of feature-specific attention allocation. Frontiers in Psychology: Psychopathology 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: the sheet applies to all 
the data used in the publication 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
 - [X] researcher PC 
 - [X] research group file server 
 - [X] research group file server via DICT 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
 - [X] main researcher 
 - [X] responsible ZAP 
 - [X] all members of the research group 
 - [ ] all members of UGent 
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 - [ ] other (specify): ... 
   
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
 - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
Information is available in the files: Aggregate_JV_2015_8.R 
 - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: full.txt: resulting output. This file can also 
be obtained by running the R script. 
 - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: Analyse_JV_2015_8 
 - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
 - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
 - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: The 'read_me' file contains clear discriptions of all stored files and 
syntax used for the aggregated dataset 'full.txt' and the raw data. 
 - [X] other files. Specify: The file 'stim_ratings' contains ratings for the stimuli used in 
the experiment. The files 'Reliability_AMP.R' and 'Reliability_RSCR.R' contain code for 
computing the reliability of the AMP and RSCR-task, respectively 
 
   
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
 - [X] individual PC 
 - [X] research group file server 
 - [ ] other: ...   
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
 - [X] main researcher 
 - [X] responsible ZAP 
 - [X] all members of the research group 
 - [ ] all members of UGent 
 - [ ] other (specify): ...   
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
  - name:  
  - address:  
  - affiliation:  
  - e-mail:  
